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During the time this book was written, from its inception as a graduate 
school paper, to a dissertation, to its completed form, I worked as an 
adjunct instructor at five different universities. Writing a book while 
working as a precarious adjunct university employee can be an awkward 
and difficult experience. While many books contain statements of all the 
institutional support the scholar received, for an adjunct struggling to 
write while surviving by juggling whatever teaching positions they may 
find, and without a stable response to the question asked at conferences 
“what school are you affiliated with?” it is a complicated task to write a 
list of those who helped you through the process. This is due to the fact 
that adjunct instructors are generally treated as economic calculations 
on a spreadsheet, names to fill classes, and faceless figures floating in 
and out of departments. More broadly, the adjunctification of university 
teachers has reached a crisis point as well over two-thirds of faculty, in 
the US case, are some form of precarious labor. This is the result of the 
adoption of the business model of the university which puts money and 
“impact factor” over the education of students. And the dominance of 
precarious work in academic life has hit instructors in socially marginal-
ized positions the hardest, whether it be due to structural discrimination 
based upon gender or race, class discrimination against those who could 
not afford elite universities, or simply the pushing aside of scholars 
working outside of the mainstream. 
That being said, I would like to thank the Filson Historical Society 
for providing me with funding to dig through their archives. Working 
with Pluto Press has also been a refreshing experience in what can be an 
alienated world of publishing, and David Castle and Neda Tehrani have 
been especially helpful in supporting this book to see the light of day. 
This work could not have been written without the support of my 
dissertation adviser, Fred Deyo, who took the time to figure out what I 
was trying to argue, even in messy and incipient forms, and understood 
the relationship between the research itself and the material conditions 
under which it was written. I could not have survived those difficult 
years at Binghamton University without the help and guidance of Linda 
acknowledgements . vii
Zanrucha and Denise Spadine, two of the most hard working and 
important members of the sociology department, and everyone else 
who expressed solidarity over the years in which this book was written. 
During this time, Walden Bello also supported my pre-dissertation 
work, and Ana Candela went out of her way to support my progress. It 
is sometimes difficult to draw a line between intellectual and emotional 
support, and in this regard, Ege Özen, Sinem Silay Özen, and Alper 
Ecevit worked to make sure I did not lose my cıvık-ness (humor) after 
spending countless hours studying the depressing history of the United 
States. Babyrani Yumnam also contributed to this project in untold ways, 
often resulting in a large pile of books on the dinner table.  I am thankful 
to the many other people who helped make this work possible. These 
include, in no particular order: Bengü Kurtege-Sefer, Akın Sefer, Deepan 
Ghimiray, Raju Huidrom, Katie Drouin, Nilufer Akalin, Kai Yang, Busra 
Ferligul, Mushahid Hussain, Alvin Camba, Nilay Ozok- Gündoğan, Azat 
Zana Gündoğan, and everyone else who expressed solidarity through 
those years of collective suffering. 
From my days at York University in Toronto, Sean Starrs always kept 
me motivated with his unrestrained enthusiasm, as he continues to do 
so. Geoff McCormack’s patience, thoughtfulness, and honesty has also 
served as a model for how to be both a thorough scholar and a decent 
human being, something that often gets lost in the world of academic 
egoism. Thanks also to Leo Panitch who supervised my master’s thesis 
all those years ago, and has continued to support my progress through 
the academic world. I am also indebted to Brad Bauerly who took the 
time to read the project in its dissertation form in its entirety.
Going back to my undergraduate days at The Evergreen State College, 
thanks to Ellis Scharfenaker and Thomas Herndon for our jam sessions 
and discussions of Marxism and political economy, and to Philip Spencer 
for his unusual patience in reading and discussing. Adam Kohut also 
left a lasting political imprint on me, and remains a motivating force in 
pushing me to consider different ways of organizing work and social life. 
Special thanks to Alan Nasser for introducing me to the labor theory of 
value and opening my eyes as a young undergraduate.
Santino Regilme’s practical wisdom has also guided me through the 
challenges of the publishing industry, and his good humor, combined 
with his sharp mind, helped to keep me moving forward. Sam Allingham 
has also served as a model writer-activist due to his unrelenting optimism 
and faith in the face of the uphill battle to organize contingent faculty. 
viii . how america became capitalist
My bartender, Nice Guy Nate, also deserves gratitude for keeping our 
glasses full and our minds just soggy enough to sprout new ideas. 
Ken Baker’s humility was an inspiration for what a researcher and 
teacher should be. Tynesha Davis introduced me to new ideas and exem-
plified the passion necessary to make social change happen. Neither are 
here to read this book, but I hope you both would have liked it. 
Thank you to my Turkish family, Ayşe, Ilker, and Cem Tanır, Sirin 
Ozgun, and most importantly Yasemin and Leyla. And of course to my 
American family, too many to name, so I will leave it at “you know who 
you are.” Finally, this project would not exist were it not for my grand-
parents, to whom I am grateful: Betty and Bob Jones, Ron and Virginia 
Parisot, J.P. and Sue Quinn, and Bob and Alice Glasgow. 
Most importantly of all, I thank Canan Tanır, whose ever critical mind 
has pushed me to take this book further than I would have been able to 
otherwise. Her presence pushes me to be a better scholar and a better 
person in ways words fail to capture. 
On the Prospect of 
Planting Arts and Learning in America 
 
The Muse, disgusted at an age and clime 
Barren of every glorious theme, 
In distant lands now waits a better time, 
Producing subjects worthy fame. 
 
In happy climes, where from the genial sun 
And virgin earth such scenes ensue, 
The force of art by nature seems outdone, 
And fancied beauties by the true; 
 
In happy climes, the seat of innocence, 
Where nature guides and virtue rules, 
Where men shall not impose for truth and sense 
The pedantry of courts and schools: 
 
There shall be sung another golden age, 
The rise of empire and of arts, 
The good and great inspiring epic rage, 
The wisest heads and noblest hearts. 
 
Not such as Europe breeds in her decay; 
Such as she bred when fresh and young, 
When heavenly flame did animate her clay, 
By future poets shall be sung. 
 
Westward the course of empire takes its way; 
The four first Acts already past, 
A fifth shall close the Drama with the day; 
Time’s noblest offspring is the last.
George Berkeley, 17281

Introduction: The Embrace of Empire
The phrase “westward the course of empire takes its way” originated in a 
poem by George Berkeley, who lived in Rhode Island from the late 1720s 
to early 1730s. The poem celebrated colonization as the advancement of 
human civilization and as the next step in the intellectual and geographi-
cal progress of western society. By the time of the Civil War, northerners 
had embraced the motto as part of their struggle against southern 
secession. In 1862, for example, Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze completed 
his painting Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way for the US 
Capitol.1 In many respects, his painting represents the typical image of 
American expansion: masculine pioneers, chopping down trees, charting 
the territory of future empire, while their wives and children follow to 
tame and populate the virginally gendered ecology. At the top a man 
stands reconnoitering the mountainous terrain while another climbs to 
hoist the American flag, forging the path of empire. In the middle of 
the painting is a black man—liberated from the chains of slavery—who 
can find freedom through empire, yet is subordinate to the white men 
charting the course.2 And the pro-union newspaper out of Marysville, 
Kansas, The Big Blue Union, for instance, announced each issue with 
“westward the course of empire takes its way!” directly below the title 
of the paper itself. Its editor for a time, Edwin Manning, future member 
of the Kansas State House of Representatives, was personally invested in 
both empire and capitalism. Among other exploits, he founded the town 
of Winfield, Kansas with the hopes of selling land to make a profit. Like 
many of the white settlers who built the west, Manning was someone 
whose life reflected both profit and empire.3
The idea and imagery of empire was historically embraced by 
Americans from the founding of the post-Revolutionary state through 
the nineteenth century.4 The unprecedented pace of human expansion 
underlying this was observed by travelers such as Joseph John Gurney 
who explored Ohio in the early 1840s, noticing “undoubtedly the most 
interesting and surprising circumstance which engaged my attention, 
during this journey on the main route to the westward, was the unpar-
alleled scene of movement—all in one direction—of which we were 
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witness. ‘Westward, westward speed thy way,’ seemed to be the common 
motto.”5 And as another commentator put it, regarding expansion past 
the Alleghenies, “so rapid has been the emigration into that section of the 
Union, and so sudden its transformation from barbarism to refinement, 
that it seems rather the effect of magical power, than of human exertions, 
operating in the ordinary way.”6 
But this seemingly magic-fueled empire was not always guided by 
the power of profit-seeking capitalists. While capitalist interests were 
involved in colonial adventures in North America from the start, as 
joint-stock companies funded the transportation of populations across 
the ocean with hopes to profit from white-settler colonization, the 
history of American expansion is not simply a linear story of a transition 
from a non-capitalist to a capitalist society. Rather, the first two and 
a half centuries of American expansion are a circuitous tale, in which 
historically specific and unique social relations were built which often 
defy strict binary notions of “capitalism” or “non-capitalism.” While 
land speculators and fur trappers and traders may have moved west 
seeking profits, other settlers relocated in order to escape the pressures 
of capitalism which pulled them from their freedom and autonomy and 
forced them into a system of dependence, revolutionizing their mode of 
production and habits of social life. 
This book tells the story of how a society with capitalism became a 
capitalist society.7 On the one hand, capitalist aspects existed from the 
earliest colonial days and continued to develop so that, by the 1830s, one 
traveler could write, “there is probably no people on earth with whom 
business constitutes pleasure, and industry amusement, in an equal 
degree with the inhabitants of the United States of America … business 
is the very soul of an American.”8 On the other hand, this same author 
could also say “an American prefers cultivating the smallest patch of his 
own to working on the largest farm of his neighbors, and rather emigrates 
further to the west than consent to become, in any manner or degree, 
dependent on his fellow-beings.”9 While part of the soul of an American 
may have been business, for many settlers, westward movement was a 
way to escape rising relations of capitalist dependence in the east. These 
settlers were not opposed to participating in market relations but they 
were reluctant to embrace a lifestyle of absolute market dependence. In 
the long run, though, capitalism did come to dominate and control the 
American population as the accumulation of capital penetrated into 
each and every aspect of daily life and the concept of what it meant to 
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be a free American shifted to accommodate wage labor dependency as a 
life-long, normalized condition.
Overall, if there has been one constant in this messy history of social 
change, from the colonization of Jamestown to the global corporate, 
banking, and military empire the United States sustains today, it was 
what William Appleman Williams called “empire as a way of life.”10 
Historically, empire was thought of as something to celebrate. And at 
certain moments in US history debate over the term has reappeared. 
Talk of American imperialism, for instance, was rekindled during the 
Vietnam War and during the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq.11 But more commonly today “imperialism” is replaced with “inter-
vention” as the United States “spreads democracy,” just as European 
colonialists supposedly spread “civilization” at the expense of the lives 
of millions of victims of colonialism. In other cases, “empire” is replaced 
with “hegemony” and “leadership” or, at best, “informal empire,” as 
soft-power and consent building are seen as the central characteristics 
of American power domestically and internationally. But, if anything, 
the idea of American power as hegemonic in a sense similar to Antonio 
Gramsci’s definition—a dominant power engaging in consent building by 
presenting its interests as the universal interest—historically underem-
phasizes both the role of violence in the last seven decades of American 
global domination, and, as significantly, the centrality of empire as a 
central social and cultural aspect of American life from the start.12 
From Western films depicting “cowboys versus Indians” and the 
continual reproduction of an image of “the west” as a harsh and volatile—
yet mostly empty—space claimed triumphantly by white frontiersmen, 
to today’s reproduction of imperial tropes through video games such as 
Call of Duty, films including American Sniper, or television ads recruiting 
young men to join the military as a way of fulfilling their masculine 
fantasies, Americans have always celebrated empire either directly, or in 
a fetishized, obscured form. To be an American patriot is to support the 
spread of freedom. This freedom was found through Andrew Jackson’s 
use of violence to tame the supposed uncivilized indigenous peoples and 
through practically countless foreign interventions, from the invasion of 
the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century to the Bush Admin-
istration’s Iraq War to Obama’s drone strikes, and beyond. To, say, live in 
the United States and not support American imperialism, albeit often 
clothed as a sheep, is to be un-American and a traitor to the nation. To 
criticize American power and society, at its roots, is supposedly to miss 
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the point of freedom. And, after all, if you don’t like it in America, its 
defenders chant, you can leave. And for those outside the highly policed 
borders of the United States, well, you are just jealous of “our” freedom. 
Although its forms and meanings have changed—from Washington 
and Jefferson to Obama and Trump—imperialism has maintained its 
position as a mainstay of American life and US power. American consent 
building, domestically and abroad, has always rested on American 
military and police might, and, most centrally, the fact that imperial-
ism is deeply embedded in the culture of society. Imperialism is not 
simply a political practice, it is a practice of daily life within American 
society, reaching down into the deepest roots of what it means to be “an 
American.” 
The purpose of this book is to partially excavate the historical depth of 
this. To this day, many studies of American imperialism tend to focus on 
the top down—as if imperialism is a political-economic practice—rather 
than a pattern of daily life. And while some work has been done over the 
last two decades examining the culture of imperialism, the question of 
the relationship between capitalism and empire building from below has 
been left relatively open.13 In this context, the specific goal of this book 
is to examine the history of capitalism and empire in (what became) the 
United States and, in that, to locate how capitalist imperialism became a 
dominant factor in the structure of American power. 
My method to accomplish this is to present an interpretation of the 
US’ 250-year transition to capitalism. By showing the uneven social 
forms involved in the history of American expansion I aim to document 
how, from the early colonies through the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
the social relations underlying and driving empire building shifted. My 
focus on western expansion also allows the narrative to investigate the 
way empire formed as a racialized and gendered project. The American 
transition to capitalism as the dominant force organizing social life 
and the incorporation of further western territories into the American 
Empire were part of the same historical process. This is not to say empire 
simply “caused” capitalism or capitalism “caused” empire, exactly, in a 
general sense, although by the last phase of continental expansion capital 
did play the leading role shaping empire’s form. Rather, the shape of each 
developed through an internal historical relation with the other. The goal 
in this book is to show the complexity of how these relations took shape. 
By the 1870s empire was essentially, although perhaps not completely, 
driven by capitalist interests. The logics and patterns of capitalism and 
introduction: the embrace of empire . 5
empire had fully merged. Capital subsumed empire to its own histor-
ically specific imperial forms as the west became a space for capital to 
remake its own image with the labor of a multiracial working class. 
The broad aim of this project comes out of an attempt to draw from 
the legacy of historical sociology going back to Marx and Weber and 
their struggles to understand what might be unique about capitalism by 
studying how it came into being. But to develop a relatively comprehen-
sive interpretation of a two and a half century-long story would take a 
lifetime or two. Therefore, to organize a project of such historical scope 
but, at the same time, manageable focus, this book highlights particular 
states (in the making) as, in a way, case studies to demonstrate aspects 
of the larger thesis the book develops. The result may be a book that 
raises as many questions as it solves, and leaves open avenues for future 
research as much as it fills them in. 
Additionally, while much of the narrative is based upon a state by state 
analysis, I do not mean to claim, by any means, that history happens 
“in” states. Capitalism emerged as an international system, just as the 
history of even, say, the Missouri frontier was shaped through broadly 
interconnected social processes linked on a world scale. Organizing the 
book this way was primarily a method to make a complex and huge story 
manageable to write, and to help focus the narrative on the interrelations 
of white settlers and empire. The interpretation of history presented here 
may also come across as messy and circuitous and that is, simply, because 
history is more often than not a disorganized and chaotic process. 
Capitalism in the United States did not emerge because of its incorpora-
tion into the world market, nor was solely it the product, exactly, of the 
unintended consequences of a clearly delineated class struggle. Locating 
class positions on the American frontier and expanding west, alone, 
tends to be complicated by the problem of class fluidity. The stories of 
individual settlers were often stories of class mobility, or overlapping 
and continually shifting class positions wherein families were squeezed 
between clear-cut class lines. White settlers’ day-to-day decisions over 
several decades often found them, at the end of this, in a position in 
which capitalism had a greater degree of control over their life than 
before this process. 
The argument presented here may also challenge currently existing 
disciplinary boundaries. Here I want to suggest a critique of some of what 
might fall into the contemporary structure of academic “professional-
ism.” As Marx famously demonstrated, knowledge is never separate from 
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material power relations, and reflects the ideology of the social power 
relations underlying its production. Historical knowledge is produced 
for different reasons—more often than not as nationalist knowledge to 
legitimate state power—and is generally divided, periodized, and com-
partmentalized by the ways that historians segment, regulate, police, 
and professionalize their division of labor. In other words, research 
does not just fill gaps in a literature, but is shaped by the power relations 
that shape the social sciences in themselves. For a scholar to find their 
place in “the discipline,” then, means to follow the boundaries of a par-
ticular specialization or, at best, engage in “interdisciplinary” research 
which in most cases does not actually challenge these divides but simply 
combines them into countless sub-areas. Particularly in the age of neo-
liberalism, social scientific research is organized by the ways researchers 
brand and market themselves as a specific type of commodity, say, an 
“early American historian” or a “southern historian” or a “constitutional 
historian” or a “social historian,” and so on. And this professionalized 
compartmentalization, reinforced by the elitist, prestige and status-based 
culture of the academy, tends to obscure the long and complex history 
of capitalism.
But as Fernand Braudel discussed many decades ago, historical 
time has many layers, from the day-to-day events we read about in the 
newspaper to the deep, long-standing structures of history that shape 
our lives in ways we are often not aware of or, in the case of capitalism, 
tend to naturalize.14 Overly fragmenting history can block the advance-
ment of our understanding of the history of capitalism as a deeply 
embedded social order that does not necessarily fit into clearly deline-
ated conceptual and temporal boxes. In this way, the methodology and 
temporal scale of this book may hope to act as a call to problematize and 
rethink these divisions and the material power and status relations which 
underlie them.15 
In this context, the overarching theme of this book is one of multi-linear 
complexity. If we draw our patterns and frameworks too tightly upon 
history’s turbulent and tumultuous randomness and irrationality, then 
we end up creating neat looking abstractions against history’s complex 
layers, as can sometimes be the tendency of sociologists. But if we take 
history as a disorganized jumble, as is sometimes the case with historians, 
then the connections between past and present, and, most significantly, 
the story of capitalism, can become lost. This book presents one way to 
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address this problem, albeit not necessarily the “best” way if ever such a 
thing might exist. 
Imperialism: the birth of a concept
For the so-called founding fathers, who built a state on the backs 
of African slaves and working class immigrants, empire was seen as 
something positive. For South Carolina Chief Justice William Henry 
Drayton, writing a case for American independence in 1776, all empires, 
from Rome to Britain, were destined to rise and fall. The next step in 
history was the rise of American Empire; a space of freedom and inde-
pendence from the tyranny of Britain’s cage. As he put it, “the Almighty 
setteth up; and he casteth down: He breaks the Sceptre, and transfers 
the Dominion: He has made Choice of the present Generation to erect 
the American Empire.”16 The idea and imagery of empire, drawing from 
influences heralding back to ancient Greece and Rome, shaped the 
physical and intellectual architecture of the country: Manifest Destiny, it 
would later be called. And even by the middle of the nineteenth century 
empire was still seen through a positive lens. It was, essentially, through 
the advancement of civilization that native populations were destroyed, 
replaced by the bright white light of American Empire so that:
whatever colour poetry may lend to the removal of the Indians, it is, 
nevertheless, but the removal of a sick bed from a place where death is 
certain, to one from which it is more remote. Neither is it the death of 
youth or of manhood, but that of old age and decrepitude, which the 
Indian is doomed to die; and in his mouldering ashes germinates the 
seed of empires, destined to change the world.17 
But something changed. Over time the categories of imperialism and 
empire shifted meaning. Through the 1800s the word imperialism began 
to take on negative connotations, so that empire became seen as a thing 
of the past: something nation-states advanced beyond, even if, in reality, 
the practice of empire remained. 
In what remains the most detailed study of the history of the concept 
of imperialism by Richard Koebner it was argued that “the word impe-
rialism was introduced into the English language as a gloss on a regime 
which had been established in France. It indicated the various—and in 
English eyes often dubious—ways by which the Empire of Napoleon 
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maintained its hold on the French during the period 1852–1870.”18 It 
is said this is when “imperial” became an ism.19 But in fact references to 
imperialism in the case of American history go back further than this. 
The term can be found in American newspapers as far back as the 1830s, 
if not earlier. In 1837, for example, the Morning Herald, a short-lived 
New York City newspaper, contains a column with a letter which states, 
“if these lines meet the eye of one now enthroned in American imperial-
ism of political power, he may bid you beware of further publications.”20 
While in the American context “imperial” itself was a term regularly 
used, often in reference to China and various other world powers, impe-
rialism also appears in the mid-1840s not in reference to France, but the 
Mexican Empire. As an 1844 piece in the New-York Daily Tribune says, 
Mexico, newly emancipated, and too inexperienced to use her wealth 
discreetly, was reeling to and fro in the intoxication of Freedom, 
and lavishing her resources on every hand with blind and careless 
profusion. She was making her experiment in Imperialism, when 
Austin appeared in the Capitol, and he found Iturbide on the throne.21 
For the author, imperialism refers to the reign of Iturbide who was 
emperor of Mexico after its independence. The concept, in other words, 
describes a concentration of power. 
Following this, imperialism would become used in reference to 
Napoleon III’s centralization of power. As one Washington, DC newspaper 
reported regarding France in 1848, “the chief subject of discussion in 
political circles, and the source of serious alarm to the republican parties, 
is the diffusion of the spirit of imperialism throughout the country, 
but more especially in the army.”22 And the Evansville Daily Journal 
reported “since his election Imperialism had spread to an alarming 
extent throughout the country.”23 References to Napoleon’s imperial-
ism continued through the next several decades. In 1859, for example, 
several newspapers including Louisiana’s The Sentinel printed an article 
by Italian political figure Giuseppe Mazzini. In it he warned against the 
spread of imperialism throughout Europe, stating, “the life of the Empire 
in France requires the triumph of imperialism in Europe.”24 And in 1865 
another paper reports, “they know that the Emperor Napoleon is, by 
choice, both in literature and the more earnest world of fact, the great 
defender of imperialism in Europe.”25 Continuing, in June of 1869 The 
Daily Evening Telegraph of Philadelphia carried an article on the tension 
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between imperialism and liberalism in the Bonaparte regime. It argued 
“imperialism is assailable on every side, and the Emperor will ever feel 
the ground sinking from under his feet, and the fruits of his policy turn 
to ashes in his grasp. In attempting to reconcile Liberalism and Imperial-
ism, he has not succeeded on either side.”26 In these contexts, imperialism 
still tends to refer not to, say, colonization or expansion, so much as the 
tendency of a political leader to centralize power upward. 
From here, the category began to develop its own American charac-
teristics. Imperialism, it was now believed, was not simply a European 
phenomenon: Americans risked becoming dominated by an imperi-
alist state at home. Specifically, Reconstruction was seen as a form of 
Republican Party imperialism against a defeated south, with President 
Ulysses Grant representing the American version of Napoleon. As one 
newspaper reports in 1874, 
this is an outgrowth of Republican rule, and of Grantism, which 
controls the party organization. It is a step in the direction of Imperi-
alism, which Louis Napoleon illustrated when he threw off the mask 
of simplicity as a republican president and seized absolute power by a 
corrupt conspiracy of adventurers not unlike some who are now flour-
ishing in Washington.27 
And another paper goes so far as to title an article “The Fifteenth 
Amendment. A Blow at the Organic Structure of the States and in the 
Interests of Imperialism.”28 The Fifteenth Amendment, giving former 
slaves the right to vote, was seen as an imperialist policy because it 
destroyed the federal character of the American government and 
replaced it with a centralized form of imperialism as the north forced 
its policies upon the rest of the country. Anti-Republican papers would 
continue to equate Grant with imperialism through the 1870s and start 
of the 1880s. The Nashville Union and American, for instance, titled an 
article “Imperialism of the Grant Administration,” suggesting “some of 
the Republican journals are growing somewhat restive and excited under 
the demonstration of the imperialism of the Grant administration.”29 
And in 1880 one report stated, “General Hancock stands prominently 
forward as a man upon whom all true lovers of law and constitutional 
liberty can unite, as against centralism, imperialism, Grantism.”30 Joseph 
Pulitzer also wrote on the topic in this era, suggesting imperialism is 
“injustice, inequality, class distinctions, privileges to the few, wrong to 
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the many, corruption and venality, but above all—fraudulent one-man 
power.”31 Thus, imperialism continued to refer to the concentration of 
corrupt political power. 
In the 1890s the meaning of the term continued to transform as 
American expansion culminated in the Spanish-American War. Impe-
rialism no longer referred to the tendency of governmental power to 
centralize, but American expansion abroad and the domination of 
colonized populations. As J.H. Tyndale wrote in 1899, “for all practical 
purposes imperialism and militarism are synonymous terms. Imperial-
ism means to conquer with … sword and militarism to hold by brutal 
force.”32 This definition signifies what imperialism came to mean: to 
dominate another population and overpower them with violence. Or as 
The Commoner put it, “imperialism is the polite term used to describe 
wholesale killing and grand larceny.”33 
Some commentators also began to link imperialism with commer-
cialism and trusts. As Norman Etherington points out, this may also 
be due to the fact that American newspapers such as Boston’s United 
States Investor were actually calling for expansion and imperialism as 
a way to solve domestic problems of overproduction at the turn of the 
century.34 And as Walter LaFeber famously discussed, the closing of the 
frontier at the end of the 1800s created a panic among some American 
intellectuals and political leaders who called for expansion as a way to 
solve the country’s economic problems.35 In many ways those critical of 
imperialism took their arguments from politicians and capitalists who, 
themselves, were advocating expansion as a way to solve problems of 
overproduction and economic slowdown domestically. These arguments 
were given form clearly by Charles Conant who stated, 
the writer is not an advocate of “imperialism” from sentiment, but 
does not fear the name if it means only that the United States shall 
assert their right to free markets in all the old countries which are 
being opened to the surplus resources of the capitalistic countries and 
thereby given the benefits of modern civilization.36 
In other words, the United States needed to expand internationally and 
invest abroad to prevent its own crisis of over-savings. Imperialism was 
not necessarily an evil. Against this, by 1900 H. Gaylord Wilshire created 
an early socialist theory of capitalist imperialism.37 He argued that the 
root of imperialism was American trusts damming up the domestic 
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economy in the search for profits.38 He developed this idea further over 
the next year, soon after writing, “‘imperialism’ is a means of diverting to 
foreign shores this threatening deluge of domestic ‘savings.’”39 
By the turn of the century the political embrace of American impe-
rialism had started to go out of fashion, as even those who positively 
employed the concept tended to do so with reservation. And gradually 
in this context Americans would no longer present their “democratic 
experiment” as an empire. Imperialism led to the thirty years’ war of 
1914–45. Post-colonial movements emerged globally in the ashes of 
Europe’s implosion and the collapse of aggressive Japanese nationalism. 
Following this, the United States supposedly became a leader ruling 
through consent rather than coercion, and supporting decolonization 
at the expense of the European empires. We are said to have moved 
from a world of empires into a world of nation-states. Globalization 
would integrate the world and, at least in theory, as liberal perspec-
tives on international power suggest, states that are incorporated into 
dense market networks lose the motivation to go to war. With China’s 
transition to capitalism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the spread 
of global neoliberalism, the poor of the world were to be elevated while 
the rich also succeeded: everyone would supposedly be a winner in the 
eyes of capital. Of course, following 2008 the global economy was driven 
to the precipice of collapse and a decade later a new leader has emerged, 
President Donald Trump, with a plan to “make America great again.” 
Acceptance of racial equality and the embrace of gender diversity are 
threats to white Americans, who see their historical privilege under 
threat. A new president, driven by popular support for xenophobia and 
racism, has come to power, claiming to be able to protect the American 
way of life by closing the border to immigrants. But while the ideology 
of imperialism may have shifted, hiding its form, the practice of imperi-
alism remains. 
Defining capitalism
Central to this book is the concept of capitalism. Capitalism is a sticky 
term. On the one hand, it is necessary to define it as clearly and succinctly 
as possible. After all, if scholars and activists claim to be studying, or 
even fighting, capitalism, it must be possible that there is some general 
agreement on what it is, exactly. On the other hand, many greatly 
differing definitions exist, giving way to seemingly endless dispute. In 
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a sense it may be the case that, while it is necessary to define capitalism, 
at the same time, no definition or abstract analysis of the system’s inner 
logic or “laws of motion” will be able to capture the complexity—and 
most importantly great diversity—of its historical forms. 
For the purposes of this book, though, I define capitalism as a social 
order in which practically all aspects of social life are organized around 
capital accumulation and the extraction of surplus value from a variety 
of labor forms. Capital, as Marx pointed out, is value in motion generated 
through the exploitation of workers.40 The heart of capitalism lies in the 
relations of production, in essence, the organization of labor and ways 
in which value in produced. The approach used here, though, differs 
somewhat from Marx’s work in Capital in that it suggests, historically, 
capitalists have always utilized a wide variety of labor forms that defy the 
abstract binary of “free” and “unfree” labor.41 The making of capitalist 
labor relations, additionally, went along with the invention of race and 
remaking of gender relations.42 In this regard, one of the themes of this 
book is to uncover the complexities of the ways that ever-changing 
constructs of gender—both within and beyond the household—trans-
formed with the rise of capitalism. 
Methodologically, the book is grounded in a historical materialist 
perspective in which “levels of abstraction” are continually expanded to 
move towards a broader whole. Conceptually, I also keep in mind the 
problem of reification, that is, the replacement of historical data with 
theoretical constructs. Marxist historiography contains a tendency to 
build models and impose them upon history, in so doing violence to 
history itself.43 Many years ago Jean-Paul Sartre pointed this out when 
he suggested many variants of Marxism have engaged in apriorism. This 
means that “it [vulgar Marxism] has already formed its concepts; it is 
already certain of their truth; it will assign to them the role of consti-
tutive schemata. Its sole purpose is to force the events, the persons, or 
the acts considered into pre-fabricated molds.”44 Or as E.P. Thompson 
phrased it another way, capitalism does not necessarily have any timeless 
or essential laws or rules of reproduction: “in my view, subsequent 
historical materialism has not found this kind of ‘organism’, working out 
its own self-fulfillment with inexorable idealist logic, nor has it found 
any society which can simply be described as ‘capital in the totality of its 
relations.’”45 My approach follows Jairus Banaji’s call for historical mate-
rialism to stay continually open to the complexities of history against 
the tendency to box history in as, for example, perspectives that locate 
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capitalism’s origins in the sixteenth-century English countryside or, in 
another way, the view of capitalism as a strictly defined “world-system” 
tend to.46 I do not claim the definition of capitalism as used here as a 
universal definition that potentially captures all of capitalism’s history; 
in a sense, Marx’s process of abstraction calls for the continual redefi-
nition of categories as the analysis proceeds, and suggests staying open 
to further refined category clarification. But it does provide a particular 
working lens through which the history of the remaking of social 
relations towards dominance by capital from below as well as above may 
be seen. 
This book also goes against the dominant “market revolution” 
approach in early American historiography in that it sees the social 
dynamics of particular market relations constituted by the social 
relations which underlie them.47 Thus, “the market” is not something 
that has a life of its own, but is built through human labor and takes 
different historical forms depending upon the way the class relations 
underlying and structuring market relations are organized. In other 
words, the market revolution, and the ways in which social life became 
incorporated into relations of exchange, in the American case, has an 
overlapping but not necessarily simultaneous history with the capitalist 
revolution in which the logic of accumulation—rooted in social relations 
of production—became the dominant force guiding social development 
and colonial and imperial expansion. 
My argument also goes against the idea that plantation slavery was not 
capitalist.48 Southern American capitalist slavery was characterized by 
increasing productivity and technological advancement, from the cotton 
gin to the cross breeding of seeds, rational accounting, the hiring out of 
slaves if it proved more profitable than holding them—to keep capital 
in motion—a large-scale interstate slave trade, and a constant push to 
expand geographically: imperialism in pursuit of profit.49 The primary 
difference with wage labor-based capitalism is that, instead of purchasing 
the temporary labor power of a worker, the capitalist purchases the entire 
life of the worker themselves. In addition to slavery, the narrative con-
structed here also attempts to locate the wide variety of labor forms 
capital subordinated historically including plantation slaves, hired slaves, 
tenant farmers, indentured servants, wage workers, and so on. 
In conclusion, in this book capitalism is seen as theoretically definable 
at a particular level of abstraction as the point thereafter when capital 
restructures relations of production themselves. But capitalism is only 
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truly definable through historical interpretation itself. Simply put, 
capitalism is not a definition but the concrete history, the complexities of 
which, and the labor forms and, more broadly, forms of power involved, 
defy closely knit, tight sounding definitions imposed upon history. This 
does not mean that no definition is necessary, or history can be told 
without theory. But it simply means that the goal of this book is not to 
develop a universal conception of capitalism or make a complete theo-
retical typology of its features, but to show how it historically came into 
being in its messiness and complexity and changed the lives of those who 
were gradually subsumed to its logic. In other words, my goal is to locate 
and bring out the grey areas in the history of capitalism which defy easy 
classification in order to challenge existing narratives as well as provide 
an alternative to them. 
Defining empire
I define a capitalist empire as a structure of power overdetermined by the 
power of capital accumulation in which an often but not necessarily cen-
tralized political-economic system with diffuse, relatively autonomous 
arms, and containing expansive formal and informal tendencies along a 
continuum, controls, regulates, and dominates diverse populations and 
polities through a wide variety of methods of social control including the 
hegemonic construction of consent, creation and reproduction of racial 
hierarchy, regulation of patriarchal gender norms, and support for class 
inequality and exploitation. Capitalist empires differ from states in that 
states tend to be the central regulating political bodies of empires, but 
empires are generally broader structures than states in themselves. For 
example, the global British Empire was something larger than the British 
national state, just as in the American Empire the state plays a role of 
regulator of national and global capitalism, but corporations and banks 
contain their own co-constitutive logics and expansionary tendencies.50 
In other words, just as the British East India Company was initially part 
of the British Empire but not necessarily a part of the British “state” per 
se, so Walmart’s global presence is supported by the American state, but is 
also a part of the broader American Empire as a whole. This perspective 
also differs from the majority of works on the history of empires in that it 
aims to radically historicize the concept of empire beyond transhistorical 
generalizations which take “empire” out of the context of “capitalism.”51
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Empire is expressed in the form of capitalist imperialism; the 
expansion of the power of capital usually against the wills of those who 
are forced under the weight of its violence. Marxists have tended to 
view imperialism as, with variation, the result of the push of capital to 
expand outside of national boundaries.52 From this angle, imperialism is 
essentially caused by the interactions between banks and financial firms, 
industrial companies, states, and so on; in other words, imperialism is 
imposed from the top down. In this, the ways that gender and race are 
embedded in imperialism tend to be downplayed. But in contrast to the 
list of names more usually associated with sociological advancement 
of the theory of imperialism—Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin, Bukharin, 
Luxemburg, Kautsky—one key thinker developed another perspec-
tive which is often overlooked.53 More than any of the other classical 
thinkers, W.E.B. Du Bois saw that imperialism was about more than 
states and capital: it was an experience of life traversing relations of class, 
gender, and race. His work Darkwater, for example, first published in 
1920, featured a systematic analysis of the role of race and its relation 
to gender in European imperialism in the context of an anti-capitalist 
politics.54 
For Du Bois, race and gender were built relationally and historically 
constructed through the history of European imperialism and colo-
nialism. In inventing whiteness, Europeans claimed a higher level of 
self-perfection than any peoples in world history before them, assert-
ing, essentially, a monopoly on civilization and nobility, and the right to 
spread through means deemed necessary in their own terms. Violence 
against other races, both in the United States and internationally, was 
done in the name of white morality, justice, and “motherhood”; as white 
Europeans also claimed to be authorities on proper gender roles, and 
whites also self-proclaimed their own visions of “masculinity” and “fem-
ininity” as hegemonic. 
For Du Bois, while other commentators may have analyzed aspects 
of imperialism and capitalism, their analysis was incomplete without 
including the ways in which racialized capitalist states and their 
capitalist firms battled to divide the world up to create profits through 
the exploitation and value extraction of racialized labor forces on a world 
scale. And this racial imperialism was also gendered. European impe-
rialism itself was rooted in the actions of men, and, in defining their 
own masculinity, they defined the masculinity of other races as lesser 
than their own. As he puts it, “they are not simply dark white men. They 
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are not “men” in the sense that Europeans are men.”55 In addition, black 
womanhood was viewed as unclean and immoral. From the perspective 
of white supremacy, black women were inherently unable to reach the 
levels of high civilization of white motherhood. In a broader sense, then, 
he begins to show that white conceptions of femininity and motherhood 
were generated through the history of colonialism and imperialism as 
the ideal image of what a woman was “supposed” to be was built through 
processes in which white European femininity was seen as the standard 
and other racialized populations were viewed as deviations from this. 
This, at the same time, was used as a way to reinforce masculinity and 
patriarchy amongst European men. 
Drawing from this legacy, this study aims to explain capitalism, 
imperialism, and empire as processes reaching down into daily life 
and stretching back to broad historical structures which they in turn 
co-shape. Western expansion on the frontier, for instance, was driven 
by the ways in which white masculinity was formed through the regen-
eration of empire. Race and gender were never peripheral to capitalist 
imperialism, but central to its history. By linking the saga of empire and 
capitalism with an analysis of gender and race, overall, this book aims to 
move past more limited abstractions and frameworks towards painting a 
broader picture of the history of American Empire. 
Outline of the chapters
Chapter 1 examines the early colonization of British North America in 
the context of the broader international origins of capitalism. The devel-
opment of late-medieval European capitalism formed through Europe’s 
relations with the rest of the world, from the Italian city-states drawing 
from Arab commercial innovations to Northern Europe’s connections 
with the Mediterranean, and beyond. Even England, which became the 
supposed national model of capitalism par excellence and the supposed 
ideal of the first fully developed capitalist society, advanced economically 
through its international linkages. Resulting from this world historical 
process, yet taking on specific characteristics due to the political 
economy of England’s own unique capitalist pathway, the colonies of 
Virginia and New England formed their own historically specific char-
acteristics. While capitalist interests and social relations played a large 
role in the Virginia colony from the start, albeit with some challenges 
and alternatives, in New England social relations formed that in many 
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regards were not necessarily capitalist. From the start, the colonies were 
characterized by an unevenness of a variety of modes of social reproduc-
tion which would play out over the north-south patterns of development 
as empire expanded west. This chapter also highlights the complexities 
of gender in the history of empire. Most importantly, it suggests a less 
binary approach to the question of capitalist transition than has tended 
to be the case, and provides an outline of what this might look like. Here, 
I also introduce the category of patriarchal household mode of social 
reproduction as an ideal type to explain the role of gender relations in 
colonial and early American history. 
Chapter 2 continues to trace the history of white-settler colonialism 
through Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. Here, my aim is 
to highlight the uneven distinctiveness of each region in the context 
of the transition towards a capitalist society. In so doing, the aim is to 
problematize the complexity of colonial and early American history 
itself, as much as explain the history of capitalist development in these 
particular states-in-the-making. While in Massachusetts, the township 
model provided an early method of settlement, and westward movement 
was driven in large part due to the expansion of patriarchal household 
relations, western New York, for example, was very much a project of 
capital-led development by the Holland Land Company, albeit in a way 
which articulated with petty-commodity relations of production. And 
Pennsylvania’s proprietary history under the Penn family, religious 
experiments, and racialized patterns of squatter settlement and Native 
American removal also led the region to have a relatively distinct social 
history. 
The third chapter brings the story together by examining the history 
of Kentucky, Ohio, and the borderland between. Here, settlers and 
squatters both cooperated and conflicted with American military forces 
which, in some cases, attacked their homes. These frontier settlers were 
also racialized as at times they were considered “white Indians.” While 
light-skinned, these vagabonds did not fit the supposedly civilized norms 
which white Americans further east identified as the key component 
of their race. This chapter also examines the space between slavery 
in Kentucky and so-called freedom in Ohio, to examine the complex 
grey area between wage labor and slavery, and bring out the ways that 
capitalist development, from the start, exploited a variety of interchange-
able labor forms between the states that defy economistic categories of 
“free” or “unfree” labor. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 switch the lens to the American south. As much as 
the United States was an empire of small farmers and laboring artisans, 
it was also an empire of racialized chattel slavery. I argue in Chapter 4 
that the form of plantation slavery which developed across the Americas 
was unique in that it meant that the bodies of slaves were wholly com-
modified. In contrast to the argument that plantation slavery was not 
capitalist, or a hybrid form of capitalist and non-capitalist relations, I 
suggest that it was a form of capitalism in which plantation capitalists 
extracted surplus value from slave labor. But I also suggest that not all 
American slavery was plantation slavery, and necessarily capitalist. Par-
ticularly in the upper south, many households acquired small amounts of 
slaves to incorporate into the patriarchal household mode of production, 
similarly to the non-capitalist form of frontier production in the north. 
This chapter also discusses the “poor white trash” and “plain folk” of the 
old south to outline the general social structure and, in this, the articula-
tion of capitalist and non-capitalist agrarian relations. 
The fifth chapter applies this interpretation to the history of the terri-
tories which became the states of Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas. Here, I 
examine the first white settlers into these territories, and the slaves they 
brought, as up through the Civil War, slavery, in its uneven forms, drove 
much of southern empire building. For instance, it was not unusual 
for a planter to send slaves and an overseer to the frontier of empire, 
wait for the slaves to establish the infrastructure of colonialism, then 
follow after. These particular territories I have selected highlight the 
unevenness of slave relations of production. Too often, slavery is equated 
with the deep south, but by telling the stories of slave relations on the 
expanding western edge of empire, this chapter also aims to emphasize 
the complexity of capitalism, slavery, and empire in the south. 
Chapter 6 brings the narrative together in the context of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction. I argue that the war was rooted in the complex 
interactions and contradictions between two forms of imperialism: 
one increasingly normalizing wage labor in the north and the other 
slave based in the south. Each major conflict escalating in the war was 
essentially about what the legal and social characteristics of newly incor-
porated territories would be, and whether slavery was to be legal or not. 
From the Missouri Crisis of the 1820s to the “Bleeding Kansas” conflict 
of the mid-1850s, to several attempts by southerners to take control 
of states in the Caribbean and Central America in the decade before 
the war, the slave system pushed a logic of empire building through 
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extensive geographical expansion which could only be solved through 
the continual incorporation of new land into the empire of slavery. It was 
this tension which led to the war, and the result, Reconstruction, would 
play a key role in consolidating American capitalism. While by the 1850s 
the new Republican Party began to normalize wage labor as compatible 
with freedom, after the war the Democrats would as well. Meanwhile, 
“Slave Power” reorganized by defeating the attempts of free blacks to 
develop autonomous relations of production throughout the south and 
re-subjugating them with new forms of work including sharecropping.
The book concludes by briefly outlining the last phase of con-
tinental expansion. Instead of frontier households organizing in a 
patriarchal household mode of social reproduction, the last phase 
of western expansion was driven primarily by railroad and mining 
interests, agribusiness, and, fundamentally, the logic of capital. This is 
symbolized by, for instance, the Gadsden Purchase, as the last piece of 
continental territory was acquired for the purposes of profit through 
railroad building. Although the Homestead Act of 1862 did, for instance, 
allow the small farmer to persist in the newly incorporated territories, 
the convergence of capitalism and empire was, on the whole, complete.
1
The Origins of Colonial Society
The colonial exploit that became the United States emerged as a product 
of the European, and most significantly British, empire-building process. 
And while the community patterns of the colonial power were trans-
planted to the colonies, these were not necessarily reproduced identically. 
English aristocrats—or want-to-be aristocrats—indentured servants, 
African slaves, and other classes of settlers who migrated out of choice 
or force, found themselves in alien conditions with a foreign ecology to 
grapple with and living upon land already settled by native populations. 
In their new surroundings the white-settler societies of New England 
and Virginia did not simply emulate the habits they brought but adapted 
to their conditions to build something unique.
In this context, this chapter has two goals. First, it examines the ways 
that the Virginia and New England colonies emerged out of the interna-
tional history of capitalism. In a broad sense, European global colonial 
expansion developed in an era in which Europe itself was going through 
a slow and uneven transition to capitalism, and patterns of colonial-
ism reflected this. Each colony echoed a different aspect of European 
migration, and distinct intentions, which led to a less capitalist social 
structure in the north and social formation that was initially more 
capitalist in the south. Secondly, the chapter presents an overview of how 
gender relations were made in the colonial era and provides a framework 
for understanding some of the ways in which gender was recreated with 
the rise of American capitalism. In particular, I emphasize the concept 
of a patriarchal household mode of social reproduction, but also aim 
to move past binary conceptions of gender roles in the transition(s) to 
capitalism. 
While in today’s world many people assume capitalism is the “natural” 
outcome of human nature, in fact, as generations of social scientists 
have discussed, this is not the case. Rather, on a world-historical scale, 
it is relatively new as the dominant form of social life. Historically, in 
northern European cities such as Ghent and Bruges capitalism began 
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to sprout as early as the twelfth century.1 Textile production in Flanders 
was stimulated through relations with the international market as wool 
was sourced from England and finished goods made their way south to 
the Mediterranean through the Champagne fairs.2 And, as capitalism 
was international from its origins, fluctuations in the Flemish textile 
industry stood directly in relation to economic movements elsewhere. 
From Flemish traders traveling to England in the thirteenth century to 
establish an interdependence between English wool production and the 
textile industry back home, to the first Genoese sea voyage to Flanders 
in 1277 bypassing the Champagne fairs, economic movements in the 
textile industry were linked to fluctuations in the international market.3 
Wage labor and class struggle were also present in both rural and urban 
Flanders. Many of the textiles produced were created by the labor power 
of workers who went on large-scale strikes several times, the greatest 
being in 1280.4 
Connected from England to Italy, to the Baltic through the Hanseatic 
League, Bruges became the entrepôt of northern Europe and developed 
a sophisticated financial system to accompany its commercial growth.5 
Within the region, capital also flowed towards maximizing profitable 
investments and managing risk. In fourteenth-century Ghent, for 
instance, capital shifted towards the countryside to search for lower labor 
costs.6 Capital also invested in infrastructure, specifically in the form of 
water management and flood prevention technologies. These projects 
generally used temporary laborers paid relatively low wages and were 
organized by contractors who expected to profit from taxes that water 
boards collected. Water boards also sold annuities to investors, who 
hoped to profit from the infrastructure projects.7 And while some labor 
was organized into guilds, this did not necessarily preclude capitalist 
development. While guilds regulated prices, supply and demand, and 
regulated class conflict and compromise within production processes and 
between producers and merchants, many apprentices and journeymen 
never themselves became masters as the apprentice system partially 
functioned to create a working class of labor for masters to use.8 Overall, 
as Bas van Bavel notes, in the Netherlands, by the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries market relations were well established and by the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, land was commodified and marketized and 
capital-wage labor relations took off, as, by the sixteenth century, in the 
Netherlands as a whole, perhaps one-third to half of all labor was wage 
labor, with higher rates in some parts of the countryside.9
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Further south the development of capitalism in the Italian city-states 
was shaped by international relations and appropriations, especially 
from Islamic societies. The Crusades spurred the growth of Italian 
wealth as capital sought profits through violence. Venice supplied ships 
and in return for transporting soldiers and weapons Venetians would 
demand partial control over captured cities, which they could then profit 
from through taxation and control of licenses for productive enterprises. 
And Venetian capital, perhaps in part emulating the Arab qirad, was 
regularly pooled into commendas, partnerships in which investors could 
merge their capital to manage risk.10 Many other aspects of what would 
become early capitalism in the Italian city-states seemingly derived 
in part from Arab ideas and institutions. Commercial terms such as 
sakk which became translated into check, an instrument of monetary 
exchange, among many other concepts, came from Arabic words. The 
adoption of Arabic numerals made calculations much easier than using 
Roman numerals and, along with algebra, made the Italian “invention” 
of double-entry book keeping possible.11 And leading mathematical 
thinkers such as Leonardo Fibonacci, who grew up in Algeria, developed 
commercial mathematics after learning from Arabs.12 Europeans also 
modeled their coins after Islamic currencies.13
Additionally, through the latter part of the thirteenth century, Florence 
developed a capitalist economy in which wool produced in England, 
Spain, and Portugal was shipped through the Low Countries and France 
into Florence to be worked by the Florentine proletariat to sell to traders 
in the Levant for Asian goods. By the 1330s a significant proportion of 
Florence’s population lived on wages from the textile industry.14 Overall, 
by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many aspects of capitalism 
unevenly developed throughout Europe. Capitalists pooled their capital 
in associations to manage risk, complex credit and financial tools were 
developed, workers sold their labor power to capital for wages, and 
merchant capitalists made great profits, and sometimes losses, from 
international trade.
Slave labor also played a key role in the rise of capitalism. Initially, 
Portuguese expansion set up the pattern for the European conquest 
and colonization that followed. This included creating the model of 
plantation slavery that spread across the Atlantic to the West Indies 
and North American colonies. Settling on Madeira in 1419, the Azores 
in 1427, and the Cape Verde Islands in 1450, and later Sao Tome and 
Fernando Po in the 1470s and 1480s, Portuguese merchants soon found, 
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first, profits from intercepting the already existing African slave trade 
and, secondly, that slave labor could be put to profitable use. They found 
slaves could be a useful source of labor to work on and strengthen their 
trading posts.15 Thus, Sao Tome and Fernando Po were settled and 
quickly became centers of the slave trade based on the use of slaves to 
build fortifications, churches, and so on. And Lisbon responded to the 
rise of the slave trade by introducing licenses and taxes on slave traders 
with the goal not of capitalist development, but financing the monarchy 
as taxing merchant capital became a major source of wealth for the 
Crown, by 1560 perhaps half of its revenue.16 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, all the components for the rise 
of a plantation sugar industry on islands off the coast of West Africa were 
in place. The Portuguese brought sugar cane and processing equipment 
from Sicily (as islands such as Cyprus, historically, had plantation sugar 
production in the fourteenth century) and Spain to Madeira in 1446. 
Beginning as a way to finance exploration, colonization and plantation 
building brought together territorial empire building, capital, and 
market relations stretching from Italy to Africa, and beyond. By 1500 
Madeira had become a large center of sugar production, with about 
2,000 slaves working in a total population of 15,000–18,000. Slavery then 
spread across the Atlantic to the Americas. As the native populations 
were wiped out by the millions and indigenous labor proved difficult to 
sustain and control, the Spanish and Portuguese soon resorted to African 
slave labor, and by the middle of the fifteenth century, dozens of sugar 
plantations were set up in the Americas, some of which had more than 
a hundred slaves. By 1570, it is estimated that there were perhaps 2,000 
to 3,000 African slaves in Portuguese Brazil, and perhaps ten to fifteen 
as many native slaves. But by 1600, there were perhaps 12,000 to 15,000 
Africans in the colonies, and between 1600 and 1650, it is estimated at 
least 200,000 Africans were brought across the ocean.17 
In this emerging world order, by the time capitalism developed in 
England, its international formation had been in motion in fits and starts 
for several centuries. England’s contribution to the origins of capital-
ism, then, was not, as some have argued, that capitalism was essentially 
invented there.18 Rather, England took this uneven history several 
steps forward as the enclosures dispossessed the agrarian population, a 
wage labor class with nothing to sell but labor power formed, and cap-
italism gradually took hold, setting the stage for the British to build a 
global empire.
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From England to Virginia
Out of this historical process the colonies of North America were 
founded. From one angle, it might appear the colonies were capitalist 
from their inception. They arose interconnected with the developing 
Atlantic world market, held together by ships sailing for profit. Yet social 
historians have argued that the social relations that formed within the 
first two centuries of colonization may have not been capitalist. So we 
seem to have two different possibilities: either (what became) the United 
States was capitalist from the start, and never went through a transition 
in the first place, or else at some point the country became capitalist.19 
In the case of Virginia, capitalist interests tended to prevail from the 
start. The first British merchants, gentlemen, and adventurers began to 
explore the coast of North America in the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century. And the first substantial attempt at colonization was the lost 
colony of Roanoke. The reasons for the creation of the colony were 
manifold, from interimperial rivalry with Spain to privateering.20 While 
dreams of the profits of empire may have guided the Roanoke adven-
turers, resulting in failure after three expeditions, following in the path 
of the Spanish and Portuguese, some English investors continued to see 
North American colonization as a path towards profits. They dreamed of 
locating precious metals, or finding a Northwest Passage, or producing 
wine and silk for the English market. Thomas Hariot, for example, wrote 
a guide in 1588 describing commodities which could be produced in 
Virginia to stir up excitement for colonization among English investors.21 
And adventurers and investors such as Richard Hakluyt believed that a 
colony could produce basic commodities such as oil, wine, and sugar, 
moving England away from dependence on foreign sources. It would 
additionally create an outlet for the English poor, dispossessed by the rise 
of capitalism. The colony would likewise provide an impetus to expand 
English naval power, particularly as natural resources such as timber 
could be used to develop a shipbuilding industry.22 But this capitalist 
fantasy eventually clashed with reality as early settlers instead found a 
country populated by native peoples who resisted their expansion, in 
which precious metals were scarce and silk and wine difficult to produce, 
no evidence of a Northwest Passage, and a climate in which tobacco, 
partially to the consternation of the ruling political elite of the Virginia 
Company of London, became the staple of local farming. 
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From the start, Virginia was built on a combination of capital and col-
onization. But the dream of an independent American Empire was yet 
to be conceived for almost two centuries. Rather, settlers were part of the 
emerging British Empire. The colony was born at a time in which England 
was going through its own transition to capitalism, and the political 
economy of colonial Virginia reflected this, as it was not the British 
Crown that initially governed the colony, but the Virginia Company. For 
investors in the Virginia Company, the colony was a potential source 
of primary resource extraction and hopes existed that gold and silver 
might be found. It was also a way to break England’s dependence on 
foreign imports by producing basic agricultural commodities for the 
English market. And it was believed that a route to China could be found 
through America. In any case, for investors in the Virginia Company 
colonization was seen as a potential route towards profit.23 
The first settlers reached Virginia in late April of 1607 and explored 
the area until, in mid-May, they choose the site to build Jamestown. From 
the start, tensions arose with the natives. First, the Native Americans 
found a group of two or three dozen explorers in Cape Henry, and 
chased them back to their ships. And after spending a week construct-
ing a fort, the colonists, under Captain Christopher Newport, headed 
up river to explore and begin diplomatic relations with the natives. 
They learned that local native groups were linked together through the 
leader Powhatan, and on returning to Jamestown three days later, found 
Powhatan’s warriors had attacked the fort.24 Of course, relations with 
the natives were not always so violent, and the settlers quickly became 
dependent on their food. This was in large part due to the poor planning 
of the English. Rather than sending over potentially self-reproducing 
families, or laborers and farmers who could work the land, a dispropor-
tionate number of settlers were gentlemen. In the first three shiploads, 
for example, 293 men and two women came, and 110 of these were 
gentlemen. Only fifty-one were laborers (in some cases servants of the 
gentlemen) and twenty-seven craftsmen.25 The fundamental problem 
was that “gentlemen, by definition, had no manual skill, nor could they 
be expected to work at ordinary labor.”26 Instead, their role was supposed 
to be “force of knowledge” and “exercise of council”; in other words, 
organizational planning and governance. But a colony cannot be built on 
brains alone, and the inability of Virginia to become self-sustaining in its 
early years meant that, by the cruel winter of 1609–10, it has been said 
that colonists were possibly going so far as to resort to cannibalism.27 
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The social forces that drove the colonization of Virginia were also very 
much a masculine infused form of capitalism. Men risked their lives, 
and often died, traveling across the ocean seeking profit and prestige. 
Given that the majority of settlers were men, the Company also sent over 
shiploads of women, “Tobacco Brides,” to marry them. For example, the 
Company’s notes of 1619 record they sent over ninety “young maids 
to make wiues for so many of the former Tenants.”28 And in 1621 the 
Company sent over fifty women as “they require one hundredth and 
fiftie of the best leafe tobacco for each of them; and if any of them dye 
there must be a proportionable addition vppon the rest.”29 A social logic 
of patriarchal expansion was also quickly established in the colony. 
The 1619 Proceedings of the Virginia Assembly contain, for example, a 
petition to assign land to the male children of planters.30 Thus, shortly 
after the colony began, settlers began to clamor for more land to pass to 
their sons. 
While capital may have guided colonialism, the Company also 
suggested adopting aspects of a tributary form of empire over the indig-
enous peoples. In 1609, for instance, the Virginia Council instructed Sir 
Thomas Gates that, if distrust arose with Powhatan, “but if you finde 
it not best to make him yor prisoner yet you make him yor tributary.”31 
But overall, the goal of the Company, funded by shareholders, was to 
find a way to generate profit. In their letter to Gates, for example, they 
suggested four ways of doing this; mining, trade, tribute from the land, 
and “the fourth is labour of yor own men in makinge wines pitche Tarre 
sope ashes, Steele Iron Pipestaues in sowinge of hempe and flaxe in gath-
eringe silke of the grasse, and pvidinge the worme and in fishinge for 
Pearle Codd sturgeon and such like.”32 In other words, the desire of the 
Company was not to become dependent upon tobacco production, but 
to create a diversified economy through the construction of profitable 
social relations. To accomplish this, they sent over men to start ironworks, 
saltworks, build sawmills, breed silk worms, and so on, although their 
attempts proved of limited success as tobacco quickly became king.33 
Initially, agricultural production was run collectively.34 But in 1609 small 
amounts of land were distributed to individuals, and in 1614 the first 
group of Company men finished their contracts and were allotted 3 acres 
per individual, or 12 per family. Independent farmers were expected to 
feed themselves in addition to providing two and a half barrels of corn 
a year and working for the Company one month per year.35 This started 
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the tradition of private individual agricultural social property relations 
that would continue to grow. 
By 1618–19 the Company introduced full private property into the 
agrarian landowning structure by allowing “fee simple” land. In contrast 
to “fee tail” land in which an individual’s ability to alienate land was 
dependent on personalized relations with state authorities, under fee 
simple land individuals were given independent mastery of their land; 
the difference between “holding by grace” and “owning by right.”36 
This was part of political restructuring in 1619 in which martial law 
was replaced by a limited representative democracy. An elected general 
assembly was set up, run by the colony elite. The Virginia Company 
encouraged this with the hope that giving settlers some of the rights and 
privileges they had back home might encourage more to come and build 
profitable plantations.37 Although landholdings would be fee simple, 
to regulate production and satisfy the basic subsistence needs of the 
colony, farmers were required to grow corn for the Company, as “every 
man to sett 2 acres with corn (Except Tradesmen following their trades) 
penalty forfeitr of corn & Tobo & be a Slave a year to ye Colony.”38 The 
Company also kept land on which its agents hired tenant farmers. These 
tenants were to pay half of their profits to the Governor, Treasurer, and 
Company.39 
Rights to individual capitalistic ownership of land did not go uncon-
tested though. Under Charles I, after the Virginia Company lost control 
of the colony to the Crown in 1624, Royal Governor Sir John Harvey 
arrived in 1630. He was given instructions by Charles I to transform 
Virginia’s ownership rights to something closer to a system of subin-
feudation as opposed to capitalist private ownership. He declared all 
preexisting patents invalid and created new ones that would require 
settlers to pay rents to proprietors and a quit rent to the empire.40 But 
these changes proved very short-lived, and several years later the Puritan 
colonialists expelled Harvey from the colony. 
By the 1620s the path that Virginia would follow which set up the 
basis for the uneven development of the southern colonies was in place: 
primary commodity production and forced labor. As slavery gradually 
came to dominate in the next half century of expansion, capital and 
unfree capitalist labor came together. This was a small part of the broader 
uneven development of the making of international capitalist relations. 
Capital accumulation in Virginia developed as part of a spatially 
expanding world market and as one node on the broader trans-Atlantic 
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world. This was solidified by the formation of a legal structure supporting 
capitalist private property rights. Virginia lawmakers imported English 
law and modified it to fit the pressures of capital accumulation in the 
colony. This included creating a legal structure which would enforce the 
collection of debts, punish indentured servants’ deviance, and support 
the development of chattel slavery.41 Territorial expansion continued as 
the headright system developed. Colonists who could afford their way to 
Virginia would be given 50 acres, and anyone who paid for another to 
come over would also be given 50 acres.42 And most importantly settlers 
started growing tobacco.43 The Company itself, though, was very critical 
of tobacco production, and repeatedly complained, particularly as they 
saw planters neglecting corn production at the expense of tobacco.44 
Also, given the lack of specie money, tobacco also served as the major 
currency of the colony as the Company even collected taxes in tobacco.45 
It was also used to pay rangers who policed the frontier.46
Just as the Company shipped and sold women to male settlers, so 
they additionally sent over children. For example, in January 1619 it is 
recorded, “the Citie of London have by Act of their Common Counsell, 
appointed one Hundred Children out of their superfluous multitude to 
be transported to Virginia; there to be bound apprentices for certaine 
years.”47 During this time they also carried over servants to be exchanged 
with settlers in return for their passage.48 By then, the use of indentured 
unfree labor began to take off in the colony, encouraged by the headright 
system. For the next few decades, indentured servants, more than slaves, 
would provide the main source of labor for the colony. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, it is estimated that at least 
half to two-thirds of immigrants to North America were indentured 
servants and this rate was particularly high in the Chesapeake region.49 
Indentured servitude generally took two forms: either the servant would 
make a contract before leaving Europe or else servants were sent without 
contracts, to make them on arrival.50 Servants themselves were a form of 
unfree commodity; they could be bought or sold on the market. And, in 
effect, indentured servitude functioned as a type of indirect wage; to pay 
for their passage across the ocean they were required to work as servants 
for a number of years until given their “freedom dues”; usually a piece 
of land and basic resources to survive. But while servants made up a 
high proportion of immigrants, their proportion of the total population 
declined over time. While in 1630 servants may have made up over 40 
percent of the population, a decade later they made up perhaps a quarter 
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of the population (depending on the estimate) and between 7 to 10 
percent by 1700.51 In other words, some servants died and some gained 
their freedom. 
Indentured labor combined with tobacco production and family labor 
set the basis for Virginia’s growth. While the colony had perhaps 8,000 
people in 1642, thirty-five years later it had 40,000.52 This immigra-
tion was made possible by social conditions within England. Many of 
those sent were poor and working people who were swept off the streets, 
convict labor, or wage laborers who chose to go given poor opportu-
nities for employment in English capitalism. Historians have noted, 
for example, a correlation between immigration, wages, and tobacco: 
“servants indentured themselves to Chesapeake planters when English 
wages declined and tobacco prices rose; they refused to go when English 
wages rose and tobacco prices dropped.”53 Not all indentured servants 
were necessarily young men and women though. Blurring the line 
between indentured servant and tenant farm family, Richard Smyth and 
his wife and children were brought over in 1620 in an indenture and had 
their expenses paid for and were given a piece of land to work in return 
for “one third pte of all English corne & of maiz or Indyan wheat and 
the one halfe of all other pfits fruite cattle seeds & increase whatsoever 
raysed taken or had from the ground or land of them.”54
But while in many ways the Virginia colony was organized around 
capitalism from the start, not all farmers practiced capitalist production. 
On Virginia’s eastern shore, where settlers were connected to the world 
market through merchants, social life appears to have been organized 
around non-capitalist forms of production in the early and mid-1600s. 
Production tended to be organized around family farms, connected 
through kinship and friendship networks which generally did not stretch 
between walking distance of farms, as most people did not own horses, 
and in which most commercial exchange took the form of barter and 
personal loans and gifts. In some cases, there were tenant farmers. But 
this was a way for working farmers to attempt to raise themselves up to 
become independent petty-commodity producers, rather than a contin-
ually dependent tenant or laborer class.55 
Likewise, by the late 1600s one account of the inhabitants of Virginia 
more generally suggests, “of Grain and Pulse they commonly provide 
only as much as they expect they themselves shall have occasion for, for 
the Use of their Families, there being no Towns or Markets where they 
can have a ready Vent for them, and scarce any Money to serve for a 
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common Exchange in buying and selling.”56 Settlers also often produced 
their own clothing, as one complained that Lieutenant Governor Francis 
Nicholson recommended an act to Parliament “forbidding the Planta-
tions to make their own Cloathing; which, in other Words, is desiring a 
charitable Law, that the Planters shall go naked.”57 That being said, traders 
including William Byrd linked backcountry settlers to broader world 
market relations as they made sure commodities could pass from the 
frontier of Virginia eastward, as his commercial networks in the 1680s 
extended to England and the West Indies.58
But gradually slavery took hold. By this time, Virginia was a latecomer 
to slavery in the Americas, but its adoption would condition the southern 
developmental path. Slavery in Virginia emerged out of the making of 
Atlantic world slavery and the first dark-skinned people presumed to 
be slaves were brought over in 1619. Early language tends to conflate 
slave and servant though; the distinction itself was vague as indentured 
servants were sometimes called “slaves” and as black servants were also 
in some cases not necessarily slaves for life. For example, a record from 
1675 discusses the case of Philip Corven, a black servant, who was to 
serve Mr. Humphrey Stafford for eight years, “then, next ensueing, and 
then fhould enjoy his freedome & be paid three barrels of corne & a 
sute of clothes.”59 But Mr. Stafford sold Philip to Mr. Charles Lucas, who 
forced him to serve three years longer. Due to this, Corven petitioned 
the court for redress. And racial ideology in this era remained at a for-
mational stage, as the term “race” itself was not used. Rather, native 
peoples were referred to as infidels or savages, in contrast to Christian 
settlers. But early racial stereotyping was in full force. As one record puts 
it in 1622, “they are (saith hee) by nature sloathfull and idle, vitious, 
melancholy, slouenly, of bad conditions, lyers, of small memory, of no 
constancy or trust … lesse capable then children of sixe or seauen yeares 
old, and lesse apt and ingenious.”60 Native Americans were also enslaved, 
for example, in 1685 a man named Crawford petitioned against Roger 
Jones for harboring three Native Americans who he claimed to have 
purchased as slaves.61
By the 1640s Virginia court documents record sales of black slaves and 
around this time the first records of laws based around race in Virginia 
were recorded such as a 1643 Virginia tax law for tithable persons that 
shifted from all working adult men to all adult men and “Negro” women.62 
And by the 1660s the racialized state began to solidify, for instance, a law 
was passed in 1662 in Virginia doubling fines for those caught fornicat-
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ing with a “Negro” man or women, and interracial marriage was banned 
in Maryland two years later.63 While early on the distinction between 
slave and servant was somewhat unclear, fear of slave revolt along 
with the creation of a shared sense of whiteness, even among servants, 
reinforced divisions between supposedly superior white people and 
inferior red and black skin especially after Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676.64 
While by 1675 there were perhaps 2,500 slaves in Virginia, between 1700 
and 1750 an estimated 75,000 slaves entered into the Chesapeake region, 
most coming directly from Africa.65 And by the beginning of 1700 the 
line between slave and servant was set, as one writer of the time put it, 
“their Servants, they distinguish by the Names of Slaves for Life, and 
Servants for a time.”66 Through 1740, when the Virginia economy began 
to diversify beyond tobacco into commodities like wheat and iron, slaves 
and tobacco provided the basic recipe for the growth of capitalism in 
the Chesapeake. While the Virginia Company eventually collapsed and 
the colony was taken over by the British state, which charged quit rents, 
it was this general process of uneven development, conditioned by the 
way the American south articulated with the world economy that set the 
basic path for the expansion of capitalism through the south.67 Economic 
development would be further encouraged by the state as, for example, 
among other incentives, “for Encouragement of Manufactures, Prices 
were appointed for the Makers of the best Pieces of Linnen and Wollen 
Cloth, and a Reward of Fifty Pounds of Tobacco was given for each 
Pound of Silk.”68 Thus, while the colony was controlled by the Crown 
rather than the Company, it would continue to encourage capitalist 
development and enforce the power of capitalist law. 
The settlement of New England
In their own time, most settlers may have believed they were extending 
what New England Puritan leader Cotton Mather called “Christ’s 
Empire.”69 As one poem from the era put it, “yet there a mighty future 
is begun, and men and things a race of empire run.”70 As empire was 
built by the hands of colonial New Englanders, by the mid-1800s one 
commentator said of Increase Mather, Cotton’s Father, “by these wise 
exertions, crowned with complete and extraordinary success, he laid 
the foundation upon which Washington, Franklin, and their compa-
triots established the vast and extending empire of the United States 
of America.”71 But even by this time not every American necessarily 
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celebrated empire. The esteemed women’s rights activist Lydia Marie 
Child lamented the destruction of Native Americans, saying, “in the 
struggle to obtain the sole empire of this country, the settlers showed 
little scrupulosity in regard to the means used to ensnare or seize by 
violence the natives.”72 Thus, for her, empire represented the tragic 
destruction of native peoples. It also led to a distortion of the culture of 
white Americans themselves.73
While in Virginia the pool of laborers dispossessed by the rise 
of English capitalism provided a basis for the creation of a labor 
market of indentured servants, in the northern colony religious and 
political-economic conditions in England pushed Puritans to search 
for a new space to create their “city on a hill.” In 1534 King Henry VIII 
repudiated the Catholic Church and became the leader of the Church 
of England. Following this, the Anglican Church became a structure 
formed around a state-religion nexus, where bishops and archbish-
ops were appointed by the monarch, reinforcing each other’s power. 
Yet the new Church held on to vestiges of the old ways. Rote learning 
and demonstrations of prayers and rituals and obedience to hierarchi-
cal church authority remained the norm. In 1625 Charles I came to 
power and appointed William Laud as Bishop of London in 1628 and 
Archbishop of Canterbury in 1635. Charles and Laud encouraged a form 
of Anglicanism much closer to Catholicism than Puritanism, emphasiz-
ing obedience to authority and conformism. Under Laud, the Church 
also removed dissenting ministers and censured Puritan literature and 
practice.74 In this context, Puritans searched for a new land to move 
to. While some fled to the Dutch Republic others started a new colony 
across the ocean. 
The Puritans were not the first Europeans to visit the New England 
region. John Cabot explored the area at the tail end of the 1400s and in 
1524 Giovanni da Verrazzano sailed to Narragansett Bay.75 But in the 
context of increasing religious intolerance, settlers traveled over in 1620 
and from 1629 to 1640, the era of the Great Migration, about 80,000 
people left England, with perhaps 30 percent of those going to New 
England.76 The demographics of New England settlers were very different 
than those who went further south. Many came from the Greater East 
Anglia region where economic conditions had deteriorated.77 Colonists 
were primarily families of middle class status and perhaps 40 percent 
were over the age of 25.78 In other words, the New England colony was 
comprised of a high proportion of mid-life families, in contrast to the 
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younger adventurers and servants that emigrated to Virginia. This 
difference gave New England a unique demographic pattern relative to 
other American colonies, and a distinct and more self-reproducing logic 
of population expansion, so that by 1700 the population was 100,000.79
The question of the motivations of early New England settlers has 
been up for debate.80 As the New England Company—which became 
the Massachusetts Bay Company—emerged out of the ruins of the 
Dorchester Company, it appears that the interests of religious freedom 
prevailed over the interests of profit.81 Investors in the company in many 
cases did not invest simply to profit, but also brought their families to 
New England to settle. In the colony, these shareholders became political 
leaders and landowners as the colony itself was governed from New 
England.82 Of course calculations of profits and finances were necessary 
for the operation, for instance, “the ioynt stock being thus managed, at 
the end of 7 yeares … the said stock, as the pceede & pfitt thereof, to 
bee devyded to every man pportionably, according to his adventure.”83 
And the company’s records demonstrate much time was spent managing 
finances and tracking down those who were behind on their payments. 
But overall, as expressed during a general court, “lastly, vpon the mocon 
of Mr Whyte, to the end that this business might bee pceeded in wth the 
first intencon, wch was chiefly the glory of God.”84 Managing finances, it 
appears, was less about generating profit so much as building a successful 
colony organized around religious discipline and order. And, of course, 
this also meant that the colony was to “wynn and incite the natives of 
the country to the knowledg and obedience of the onlie true God and 
Savior of mankinde.”85 Thus, along with building their own Protestant 
utopia, the settlers desired to “civilize” those “savages” indigenous to the 
country. 
For Max Weber, the Protestant ethic, and specifically the “calling,” 
provided an ideological basis for the development of New England 
capitalism.86 But Weber never dealt with the problem that, in fact, New 
England went on to develop complex non-capitalist forms of social life. 
Specifically, the social property relations that predominated in New 
England were far from purely capitalist. Social regulation and the main-
tenance of a Puritan hierarchy took precedence over the law of value in 
regulating land control. Although fee simple landholdings were estab-
lished and promoted by the Massachusetts Bay Company, rather than 
being regulated by market forces, they remained socially controlled. 
New England colonies were organized around town authorities who 
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were generally also in charge of land distribution. Towns did have some 
variety in their regulations. For instance, Watertown declared in 1638 
that land could only be sold to a freeman of the congregation, New 
Haven required strangers to have permission of the court to obtain land, 
and in 1659 in Hadley it was decided that no one could purchase land 
without three years of occupation and with approval of the town.87
These are just three examples of many; overall the ownership and 
control of land was regulated according to what was acceptable to the 
local Puritan hierarchy rather than abstract capitalist land markets 
regulated by the law of value.88 Landholdings were not equal; generally, 
those who invested more in the community and had more social rank 
and status and influence were able to secure larger holdings.89 But land 
was not a speculative, profitable investment, rather, landholdings were 
regulated based upon use value rather than exchange value. In order to 
settle in a particular community, for instance, one needed permission 
from the government.90 Some land was also settled in common and 
regulated within the jurisdiction of particular towns so that freeholder 
settlers in those towns had access to forests to gather wood from, and so 
on.91 This landholding pattern also drove the expansion of what might 
be called an empire of townships. To continue to grow the township, 
community, and religious-based society, as the population expanded 
so new towns were incorporated and more territory brought into the 
colony. For example, in 1635 Marblehead was created, Concord later 
that same year, Dedham the next, and Watertowne in 1637.92 Generally, 
town space was designed to allow fifty or sixty families to settle there and 
obtain “competent” lifestyles, so that future settlers would be pushed to 
start their own towns, expanding the empire. 
Early on, the colony aimed to stimulate production, but this was as 
much or more for the purposes of the general good and success of the 
colony rather than the endless accumulation of capital. In 1628, for 
instance, the company agreed to bring over Thomas Graues and his family 
and pay him to locate iron mines, as well as other metals and minerals. 
In return, the company would also grant him 100 acres of land “to alloue 
me some competency of necessary victualls for the subsistence of me 
and my ffameley till the next season of plantinge & reaping after there 
arryuall.”93 Additionally, the company impressed workers to build public 
works.94 Also, wages for artisans were continually set and readjusted as 
the economic relations were built around a moral economy of “just price” 
which took precedence over pure profit-seeking behavior. 95 Court cases 
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record that those who charged above these amounts were fined, the most 
well-known case being that of merchant Robert Keayne who used his last 
will and testament as a space to defend himself after developing a bad 
reputation for repeatedly overcharging for goods.96 Similarly, those who 
set up mills had to do so with permission of court officials, and the prices 
they could charge farmers to use their mills were limited by law.97 The 
colony was also linked into the world market. John Winthrop’s journal, 
for example, records trade with nearby neighbors, the Dutch, the French, 
and the Virginians, and extending as far as Bermuda.98 But just because 
the colony emerged as part of the expanding Atlantic and world trade 
system did not necessarily mean the social relations that articulated with 
this system were necessarily capitalist. 
The Puritan ideology itself could be very critical of those who put 
profits above the common good. One sermon from 1621 criticizes the 
“vein” and “corrupt” “heart of man” who, 
yea and doth not experience teach, that even amongst processors of 
religion, almost all love and favor that is shewed unto others is with 
a secret aim at themselves, they will take pains to do a man good, 
provided that he will take twice so much for them, they will give a 
penny so as it may advantage them a pound, labor hard so as all the 
profit may come to themselves, else they are heartless and feeble.99 
Rather, “a man must seek the good, the wealth, the profit of others.”100 In 
other words, fair and just “profit” was not self-gain and aggrandizement, 
but contributing to the general good of others. The Puritan work ethic, 
though, was not simply internalized by the population. Rather, use of 
force was a regular part of settler life. Those who were idle or slacking, 
for instance, were punished by the court.101 Laws made sure each settler 
worked hard to build the colony. Additionally, gender regulation through, 
for example, laws regarding acceptable clothing and punishing sexual 
deviance were regularly enforced. Laws were put in place, for instance, 
against wearing lace and “other superfluities tending to little vse or 
benefit but to the nourishing of pride & exhausting of mens estates, & 
also of evill example to others.”102 Additionally, “And that hearafter no 
garment shalbee made wth short sleeves, whereby the nakedness of the 
arme may bee discovered.”103 
Laws regulating sexuality and expressions of gender were deemed 
necessary as in some cases the Puritans were not so pure. In one case 
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even, “William Hatchet, for beastuality wth a cowe, is condemned to be 
hanged, & the cowe to bee slayne & burnt or buried.”104 More commonly, 
though, those that engaged in “fornication” and adultery were regularly 
punished. And while these cases were often between settlers, including 
servants, it appears there were also sexual relations between native 
peoples and settlers, for example, “It is ordered, John Dawe shalbe 
seuerely whipped for intiseing an Indian woman to lye wth him. Vpon 
this occacon it is ppounded withr adultery, eithr wth English or Indian, 
shall not be punished wth death.”105 Later, though, it was decided that the 
death sentence could be enforced for adultery. Sexual deviance, as with 
other crimes, could also be punished through slavery as, in one case, 
“John Kempe, for filthy, vncleane attempts wth 3 yong girls, was censured 
to bee whipped both heare, at Roxberr, & at Salem, very severly, & was 
committed for a slave to Leift Davenport.”106 In another case, homosexual 
activity was also recorded as “Capt. Wiggin, governor at Pascataquack, 
under the Lords Say and Brook, wrote to our governor, desiring to have 
two men tried here, who had committed sodomy with each other.”107
While indentured servants existed, and black slaves were not absent, 
generally household labor based around the patriarchal family was the 
most common form of labor organization. And independence meant 
to be free from dependency on wage labor.108 As Alan Taylor puts it, 
“diligent and realistic, most New England families sought an ‘independ-
ent competency.’ ‘Independence’ meant owning enough property—a 
farm or a shop—to employ a family, without having to work for someone 
else as a hired hand or servant. A ‘competency’ meant a sufficiency, but 
not an abundance, of worldly goods.”109 That being said, along the coast 
fishermen organized their relations of production around capitalistic 
lines, albeit not as simply a wage labor/capital relationship. Generally, 
fishermen were too poor to own ships themselves, so companies of 
fishermen made agreements with outfitters to rent boats and purchase 
supplies. Suppliers would, in turn, take their catch and give them a 
previously agreed upon rate of return for their labor.110 Many fisherman, 
then, were dependent laborers working in a profit-driven industry, but 
were “clients” rather than wage laborers. 
Artisans and farmers were also participants in market relations. Most 
towns needed a few artisans—blacksmiths, shoemakers, and so on—and 
artisans were also more concentrated in larger cities such as Boston. 
Additionally, town artisans also tended to own farms, and engage both 
in farm and artisanal labor. Farmers themselves were also embedded in 
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market relations, producing both for subsistence and to sell crops on 
the market to obtain goods they could not produce themselves.111 But, 
of course, market relations don’t necessarily mean capitalist relations; 
historically, markets existed long before capital took control of and 
reorganized social production on a mass scale. And New England was 
a colony linked into both local markets and the world market. New 
England merchants sold commodities such as fish and timber to the 
West Indies in return for molasses, rum, and sugar, and by 1700 Boston 
became a major center of trade, and had the second largest shipbuilding 
industry in the British Empire after London itself.112 
The social structure also began to form around an early racial ideology, 
although the term “race” itself was yet to be used. Rather, natives were 
called “savages,” and said to have a particular inferior disposition. As to 
their origins, Cotton Mather stipulated that the devil likely hid them 
there to avoid Jesus Christ’s “absolute empire” over them: “and though 
we know not when or how those Indians first became inhabitants of this 
mighty continent, yet we may guess that probably the devil decoyed 
those miserable salvages hither.”113 This incipient racial ideology also 
justified wars and the dispossession of Native Americans. But while the 
idea developed during the rise of English capitalism (made most famous 
by John Locke) that if the natives failed to improve the land the colonists 
had the right to settle and labor on it, in fact the land was well worked 
by the native peoples, albeit very differently than the settler way. Among 
other things, the natives cleared fields to plant crops and regularly 
burned forests to clear the underbrush but keep the taller trees in place, 
in doing so making it easier to travel through forests and hunt the 
abundant animal life. When European settlers came, they tended to take 
over paths, crops, villages, and land previously worked by native peoples, 
taking credit for their achievements without acknowledging this. 
Overall, the early colony of New England had capitalist elements, but 
was not simply a society in which all aspects of social life were regulated 
by the law of value. Much of social production was still in the hands of 
patriarchal families, and the goal of this production was not the accumu-
lation of capital but expansion of the patriarchal household form (as will 
be discussed). Production and exchange on the market was more about 
obtaining land for future generations—particularly male children—than 
it was about profit in itself. This type of social reproduction also gave 
the colony a logic of spatial expansion driven by patriarchal household 
reproduction more than the accumulation of capital. 
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Gender and the origins of American capitalism 
As capitalism became the world’s dominant social system it inherited and 
transformed diverse gender forms and inequalities across the globe. In 
the American context, racialized gender inequalities defined the colonial 
era and, over time, gender norms and family structures were remade to 
fit with the logic of capital accumulation.114 Within Europe, and similarly 
in North America, the norms of white womanhood and masculinity that 
solidified capitalist relations in the dominant zones were built through 
the de-feminization and de-masculinization—or hyper-sexualization—
of “the other”; the victims of empire building.115 Imperialism was not just 
a political-economic, but a cultural process. As Edward Said explains:
Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation 
and acquisition. Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by 
impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain 
territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as 
forms of knowledge affiliated with domination: the vocabulary of 
classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is plentiful with words 
and concepts like “inferior” or “subject races,” “subordinate peoples,” 
“dependency,” “expansion,” and “authority.” Out of the imperial expe-
riences, notions about culture were clarified, reinforced, criticized, 
or rejected.116
Through processes of imperial interaction norms of culture, gender, 
sexuality, race, class, and power were built, and hegemonic conceptions 
justifying empire building were historically created. Similarly, through 
engagements with and the destruction of indigenous populations in 
North America, and through the making of black slavery, among other 
developments, hegemonic white conceptions and structures of gender, 
race, and family were constructed. Over time, these ever-shifting 
formations grew to fit with the social rhythms of capital accumulation 
as capitalism formed as a deeply racialized and gendered system.117 And, 
for that matter, historically the rise of capitalism was not purely a binary, 
black and white, process. It went along with everything from prostitu-
tion to interracial sex to homosexual relationships and more.118 In this 
sense, just as there is no “pure” form of capitalism, so there is no primary 
way gender relations are constructed within capitalism. Rather, the 
gender-capitalism relation depends upon the particular historical and 
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political circumstance out of which the relations form. After all, black 
female slaves in the American south were a form of gendered capitalist 
labor just as much as white middle class housewives were. If the often 
discussed housewife-breadwinner family relation did emerge with the 
rise of capitalism in the United States, this was perhaps due less to the 
rise of capitalism in itself, so much as the political forms which capitalist 
relations took.
In the colonial area, particularly in the American north, the family and 
community relations and gender arrangements that formed did not easily 
fit into a definition of capitalism rooted in social relations of production/
reproduction. To address this problem, I suggest the category patriar-
chal household mode of social reproduction as a useful heuristic ideal type 
to make sense of both the division of labor and organization of gender 
in non-capitalist relations in the US context. To clarify, the relations 
were patriarchal in that they were organized around the male-centered 
household. The husband was the manager of family and labor and the 
laws and regulations of society passed through the husband to the family. 
The term “household” is included as the division of labor and mode of 
production was primarily done on the household level, especially in the 
American north. Farm families produced for self-sufficiency first with 
varying degrees of more or less incorporation into market relations, 
and often through barter and labor-sharing relations within their com-
munities. And I use the term mode of social reproduction to refer to 
the ways all aspects of social life entailed forms of labor—the social 
metabolic relationship between humanity and ecology—from women 
producing children to the production and remaking of gender norms 
before capitalism and during the transition. 
Gender in colonial America
The Puritans living in the colonial northeast would be confounded by 
many of the gender categories we use today. The concepts of “hetero” 
and “homo” sexual would not be invented for another two centuries. 
Rather, gender was a hierarchy in which male and female bodies and 
capacities were not defined in negation of each other, but in which the 
man was superior to the woman.119 As one Puritan put it, “our ribs were 
not ordained to be our rulers.”120 To be an ideal man was not to be the 
fierce, independent creature, supposedly tied down to no woman, which 
would later be encouraged. It was to be the protector of the family, as 
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social life was organized around obtaining “competency” and the repro-
duction of family life. Inherited from England was the idea that the 
household was a metaphor for the entire social order: just as the father 
was the monarch taking care of his domain, so the father-monarch had 
the responsibility to take care of his family.121 
Additionally, in colonial and early America, unlike the later era, in 
which child-raising was increasingly relegated as a woman’s supposedly 
natural role, a father’s social role was to take responsibility towards his 
children and cultivate affection. Writing about his son, who appears to 
have been sick, for instance, William Fleming wrote, 
but O’ my Dear a pang darts through my heart when I think on Lenny, 
my hopes my expectations dash’d to the ground, not from a want of 
Abilities but from want of having those abilities properly formed in 
his tenderer Years. At least this is the light that an affectionate Father 
views it in. I may be deceived in his capasity, even this would be a 
comfort to me, as it would be a less implication of negligence in the 
management.122
Through the age of 6 or 7, boys and girls wore the same gowns until boys 
were “breeched,” given male-designated clothing, and put on the path to 
manhood.123 From here, fathers would also guide boys, teaching them 
the values they would need to become husbands, fathers, and eventually 
heads of households.
The social organization of sex was also much different than it would 
later become. Married Puritan couples were encouraged to enjoy sexual 
pleasure as part of a healthy marriage, of course in moderation. And while 
pre-marital sex, “self-pollution,” and other forms of sexual deviance were 
strictly disallowed, community responses to sexual deviance depended 
on circumstance. Colonists “often placed personal loyalties and the 
needs of the local community before the imperative to enforce moral 
absolutes.”124 This likely included some amount of tolerance for (what we 
now might call) homosexual behavior. Nicholas Sension, for example, 
was taken to the General Court in 1677. On trial, a variety of witnesses 
gave testimony to Sension’s advancements towards other men since the 
1640s. In other words, while it was known Sension may have had pro-
clivities towards other men, they were tolerated as he was considered, 
overall, a harmonious member of the community.125 And in general, gay 
relationships in colonial American history, in fact, may have been more 
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common than archival records indicate. Men regularly wrote letters to 
other men in loving, passionate language which might suggest, at times, 
something more than platonic friendship.126 And although records are 
limited, historians have noted that it is difficult to imagine that Virginia 
colonists, living in a society in which men greatly outnumbered women, 
did not engage in sexual activity with each other.127 And on the frontier, 
for example, even male-male intimacy tended to be much more openly 
stated than it would in the latter era. After his sister Annie Henry Chris-
tian’s husband, William Christian, was killed in Kentucky, Patrick Henry 
wrote to her in 1786 also suggesting in the letter, “Pray tell Mr. Bullitt I 
wish to hear from him and to cultivate an intimacy with him and that he 
may command any services from me.”128
Through the late 1700s husbands were considered “friends” and 
“protectors.” After her husband’s death, for example, Annie Henry 
Christian wrote to her sister-in-law Anne Christian Fleming, 
I must enjoin secrecy from you on this distressing subject, the Man 
whose connections might have promised protection to my Family, as 
turned our Enemy & God of heaven only knows for what, only because 
he found me & my poor children deprived of our Protector & Friend 
& saw us left destitute & helpless.129 
Marriage in early American history could also be seen as a relation 
of friendship. As Richard Taylor Jr. in Kentucky wrote to his recently 
married nephew, 
I am pleased to hear you are so agreeably married, and wish you and 
your consort a great deal of happiness, which will depend much on 
your united efforts to please each other; and live in harmony with 
your neighbors. I am pretty certain you have industry, which will be 
necessary in your new situation.130
As today, throughout the entire history of the United States, in fact, 
gender was never organized strictly in a binary. Perhaps the most 
famous early example of this is the case of Thomas(ine) Hall. What 
started as an accusation against Hall for laying with Richard Bennett’s 
maid turned into an exploration of Hall’s complex gender identity and 
performances.131 Hall claimed that he was both a man and a woman, 
and had practiced different genders throughout his life. In England he 
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claimed his name was Thomasine, and he lived as a girl. Later, to join 
the military he cut off his hair and performed as a man. Returning from 
war in France, back in England he again became a woman and worked 
in needlework, until becoming a man to travel to British North America. 
After a lengthy trial, involving several physical searches of Hall in which 
it was seen he had a penis, but he claimed it did not function sexually, the 
court decided that, from then on, while Hall would wear male clothes it 
was also necessary he wear women’s headwear and an apron, as the court 
enforced his clothes to represent a punishment in which he would not be 
considered by the community to be a “pure” male.132 
Hall’s case is one example of gender fluidity in colonial America. 
Complex gender roles go back, in fact, to early American white-settler 
colonialism. As Richard Godbeer argues, “Puritans characterized certain 
roles as masculine and others as feminine, but these were not attached 
inflexibly to male and female bodies.”133 This was also reflective of the 
gendered division of labor. While it was the case that women and men 
had different roles in the household, women doing more domestic tasks 
as opposed to husbands farming, hunting, and so on, it was not unusual 
for women to take over men’s tasks as so-called “deputy husbands,” par-
ticularly if the husband was sick or traveling. The complexities of gender 
in colonial and early US history were also reflected in the complex 
language used to describe people. As Greta LaFleur puts it, 
it should not be surprising that research on eighteenth-century 
gender has demonstrated that an incredibly wide vocabulary existed 
to describe different forms of socially recognizable gender, including 
terms such as macroclitorides, sapphists, tribades, amazons, female 
husbands, mollies, bachlors, macaronis, viragos, fops, tommies, effem-
inate men, petit-maitres, “unsex’d females,” and masculine women, to 
name only a few.134 
Of course, women did live primarily in a world of submission to 
fatherly power. But compared to, say, the capitalist housewife era, 
women’s work may have been more significantly valued, or seen as work. 
Women also retained control over the birthing sphere.135 Later, with the 
rise of medical science, women’s control over areas of social life such as 
birthing would be diminished. But as Mary Beth Norton has argued, “the 
adult woman occupied a clearly defined place in the seventeenth-century 
family—so much so that she was seen more as a part of that system and 
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less as an autonomous person. Indeed, her authority derived from her 
role as mistress of the household.”136 Women were expected to take care 
of managing the house, and the affairs of the husband. And laws of 
coverture meant that marriage was also a relation of dispossession. This 
went back to England where, as Amy Dru Stanley argues,
like the wage contract, the marriage contract was founded on consent 
and created a relation of authority and subordination premised on 
reciprocal exchange: the common law named the wife a dependent and 
bound her to serve and obey her husband in return for his protection. 
Like the servant, she owed her husband her labor and its proceeds, 
though in exchange not for wages but for subsistence.137 
The marriage contract, then, effectively served as a labor contract 
between husband and wife in which the dispossessed wife was to serve 
the husband as a subordinate through her labor. This was reflected in 
American colonial law. Colonies set laws in which, when married, a 
woman forfeited whatever right to property she might have: her property 
became her husband’s property.138 There was some variation in this, 
though, and widows in some colonies, for instance, had the right to own 
a portion of their dead husband’s land and sell it if they desired. This was 
uneven between colonies. In Massachusetts, for example, it was common 
upon a husband’s death for all his possessions to pass to male heirs who 
were legally instructed to take care of the widows while in Maryland, to 
take another case, it was even possible for a remarried widow to retain 
ownership of her previous husband’s land after remarriage.139 
These gender norms also meant that men had the right to define 
and control women’s sexuality through the use of force or violence. In 
the case of rape, for example, its definition had been decided by white 
men, which continued through the post-Revolutionary era.140 While it 
was generally agreed that sexual relations were to be legally consented 
on, what consent meant was a male-defined category.141 It was expected 
that some degree of male to female pressure and violence would occur 
in sexual relations; women would naturally resist men’s urges until, 
realizing their sexuality, they would consent. And if a woman was raped, 
it was not unusual for her to be blamed; if a man raped her, it must have 
been due to the fact that she had somehow seduced him by failing to 
control her passions. It was also highly racialized; a black man who raped 
a white woman, for example, would easily be charged while, say, a white 
man who raped a black woman would rarely. 
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In Virginia, where environmental conditions were harsher, gender 
relations also played out somewhat differently. By 1620 the Virginia 
Company began to send over “Tobacco Brides” to marry men who they 
hoped had a higher social status than their own.142 But most women 
who went to the colony came as indentured servants where they proved 
to be cheaper to Virginia colonists than men which, in some cases, 
meant their conditions could be worse than male servants. And while 
women indentured servants were often tasked with housework—as was 
a women’s role—it was not unusual for them to also be put to work in 
the tobacco fields by the relatively poor farmers who purchased years 
of their lives.143 Thus, in the colony which had the most capitalistic 
relations, women’s role as commodified indentured labor could fuel 
small-scale capitalist production. Additionally, in the south, pre-marital 
sexual relations may have also been more difficult to regulate. As settlers 
scattered throughout Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina, pastors 
often proved too far and few between to formalize marriage relations, 
although missionaries did, at times, go so far as to travel to find cohab-
itating couples who they could formally marry.144 So while the colonial 
elite and religious leaders may have held strict views on proper marriage 
and sexual relationships, it appears that settlers and farmers themselves 
had more informal relationship patterns and customs. 
Lastly, the social reproduction of the patriarchal family drove empire 
westward. As J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur put it, 
I envy no man’s prosperity, and with no other portion of happiness that 
that I may live to teach the same philosophy to my children; and give 
each of them a farm, shew them how to cultivate it, and be like their 
father, good substantial independent American farmers—an appel-
lation which will be the most fortunate one, a man of my class can 
possess, so long as our civil government continues to shed blessings 
on our husbandry.145 
In other words, a husband’s duty was to provide land to his future male 
offspring. In this sense, as long as the population expanded, so the patri-
archal household mode of production was necessarily spatially expansive. 
Reformism, white hegemony, and the remaking of gender
By the beginning of the 1800s, as the increasing dominance of capitalist 
relations remade the patriarchal household mode of social reproduction, 
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reformist movements began that, over time, pushed against the sexual 
and gender fluidity of the earlier era towards a more “binary” form of 
gender relations dominated by white middle and upper class concep-
tions of femininity and masculinity. White women were the purifiers 
of the family against the corruption of market forces, and against the 
troubled behaviors of blacks and other non-white racial categories as 
gender, class, and race shaped each other. And while these new gender 
relations were organized around family and households, they also 
stretched well beyond this into science, medicine, public health, crim-
inality, and broader relations of social normalization and discipline. 
These new relations would constitute the racialized gender background 
of American colonization and capitalism. 
One of the issues the founding patriarchal elite faced was how to 
create a white, hegemonic social order. This also entailed the creation of 
a national identity. The new country was a diverse place and it was not 
clear how a new national hegemony might be built.146 Additionally, the 
uprooting of the political order that the revolution created also led to 
the opening of a new space of sexual freedom for Americans.147 For the 
country’s elite, untamed sexual behaviors, racial intermixing, and fluid 
gender categories were a threat to the new state. Sexuality beyond the 
limits of what the ruling elite viewed as “civilized” had to be tamed for 
the stability of the government. In other words, for social stability, it was 
necessary that patriarchy run through the family to the state and back 
again.148 
By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to establish 
hegemony, increasingly middle and upper class men and women asserted 
their gender norms as the proper civil norms for society as a whole. This 
was seen most prominently in the rise of reformist movements and 
benevolent societies.149 In some cases, these societies simply aimed for 
tasks such as poor relief, and were even led by blacks and emerged from 
black communities. In other cases, they aimed to curtail the anomie of 
society to, for example, limit men’s urge to drink alcohol or engage in 
aggressive behavior. The American peace movement of the 1830s, for 
example, saw war and violence as in large part due to men’s aggressive 
behaviors. By viewing war and aggression as “manly,” men’s attempt to 
live up to their masculine ideals created a culture of violence and mili-
tarism.150 By remaking manhood and limiting these tendencies, a more 
stable social order could be built, it was believed. 
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Central to this was marriage. In the early republic, marriage was 
still relatively flexible, in some respects less set in stone by the state 
than sanctioned by couples and recognized by local communities. But 
over time state-sanctioned marriage, along with the idea that the only 
legitimate sex was sex in a married relationship, solidified as, for example, 
from 1820 to 1860 states continually remade divorce laws as separation 
transformed towards a more solidly state-enforced relationship.151 And 
by the 1840s, what Stephanie Coontz calls the “triumph of conserva-
tive domesticity” was achieved.152 This was organized around the new 
middle class. While the idea of separate spheres for men and women 
existed before this, by the 1840s an American middle class stabilized, 
internalizing the value of women’s space as the “pure” household against 
the men’s corrupt marketplace world, which became, in many respects, 
the dominant hegemonic ideology and structure of “legitimate” sex and 
gender relations in the country. As one commentator put it, 
the American shopkeeper’s wife and daughters are never seen at the 
scene of business, for which they are neither intended nor qualified; 
and, being unable to assist him in trade, are more happily employed in 
preserving the purity and sanctity of his fire-side. They give him that 
which he would otherwise be obliged to resign—a home in the bosom 
of his family.153
This was also a racial ideology and structure.154 White woman’s space 
was defined against what was not white. Black women, who often 
had to work to survive, and “free” black men, without the privileges 
of whites, were devalued as less “masculine” or “feminine,” or overly 
sexualized, in that they could not fulfill the ideal of white masculinity 
and femininity.155 This was reflected in standards of hygiene and science. 
Historically, going back to the colonial era, whiteness was seen as pure 
and clean, in contrast to dirty blackness and brownness. This was further 
solidified as (somewhat) regular bathing became a norm for white 
Americans and as soap advertisers began “to depict soap as an imperial 
agent, capable of civilizing the brown peoples of the world.”156 And while 
the idea that race was “biological” had been around in the eighteenth 
century, in the decades before the Civil War race increasingly became 
an object of science. In this, race was seen along a biological spectrum 
in which whites were seen as the perfect or superior race, and blacks as 
the most inferior.157 
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Additionally, the development of separate spheres did not take on the 
same meaning in southern plantation capitalism. While in the south 
politics and economic production were led by the white planter class, 
plantations were essentially capitalist households which produced for 
profits on the market while generating self-sufficient production to 
reproduce the plantation society itself, the most capitalistically rational 
way of obtaining basic goods given the general structure of the south. 
Plantations themselves were at times considered personal empires—con-
ceptualized in gendered imperial terms. Fox-Genovese notes one case 
in which southerner Mary Moragne discussed her mother’s break from 
housework as resting from the “weight of empire.”158 And patriarchy ran 
through each aspect of southern society as, while white mothers occa-
sionally took care of the plantation when their husbands were away, their 
space was primarily one of domestic management and production. Yet 
male space was not that of “the market” in contrast to women’s space as 
“the household”; the organization of capitalist patriarchy went through 
states through gender and household in a broadly organized social 
hierarchy built on the empire of black slave workers fighting to build 
their own family lives through the abuse of the slave system. 
Capitalism also encouraged the development of the prostitution 
industry. In New York, for example, brothels flourished in the decades 
after the revolution, organized according to the class geography of the 
city. While some women who became prostitutes were simply the victims 
of the violence of capital, and inability to find other work, some of New 
York’s leading female brothel owners became both rich and famous, such 
as Julia Brown, who was a regular at the city’s high level social events.159 
And many capitalist landlords were happy to lease their real estate to 
brothels, as it brought high returns. Prostitution was also organized 
around race and some degree of gender non-conforming behavior was in 
some cases tolerated. For example, as Timothy Gilfoyle records, in 1836 
Peter Sewally, a black man, was convicted of grand larceny. In the case, 
it turned out, though, that Sewally lived in a brothel and went by the 
name of Mary Jones. Under this alias, Sewally dressed in female clothes, 
greeted guests, cooked, and performed domestic work.160
More generally, what was “normal” or “abnormal” also increasingly 
became a science. During the last half of the seventeenth century when 
prosecutions against witches reached their peak, for instance, it was 
possession or a deal with the devil, rather than madness or insanity, 
which was used to explain deviant behavior. Around 80 percent of those 
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accused were women, and around three-quarters of accusers were men, 
as supposedly women were more susceptible to the devil’s influence. But 
by the first quarter of the eighteenth century, behavior which would have 
been considered witchcraft was increasingly seen in terms of sanity. Over 
time, “madness” became less interpreted through spiritual terms, and 
more in biological terms.161 And in 1833 the opening of the Worcester 
State Lunatic Hospital signaled a new era in treating madness. Like race, 
“normal” (that is, white hegemonic) sex and gender were also seen in 
scientific terms, perhaps most abrasively in the development of a science 
of homosexuality as a medical illness. By the early 1800s, European 
doctors began to view gender deviance through a scientific rather than 
religious lens, as would American doctors for whom everything from 
homosexuality to masturbation could be seen as the result of illness, 
the medicine being techniques including institutional confinement and 
shock treatment.162 
In summary, the transition to capitalism in the United States both 
created, and resulted from, a political history in which the development 
of white hegemony punished all those that did not fit into its dominant 
categories of “normal” relations. And the forms of masculinity and 
femininity built through the rise of capitalism were also imperial gender 
forms, fueling the rise of Manifest Destiny and the fulfillment of the 
imperial visions of, for instance, Andrew Jackson’s violent manhood.163 
The new more capitalist gender form centered around the hegemonic 
breadwinner-housewife relation as a specific political form which 
deemed other racialized gender categories as deviant. In this sense, 
the “totality” of capitalism stretched well beyond the narrow confines 
that analysis of class struggle and modes of production in themselves 
produce, to race, complex gender relations, science, social deviance, and 
beyond. To write the history of capitalism and gender simply within 
the lens of households and kinship relations misses this history and, in 
doing so, substitutes a partial, economistic narrative of capitalism’s social 
totality for its broader, more complex history. The rest of the book will 
examine how these relations played out as the society with capitalism 
became a capitalist society. 
2
The Expansion of Empire
The early United States was a society on the move. Travel writers, for 
example, were continually fascinated with the pace of expansion as the 
population pushed west. As the Marquis de Chastellux put it in the early 
1780s, “whatever mountains I have climbed, whatever forests I have 
traversed, whatever bye-paths I have followed, I have never travelled 
three miles without meeting with a new settlement, either beginning to 
take form or already in cultivation.”1 The Marquis found that:
any man who is able to procure a capital of five or six hundred livres 
of our money, or about twenty-five pounds sterling, and who has 
strength and inclination to work, may go into the woods and purchase 
a portion of one hundred and fifty or two hundred acres of land … at 
the end of two years, the planter has the wherewithal to subsist, and 
even to send some articles to market: at the end of four or five years, 
he completes the payment of his land, and finds himself a comfortable 
planter.2
In this context, this chapter outlines the history of white-settler 
expansion into Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. The goal 
here is not to provide a complete history, so much as to chart the course 
of capitalism on the expanding early western frontier and show how, 
gradually, over many decades, social life became subsumed to capitalist 
relations of production. In particular, the chapter emphasizes the 
diversity of social life in the processes that drove colonial expansion. 
In 1630 less than 5,000 white settlers lived in the North American 
colony. That number reached almost 112,000 by 1670, half a million by 
the 1720s, and was over 2 million by the eve of the American Revolution. 
Among other states, the population of Massachusetts rose during this 
period to 235,308, New York to 162,920, and Pennsylvania to 240,057.3 
The growth of the white-settler population, also fueled by immigration 
from England, Scotland, Ireland, the Low Countries, Germany, and 
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elsewhere, pushed westward expansion. In 1850, for instance, while 
about three-quarters of the surveyed so-called “native” US population 
lived in the states where they were born, a quarter did not.4 Every year 
thousands upon thousands of white colonialists moved further west. But 
the population laboring to build the racialized and gendered empire did 
not necessarily move west to spread capitalism. Many frontier settlers 
may have moved to escape a rising capitalist dependency in the east, only 
to find themselves competing with speculators who viewed the west as a 
great space for potential profit. 
White-settler colonialism also gradually became a capitalist-driven 
industry.5 Cities were built on the western frontier serving as conduits for 
empire as, for instance, journeying through the old northwest, William 
Amphlett wrote in 1818, “Pittsburg is the head-quarters of all those who 
are about to settle in the States of Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Illinois, or the 
countries bordering on the Mississippi.”6 While many settlers initially 
self-organized their means of transportation, over time the movement of 
people became increasingly commodified. On their way to the frontier, 
Amphlett observed, settlers could hire a wagoner to transport their 
luggage. “Most of these waggoners are the proprietors of their own teams; 
many of them farmers, who employ their horses in this manner, when 
their work is not wanted at home; others make it their entire business.”7 
In other cases, “many emigrants purchase horses and waggons at Phila-
delphia, and take at once their families and their luggage, in order to be 
masters of their time, and travel on as suits their inclination or conven-
ience.”8 In other words, as families decided to move west they produced 
their own strategies and technologies of expansion yet, by the middle of 
the century with the transportation revolution, steamboat and railroad 
companies combined territorial and capitalist expansion.9 But—on the 
ground—the frontier population had not yet necessarily internalized the 
power and habits of capitalist time discipline.10 To be “free” was not yet 
necessarily to be a living commodity within capitalism. 
The social pressures behind expansion were numerous. While military 
force and violence against indigenous people played a role, socially, 
expansion was also pushed by the extensive (spatially/geographically 
expanding) logic of growth of the patriarchal household mode of social 
reproduction. This mode of life entailed a particular land-labor ratio 
necessary for its expanded reproduction in which younger generations 
could obtain land to reproduce the family farm and obtain competency 
and independence. In the eighteenth century, average family sizes 
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reached as high as seven or eight, decreasing to around four or five by 
the middle of the nineteenth century.11 Much of this decline was in rural 
areas, given that these populations tended to have more children, and 
it also appears that there is a direct correlation between declining land 
availability and a decrease in the fertility rate.12 Simply put, when frontier 
households could obtain land with relative ease, and reproduce the patri-
archal household mode of social reproduction on expanded scales, the 
fertility rate stayed high as population increase articulated with the mode 
of production to push further white-settler colonialism. As capitalist 
market relations began to subsume these relations of production, one 
result was declining household sizes and fertility rates as, addition-
ally, family structures began to change as younger generations found 
themselves increasingly dependent upon commodity relations. 
As colonization spread, a mapmaking industry also developed in which 
the imagery of empire was commodified and sold, bringing together the 
“imagined community” of the new American nation.13 Historically, orna-
mental maps became popular to display in state buildings as well as on 
the household walls of the nouveau riche and rising middling consumer 
classes in Western Europe.14 These habits transferred to the United States 
as the mapmaking and atlas industry grew after the revolution. Abel 
Buell’s A New and Correct Map of the United States of North America: 
Layd down from the Latest Observations and Best Authorities Agreeable to 
the Peace of 1783 is said to be the first full map of the country produced 
by an American for the American market.15 Soon after others followed, 
as maps, expressing the image of empire, became a popular commodity 
to display for wealthier classes in the urban United States.16 Over time, 
as capitalism deepened, mapmaking itself became increasingly scientific 
not only glorifying empire, but also outlining the locations of roads and 
resources in more detail for capital to access and appropriate. Thus, the 
population grew and the course of empire was charted.
Massachusetts
As the previous chapter argued, the British colonies in North America 
were born as a product of the larger history of European colonialism. 
Just as English farmers crossed the ocean to escape “primitive accu-
mulation” on the island, so English investors saw North America as a 
potential space to generate profits.17 From the start, English merchants 
attempted to transport colonialists to the American colony for the 
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purposes of generating profit. This represented an attempted symbiosis 
or articulation of mixed modes of production. As Bernard Bailyn puts 
it, “the theory was simple and convincing: costs could be reduced and 
profits greatly increased by sending settlers to New England, where, as 
self-sufficient residents, they could catch fish, collect furs, and process 
other products for shipment to the entrepreneurs in England.”18 The 
hope of merchants was that, however the settlers organized their means 
of production, it would at least be subsumed to capital to the extent to 
which profits would be generated back home. 
 But the social relations that did form were not so easy to subsume. 
This was reflected in the early patterns of uneven development in Massa-
chusetts that formed both capitalist and non-capitalist elements.19 While 
the Massachusetts/New England town has often been thought of as an 
example of bottom-up American democracy, paving the way for the 
legacy of today, as Kenneth Lockridge put it, “the equality of the society 
was nothing less than the equality of economic interests which lies at 
the heart, not of modern pluralistic democracy, but of Marxist-Leninist 
democracy.”20 Dedham, for instance, was founded as a utopian Puri-
tanical dream, a “Christian Utopian Closed Corporate Community.”21 
The seventeenth-century town had a population of 500 and was an 
agrarian community of yeomen and husbandmen who organized their 
lives around a patriarchal household mode of social reproduction. The 
average adult man had approximately 150 acres of land, and, while 
engaged in barter and generally non-monetarized trade with other 
community members, was also relatively self-sufficient in meeting basic 
needs. It was not an equal society; social position was determined by 
community status, and those with higher status also tended to have more 
land and wealth, and were more commonly chosen to be selectmen. But 
community decisions tended to be made from the bottom up including 
the distribution of property and use of a common field system although 
the latter became increasingly fenced in through the mid to late 1600s.22
Similarly, although coastal towns may have tended towards more 
commercially oriented production for the world market, in some cases 
the social relations of production were also decisively non-capitalist. 
Towns including Gloucester, while lacking the potentially conflict 
reducing religious and cultural coherency of Dedham, developed similar 
productive relations. With ample land, newcomers to the town were 
given allotments, and commonly owned and shared land existed through 
the end of the 1600s.23 Much of production, including the use of local 
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timber or the licensing of a cornmill and sawmill were oriented more 
towards sustaining the community of the town rather than production 
for profit.24 
In Deerfield by the late 1680s around 235 people had settled. This 
population was generally young, three-quarters of them under 40, and 
tended to marry before the age of 25 after obtaining and developing 
a piece of land to obtain competency and start a family.25 Many of the 
settlers immigrated from other relatively nearby towns, while some 
traveled from further south and east as expansion was a gradual process 
in which many settlers took small steps west to pave the empire. Relations 
of capital and profit-seeking behavior were not necessarily absent in new 
settlements. In Deerfield, for example, John Pynchon owned and rented 
land for a profit through the 1680s.26 But the relations of production 
that formed were similar to other settlements throughout the colony. 
Farmers generally owned their own land, tools, and livestock. Some land 
was held in common, albeit with the holdings of the wealthier higher 
than others.27 But most production was to reproduce the relatively 
self-sufficient household and most trade was on a barter basis as a dense 
network of debts and interdependencies developed. 
But while, on the one hand, these non-capitalist relations formed, 
on the other hand, aspects of capitalism also developed. In 1641, for 
example, John Winthrop Jr. returned to England with the support of the 
Massachusetts General Court to locate investors for iron production. 
He was eventually successful and in 1643 the Company of Undertakers 
of the Ironworks in New England was formed. After attempts to start 
ironworks in Braintree in 1644 and 1645, in 1646 the construction of 
ironworks on the Saugus River began and became the primary site of 
production, although the Braintree ironworks also remained open.28 
To produce iron, the company needed laborers. Skilled workers were 
recruited from Britain and Ireland. Less skilled workers were hired from 
the local Massachusetts labor force. Some workers were paid wages; 
others were contracted as indentured servants. But a stable labor supply 
remained difficult to obtain. The English Civil War provided some 
impetus for the importation of new workers as, for instance, hundreds of 
Scottish soldiers were captured and sent to New England, the Chesapeake 
colony, or the West Indies in the early 1650s. In 1650, sixty-two of 
these prisoners were taken control of by the Company of Undertakers, 
thirty-six of those making it to Saugus.29 Many of the workers imported 
also did not conform to Puritan standards of life, yet the colony made 
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exceptions. Overall, by the middle of the 1600s, some capitalist relations 
did exist in the colony.
Capitalist relations also formed in coastal towns, linked into broader 
movements of the world market. English, along with other European 
fisherman, worked their way to Newfoundland throughout the sixteenth 
century, hunting for cod and herring. By the time the New England 
fishing industry began to take shape it was rooted in a long tradition 
of North American fishing and nautical exploration. By the end of the 
1620s, the colony appointed a master to hire seasonal servants to go on 
fishing expeditions given the low labor supply of the colony.30 After the 
outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642, the flow of immigration from 
England to the Massachusetts colony, and the capital that entailed, dried 
up. Prices decreased, credit diminished, and the balance of trade turned. 
At the same time, the price of fish across the Atlantic increased in places 
such as Seville and Madeira, which regularly imported fish from across 
the ocean. The price of fish also increased in New England itself. And the 
number of English ships in Newfoundland dropped from 340 in 1634 to 
under 200 by 1652.31 In response, New England merchants channeled 
their capital into the fishing industry, stimulating decades of growth. 
While a substantial portion of fishers owned shares in vessels, perhaps 
60 percent did not. Their option was either to contract with a company 
or rent out a boat with other fishermen. As the industry continued to 
develop, its capitalist character deepened. While, for example, previously 
a group of fishermen might rent a boat than share the catch, by the 
mid-1670s increasingly crews worked for merchant capitalists who 
owned boats and rented them out in return for three-eighths of the 
profits.32 While workers might not directly be paid a monetary wage, 
they were paid indirect wages in the form of a share of the proceeds 
from the catch; in effect, they functioned as a dispossessed proletariat 
class dependent on selling their labor power for a wage, albeit not in 
the classic Marxist conceptualization. As one observer of the time put it, 
“the equipment of the ships and crews employed in that trade resemble 
a privateering expedition; officers and sailors receiving in a measure, the 
prize-money instead of regular wages. Every man on board has a share 
in the profits, which is according to his rank and employment.”33 In this 
way, “they have no wages; each draws a certain established share in part-
nership with the proprietor of the vessel; by which oeconomy they are 
all proportionately concerned in the success of the enterprise, and all 
equally alert and vigilant.”34
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Slavery also existed in the colony from an early age. Pequot’s were 
captured in war in the 1630s, and by 1637 were sold to the West Indies.35 
Black slaves were imported as early as 1638 and played a role in the 
building of empire.36 Although the population was not large, it was over 
2,674 by 1754. Slaves did much of the manual labor for their owners, 
clearing and planting fields, constructing buildings, building wells, and 
so on. Slave labor was used in a wide variety of ways, incorporated into 
the households of wealthy farmers and artisans to do everything from 
farming to act as household servants, to in some cases develop artisanal 
skills such as tailoring. Generally, slaves were purchased by the elite as a 
symbol of their status.37 Whether or not slaves were directly put to use by 
capital, their role as household labor for capitalists may have contributed 
indirectly to early capitalist development.
Deepening capitalism
Throughout the middle of the 1700s settlers continued to steadily flow 
into central Massachusetts. While the central-western part of the state 
had incorporated nine towns before 1740 there were a total of forty-four 
towns by the mid-1770s.38 Many communities established new towns 
in reminiscence of the older New England communal tradition but a 
population of dispossessed transients, the “wandering poor,” also took 
shape. Some who moved west were the dispossessed, looking to re-start 
their lives, and they were often greeted by communities which put in 
place laws and policies to remove them from the towns in which they 
tried to settle. As land became less available in more established towns 
with better soil, some took to the hills. The town of Pelham, for example, 
was settled in the 1740s and by the 1760s most producers worked on 
an estimated 4–7 acres of cleared land, and had ten or more for pasture 
and orchards.39 They continued to reproduce the patriarchal household 
mode of social reproduction even amongst the pressures of limited land 
plots and debt. 
But these rural communities were gradually pushed and pulled into 
capitalist relations in a slow and uneven way. Christopher Clark’s study, 
for instance, shows the ways that farming families in the Connecticut 
Valley were gradually, over decades, brought into capitalist relations. 
In the late eighteenth century farmers were not self-sufficient. They 
regularly exchanged goods and services with neighbors and the few 
merchants around the area. But they spoke in a language of “give and 
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take” rather than “buy and sell” and exchange relations were built into 
community and kinship relations.40 Neighbors swapped labor, depending 
on resources and community obligation. And debts were exchanged in 
services and labor, although occasionally money, and were built on social 
trust as they often went for many years without being settled. Overall, 
farmers worked to develop competent lifestyles—that is, comfortable 
lifestyles given the social needs of the time—and provide resources, par-
ticularly land, for their male heirs.
Over time, this mode of life became increasingly incorporated into 
capitalist relations. Debt became one avenue of the enforcement of 
market relations. Between 1811 and 1822 on average about fifty people a 
year were imprisoned on debt charges as indebted farmers were forced to 
produce for the market in order to pay their creditors.41 As the population 
increased and land became more difficult to come by, the size of farms 
also shrank. In early settlements it was not unusual for farmers to claim 
200–400 acres, but by the early nineteenth century a middling farmer 
might have 50 acres.42 This meant that patriarchal inheritance relations 
became more difficult to reproduce as less land was available to pass on 
to heirs. Given this, more and more of the population began to look for 
new routes of social reproduction. In some cases, for instance, young 
farmers unable to secure land found work in paper and textile mills. 
Women’s labor also changed. The rise of industry coincided with the 
development of outwork, especially after the 1820s.43 As manufactured 
textiles became more common, households could purchase clothing and 
focus on other work. Women, for example, produced buttons and hats, 
working within their own homes, supplied by merchants through the 
putting-out system. And most famously, the Lowell girls helped fuel the 
US industrial revolution.44
Similarly, in Franklin County farmers lived to “earn competency.”45 
In other words, their goal was not capital accumulation, but social and 
familial stability and comfort. But, as capitalism gradually took hold, 
farmers searched for new ways of finding competency through its power 
while still attempting to reproduce the patriarchal household mode of 
social reproduction. One of the main strategies of lowland farmers was to 
raise cattle and then hire drovers to sell it in cities such as Boston or New 
York. By the 1820s profits in the cattle industry diminished, after which 
farmers shifted their capital to broom corn production, while upland 
farmers began to specialize in the production of broom handles.46 And 
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in the 1850s farmers also began to experiment by producing tobacco for 
the market. 
In Essex County, although, as discussed, a capitalist fishing industry 
took off, rural society was structured around patriarchal household 
relations. Relations of exchange were personalized, based upon kinship 
and community, rather than profit.47 Yet, like in the western countryside, 
as the population increased and land became more difficult to come by, 
young people searched for new sources of employment. One option was 
military service; the Seven Years’ War, for example, provided soldiers 
with payment in wage form, acclimating them to be wage laborers. Those 
who were close to the coast could participate in the fishing industry. And 
others became craft producers and artisans.48 All of these functioned to 
erode the independent patriarchal household lifestyle. 
Rural capitalist transformation was also accelerated as capitalist social 
relations were expressed through industrialization. Increasing propor-
tions of rural society began to acquire competency through manufacture 
rather than agriculture. For instance, in Greenfield in 1771, 87 percent 
of male household heads owned some improved land, and most that did 
not were younger people waiting for inheritance. By 1820, 56 percent of 
adults were employed in agriculture, 38 percent in manufacturing, and 
7 percent in commercial occupations.49 In Dudley and Oxford, patriar-
chal household relations remained dominant through the start of the 
nineteenth century. Here, capitalist development and industrialization 
developed together. Between 1810 and 1830 about twenty textile mills 
were constructed in the two towns. Samuel Slater, who helped start the 
first factories built on the British industrial model in the 1790s, moved 
to the region in the 1810s and began constructing textile manufactures. 
By 1824, he owned three clusters of factories in Dudley and Oxford.50 
Between 1810 and 1830, the amount of land auctioned off due to debts 
after the death of farmers who owned the land rose from 19.9 percent to 
46.2 percent.51 In an increasingly economically precarious environment, 
young people were forced to search for new methods of social repro-
duction. Attempting to sustain family competency, they entered into 
the market, in doing so gradually dismantling the previously dominant 
mode of life. In some cases, this meant engaging in outwork. In other 
cases, they became wage laborers. By 1832, 816 workers were recorded 
working in the textile factories in the two towns. Around 40 percent were 
women, 35 percent men, and the last quarter children between 8 and 16. 
All of them were “free” wage laborers.52 
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By the 1720s, towns were being developed on what is, today, the 
western edge of the state. One observer noted, “the country people 
generally manufacture their own clothing, and make considerable 
quantities of tow cloth for exportation. The other manufactures are 
ashes, maple-sugar, bricks, pottery, and iron ware. All this ‘surplus’ goes 
to Boston.”53 And another traveler through western Massachusetts stated, 
coming across a settler, 
he was settled in the midst of the forest, surrounded with rocks 
and woods, and his habitation had the most dreary appearance. He 
however made a subsistence, raised plenty of grain, and made his 
own sugar from maple trees. This practice I found very common; the 
forests in this part of the country abound with the maple and sugar is 
extracted with great ease.54 
What became Great Barrington, for example, was settled initially during 
that decade. While some settlers of Dutch heritage came from New York, 
and some from further south in Sheffield, many came from towns further 
east including Westfield and Springfield.55 By 1800, the town produced 
a variety of goods from potash to pottery to hats and shoes, to wool and 
flax, and so on. Some households appear to have been incorporated into 
a putting-out system as they were provided with looms to weave wool 
and flax after which the product was completed at a fulling mill.56 But 
the majority wore homespun clothing, and producers, from blacksmiths 
to hatmakers, tended to own their own means of production. Similarly, 
Pittsfield, a new town of log cabins in the 1750s, was a community of free-
holders. Land was divided into plots, not entirely equal based upon the 
status of those who received them, and some land was held in common.57 
Not everyone in Pittsville was necessarily a landowner. As early as the 
1760s, perhaps three or four dozen laborers were temporarily hired.58 
But in general settlements on the far western edge of the state followed a 
similar trajectory of those further east. 
By the last decades before the Civil War the state was well on its way 
towards capitalism. Industrial production itself, according to the state’s 
own survey’s, rose from $86,282,616 in 1837 to $295,820,681 in 1855, 
although the actual number was higher than this due both to the fact 
that the survey did not look at every industry and for tax purposes 
some people likely underestimated their production.59 While industrial 
development was uneven, as even far western towns developed various 
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mills to process raw materials, generally the west tended to serve as a 
space producing agricultural goods for the more industrialized eastern 
parts of the state. Through decreasing land availability, incorporation 
into monetarized debt networks, an increasing emphasis on commodity 
production, and gradual development of a larger and larger dispossessed 
proletariat, life choices were increasingly constrained by the power 
of capital, forcing younger generations to incorporate into capitalist 
relations or head further west to the frontier. 
New Netherland
New York was born into the battleground of empires. From New 
Netherland and New Sweden to New York, French and British battles 
during the Seven Years’ War, to the eradication of native populations, 
and, finally, the making of a nationally American imperial formation, 
New York—the empire state—emerged as a key component of the rising 
American Empire. And unlike New England, which experimented 
with communal forms of landownership and developed a strong moral 
economy, or Virginia, which developed a slave-based political economy, 
New Netherland, from the start, developed along a capitalist trajectory, 
although New York State would later unevenly develop not-so-capitalist 
elements. 
The colony was started for profit and politics. Through the sev-
enteenth century the Dutch emerged as the leaders of European and 
Atlantic world capitalism, and the colony of New Netherland demon-
strated this relationship. European explorers first arrived in the New 
York region in 1524 when Italian Giovanni da Verrazzano, sponsored 
by France, anchored near Staten Island. But motivation to colonize the 
region did not develop until Henry Hudson, under employment from 
the Dutch East India Company, explored the region in his search for the 
fabled Northwest Passage in 1609.60 Following Hudson’s initial explora-
tion, other Dutch ships began to enter into the region, which by 1614 
took on the name New Netherland. In 1614, following these explorations, 
four companies merged to start the Compagnie van Nieuwnederland. 
The Dutch States General granted the company a patent to monopolize 
trade in discovered areas initially for three years. Several years later the 
West India Company was formed. By this point, Dutch ships had begun 
sailing across the Atlantic from Brazil to Africa in search of merchant 
profits. They imported sugar from Brazil and spices, ivory, and gold from 
60 . how america became capitalist
West Africa as the Dutch emerged as a colonial power in competition 
with the other European powers.61
On June 3, 1621, the West India Company received its charter. The 
company acquired monopoly rights for trade and navigation within 
West Africa and the Americas, along with rights to act as a military and 
naval power and function as a governmental structure.62 It formed as 
both a political and economic organization: its goal was to interrupt the 
Spanish Empire and create profits through trade for its investors. The 
company was also given the responsibility to “advance the peopling” of 
unsettled land, and effectively granted the right to colonize foreign land, 
incorporating it into the Dutch Empire. In 1622, following a dispute 
between the Dutch and English ambassador, Sir Dudley Carlton, who 
suggested the English had previous claims to North American territory, 
the West India Company began to organize plans for a small settlement 
in New Netherland. Through 1624 and 1625, the Dutch began to send 
settlers to the colony. In March 1624, for example, thirty Walloon families 
sailed to the colony. The company also brought over cows and horses in 
an attempt to make a self-sustaining colony.63 But the main goals of the 
settlers were set as, first, to act as a defense force against possible English 
colonization—the Walloons were required to serve as a military force if 
called upon—and to engage in the fur trade. 
Throughout 1625 and 1626, more settlers, along with plants, trees, 
seeds, and so on, sailed to the colony. Of course, the land was far from 
unsettled, and relations with natives would condition the patterns of 
Dutch colonization. The two main settlements that formed were Fort 
Orange (present day Albany) and New Amsterdam (present day New 
York City). In 1626 an Indian war broke out around Fort Orange. Local 
commander Daniel Van Crieckenbeeck decided to disobey company 
orders of neutrality and join the Mohicans warring against the Mohawks. 
Several Dutch soldiers were killed and, with the threat that the Mohawks 
might wipe out Fort Orange, colony commander Pieter Minuit traveled 
to Fort Orange in spring 1626. Minuit made a deal with the Mohawks 
in which settler families would be moved to Manhattan, and from that 
moment onwards New Amsterdam became the center of Dutch activity 
in the colony.64 
By the late 1620s two fractions developed within the West India 
Company. On the one hand, some argued for the continuation of the 
colony primarily as a commercial venture. On the other, some argued 
that continued resources needed to be put into colonization itself, and 
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New Netherland could be transformed into a self-sustaining agricul-
tural exporter. As a compromise, they put in place the patroon system 
under the charter for Freedoms and Exemptions in 1629. Patroons were 
manorial fiefdoms granted to the colonial elite. Patroons were given 
limited rights to govern their patroons and sailing rights. They were 
also given the right to trade in beaver pelts, with the cost of one guilder 
for each pelt obtained. But the patroonship system was, in most cases, 
ultimately not successful, with only one patroonship, Rensselaerswyck, 
succeeding in the long run.65 
While the colony was driven by a profit-seeking fur industry, to 
succeed it also needed to develop other components such as artisanal 
production and farming. This entailed the formation of a labor force and 
class structure. By 1664, before the English conquered the colony, the 
population was reaching 9,000. Most immigrants came from the United 
Provinces, and between 1657 and 1664 close to 70 percent of these were 
married couples.66 Additionally, perhaps a quarter of immigrants were 
not Dutch but from other parts of Europe. Besides Europeans, black 
Africans arrived as early as 1626. Many of these were captured from 
Portuguese and Spanish colonies, already “seasoned” from working on 
sugar plantations. Initially, black slaves were employed by the West India 
Company and were common by the 1630s. By 1664, perhaps as many 
as 700 slaves were in the colony.67 The colony also had an example of 
what has been called “half freedom.” In 1644, eleven slaves who had 
worked for the company for close to two decades petitioned for freedom 
and were granted a status somewhere between bourgeois freedom and 
slavery.68 This meant that a slave, after many years of service, could be 
freed but would have to pay a rent to the company in the form of agri-
cultural goods and livestock for the rest of their lives. Secondly, if called 
on by the company they would be forced to work for the company for a 
wage. Finally, their children (born and un-born) would be required to 
serve the company as slaves.69 
This status of half freedom demonstrates the continuum of free-unfree 
labor forms in the colony. Half-freed slaves were not slaves, nor were 
they free workers, but something in between. In addition, slaves, half 
freed, and white and free black labor were interchangeable from 
colonial capital’s perspective. Slaves and free laborers, for example, 
worked together as longshoremen. Slaves could also be hired out as 
wage laborers. Patroon owner Stuyvesant, for instance, regularly hired 
out his forty slaves.70 Soldiers also worked as a form of indentured wage 
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laborer. They were recruited by zielverkopers (meaning “sellers of souls”). 
Recruits were lodged and boarded by zielverkopers until hired out. When 
hired they would be given wages two months in advance, which they 
usually immediately gave to their boarders in return for debts for food 
and lodging.71 Cadets, then, served as another form of wage laborer, 
partly “free” and partly indebted servants.
Expansion in New York 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were the most 
powerful capitalist center of power in Europe. But Dutch capitalism 
emerged in an era of rival empires, and the Dutch were soon targeted 
by the English and French for control of the emerging Atlantic world 
market. In 1651 England initiated the Navigation Acts. These stipulated 
all trade into England had to be conducted in English ships, or ships 
from the country of origin, and were targeted to diminish the Dutch 
entrepôt trade.72 This triggered three Anglo-Dutch Wars through the 
next three decades, and in the first of these England captured New 
Amsterdam in 1664, changing its name to New York. While the Dutch 
briefly recaptured it in the third Anglo-Dutch War in 1773, from hereon, 
New York was a part of the British Empire. After restoration, Charles 
II gave New York to his brother James. The latter was given dictatorial 
powers over the colony to govern, provided his laws did not go against 
English law.73 Under James, the Duke’s Laws were passed in 1665. These 
laws, in contrast to the local politics of town meetings in New England, 
did not make provisions for localized elections.
By 1756 the population of New York was around 97,000 people as 
opposed to 220,000 in Pennsylvania.74 One reason for this was due to a 
strong presence of Native Americans in the state who continually pushed 
back early settlers. In 1690, for example, a French and Iroquois attack 
on Schenectady, the most significant colonial settlement outside of New 
York City besides Albany, killed sixty people.75 And the French and Indian 
War further deterred movement west into the territory. But in 1768 the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix further solidified white claims to western land, 
and paved the way for New York to be divided between speculator patent 
holders whose interests were primarily in using the land as a space to 
produce profits for themselves.76 The Revolutionary War also created an 
obstacle for westward expansion into New York. Settlers were attacked in 
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the Cherry Valley region; they were killed and their settlements burned, 
including German Flatts, the westernmost settlement in the region.77 
In addition to native resistance to settler colonialism, the other major 
obstacle to the colonization of New York was the manorial system. Unlike 
the other British colonies in North America which practiced fee simple 
landownership, in New York land was granted to the elite in the form of 
manors. Tenants then moved to the land in return for regularly producing 
agricultural products for the lord of the manor. Although manor lords 
invested in improvements—mills and so on—potential tenant settlers 
tended to seek out other land that they could own. This has led to sug-
gestions that New York manors were something closer to feudalism than 
capitalism. Staughton Lynd, for example, argues the Livingston Manor 
had a “quasi-feudal” character.78 The reasons for this have to do with the 
system of surplus extraction: landowners attempted to directly coerce 
tenants into giving up a portion of their surplus product to the landlord 
in return for use of the land. Tenants were required, in general, to give 
one-tenth of their wheat to the manor, ride with the horse team once 
a year, and buy wood from the manor’s sawmill. Additionally, manors 
often had manor stores that sold spices, rice, molasses, and so on, which 
tenants rarely had choice but to purchase from.79 
But manors such as Livingston may have been less of a quasi-feudal 
mode of production than a kind of capitalist institution that utilized 
tenants rather than wage workers, given the paucity of labor available 
at the time. As David Hamilton Grace has argued, “from the very 
beginning, New York’s great landholders were fully market oriented with 
no open field or commons traditions standing in their way.”80 While their 
cultural habits may have had an aristocratic flair, lords of the manors 
aimed to use their land to make a profit through tenants, quit rents, and 
investments. Livingston, for instance, aimed to generate a profit from his 
tenants, and also, similarly to other landowners, invested in gristmills, 
sawmills, a bakery, and a brewhouse as a way to encourage tenants to 
work under the manor.81 For Livingston, landownership was a way to 
engage in for-profit tenant farming. While the tenants themselves may 
have organized their relations through a patriarchal household mode 
of social reproduction, this became formally subordinated to capital as 
they produced commodities Livingston and his heirs could use to make 
profit.82 In this sense, also, the anti-rent strikes beginning on manors 
such as Rensselaerswyck in 1839 and after were not exactly “feudal” 
per se.83 Rather, they were a kind of reaction to an exploitative form of 
64 . how america became capitalist
market-dependent tenant capitalism in which the Rensselaer family, 
for instance, profited from the direct exploitation of tenant farmers by 
acquiring the results of their labor either in commodities such as wheat 
which could be sold on the market, or else in direct monetary rents and 
fees on, for example, the alienation of land. 
By 1776, settlers had generally not ventured beyond the Hudson Valley 
and Mohawk Valley.84 While the British Proclamation of 1763, following 
the French, British, and Indian War of 1754–63, restricted settlement 
west of the Appalachian Mountains, the frontier of New York had not 
yet reached this point.85 In most central and western New York counties, 
although some settlers did come between 1763 and 1776, it was not until 
after the revolution that many parts of the state were fully settled with 
white colonialists and most western counties were not started until at 
least the 1780s.86 In 1788, a group of investors led by Oliver Phelps and 
Nathanial Gorham purchased about 2.5 million acres of New York.87 
By 1790, though, the investors struggled to make a profit and sold off 
two-thirds of it, or about 2 million acres, to Robert Morris who sold off 
much of this to the Holland Land Company several years later. Unlike the 
manorial system, these speculators purchased the land with the intent of 
selling it.88 Several million new acres of privatized capitalist space were 
opened in central and western New York for settlers to purchase. 
This land ended up in the hands of the Holland Land Company. Dutch 
capitalists viewed the space across the ocean as a potential investment 
outlet for their capital, and purchased 3.3 million acres of land in the 
1790s. They hired Joseph Ellicott, an experienced land surveyor, to turn 
this investment into profit.89 After surveying the land, and beating out 
competing development proposals, Ellicott was hired to manage the ter-
ritory’s development. In contrast to speculators who simply purchased 
the land in order to sell it for a profit, Ellicott pushed an agenda of 
company-led capitalist development. This meant gradually opening 
up more of the territory for sale, and encouraging small and middling 
farmers to settle and, slowly, build up the local economy. This entailed, 
firstly, low or non-existent down payments for settlers.90 Settlers were 
given provisional sale of the land, which meant that they would not 
officially own the land until the settler who purchased it cleared and 
improved an agreed upon portion of the land and made payments to the 
company for the land fronted.91 The company also invested in roads—so 
that producers could gain access to markets—and encouraged millers, 
taverners, blacksmiths, and other necessary settlers to come by offering 
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them discounted land and loans. And, in some cases, the company 
itself financed the construction of mills. It also meant building roads 
and developing water routes so settlers’ goods could arrive at distant 
markets.92
The social relations which formed on the western and northern 
frontiers of New York resulted in a tense symbiosis between Dutch 
capital and the patriarchal household mode of social reproduction. 
Settlers arrived from other parts of greater New England, pushed out 
by declining land availability further east.93 The goal of many settlers 
on the New York frontier was not to put the land to profitable use, but 
to provide for their families and obtain competency. Settlers such as 
Stephen Durfee, a pioneer of Palmyra, noted that early settlements had 
a culture of friendliness due to mutual dependence. But he also notes 
the struggles of that time, particularly alcoholism as whiskey distilleries 
were built and trouble with taxes as money was scarce, and many farmers 
lost property due to inability to pay.94 Joseph Sibley who settled around 
Monroe County says, “in the early years, there was none but a home 
market, and that was mostly barter:—It was so many bushels of wheat 
for a cow; so many bushels for a yoke of oxen, &c. There was hardly 
money enough in the country to pay taxes.”95 Sibley also notes that early 
settlers practically lived “from hand to mouth,” and were self-reliant for 
most of their production, although dependent on a local store for black 
salts. And in 1819, Frances Wright notes on a trip to Rochester, then a 
town of perhaps 200 houses, “every man is a farmer and a proprietor; few 
therefore can be procured to work for hire, and these must generally be 
brought from a distance.”96 
Similarly, in Chautaqua County, Judge L. Bugbee, describing his 
childhood memories in an 1885 speech, points out that most early 
settlers first moved to bark-covered cabins, building log cabins as soon 
as they could. Neighbors all attended cabin raisings as part of their 
obligation to the community.97 As these communities developed, it was 
rare to find wage laborers, and when farmers needed an extra hand they 
might exchange labor with a neighbor, or else plan a day in which other 
community members worked together, for instance, to haul and burn 
logs, followed by a night with a meal and festivities. In these communi-
ties, much of basic production of goods such as textiles was done in the 
home. This changed with the onset of industrialization, for example, in 
1823 a textile weaving factory went up in Jamestown and by 1846 the 
town was exporting $30,000 of textiles.98 
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Similarly, gender relations reflected the practical conditions of frontier 
settlements. As one female settler in Chautauqua County put it: 
It was not fashionable then to be weakly. We could take our 
spinning-wheels and walk two miles to a spinning frolic, do our day’s 
work, and after a first-rate supper, join in some innocent amusement 
for the evening. We did not take particular pains to keep our hands 
white; we knew they were made to use for our advantage; therefore, 
we never thought of having hands just to look at. Each settler had to 
go and assist his neighbors ten or fifteen days, in order to get help in 
return in log-rolling time; this was the only way to get assistance.99
In other words, frontier women in western New York were less concerned 
with protecting the racial purity of their white skin or the bourgeois 
household than the practical tasks of settlement life and labor. 
Ellicott, acting as capital personified, though, had to work to make 
sure returns went to the company. In this regard he quickly encouraged 
settlers towards market incorporation. Settlers had plenty of ecological 
resources to remake, and a potash industry formed early on as trees were 
cut and burned, and lye was extracted from the ashes and burned into 
black salts which merchants purchased from settlers and sold as far as 
Montreal.100 Markets for livestock, wheat, maple syrup, and timber also 
formed as settlers were formally incorporated into market relations. And 
Ellicott also pushed for capital-led state formation as he successfully 
lobbied Albany to create a new county, Genesee County (which itself 
would later be further subdivided), in 1802–03.101
Similarly, William Cooper actively pursued capitalist development in 
Otsego from the 1780s. He believed that by selling plots of land to poor 
freeholding families on long-term credit, rather than renting the land, 
the farmers would be more productive and enthusiastic about improving 
the land they themselves owned. But in order to pay back their debts, 
farmers would need access to markets and encouragement to produce for 
the market. He acquired maple sugar and potash kettles to help settlers 
turn their raw materials into commodities and organized cattle drives 
for settlers to sell their livestock on the market. He also built a store and 
warehouse which linked frontier settlement to the Atlantic world market 
as goods came from as far as the West Indies and Britain and frontier 
potash made its way to New York City.102
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Towns such as Rochester and Syracuse were also planned, in many 
respects, along capitalist lines. As Diane Shaw puts it, “[Rochester] was to 
be a commercial city, built for profit and attractive to business interests.”103 
The city was planned along a grid pattern and divided into districts to 
serve milling, commercial, and civic zones. Public buildings were not 
to be the center of the town, but placed on the edge of the commercial 
zones, symbolizing the fact that the most central land was to be used 
for commercial, rather than political, purposes. These cities, along with 
Buffalo, exploded in the decades following the construction of the Erie 
Canal; a state-led project to further capitalist development. Carol Sheriff 
notes that “most inhabitants of the Erie Canal region embraced market 
opportunities with a mixture of impulses; they were neither wholly pre-
capitalist nor wholly capitalist in outlook.”104 That being said, the canal 
was primarily built by Irish wage laborers as immigrant labor played a 
central historical role in the making of a wage labor-based American 
working class.105 
Overall the making of white-settler empire on the frontier of New York 
was an uneven process in which emerging capitalist interests attempted 
to will and subjugate the patriarchal household mode of social repro-
duction to the logic of capitalism. While capitalist interests opened and 
developed new land, much of the labor organization itself—the social 
relations of production—were organized in a non-capitalist mode of 
production. Early empire building in New York was thus not entirely 
driven by capital. 
Pennsylvania
As the capitalist-state elite were working towards New York’s devel-
opment, Pennsylvania was, by that time, on its way towards the 
predominance of capitalist relations. The colony’s white-settler roots go 
back to Henry Hudson who noted the existence of the Delaware Bay 
as early as 1609, and while the English and Dutch sent a few explora-
tions to the region following this, the first serious settlement appears to 
have begun with the Dutch in 1623. New Sweden was started in 1638 
until conquered by the Dutch in 1655.106 Of course, New Netherland 
was soon taken over by the English, and the development of Pennsylva-
nia would begin to take off under the leadership of William Penn. Penn 
found himself in the curious situation of being a Quaker during a time of 
religious intolerance in England, and an elite member of English society; 
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a friend to the courts of Charles II and James II. The state owed debts 
to Penn’s father, Sir William Penn (whom the younger Penn claims he 
named the colony after), and Penn petitioned Charles II for land in what 
became Pennsylvania in lieu of paying the debts in cash. In return, he 
received the right to settle the territory.107 
Penn famously constructed a “holy experiment.” Quakers, as their 
critics called them, or the Religious Society of Friends as they called 
themselves, led by George Fox, believed that following their inner light 
was the path towards salvation. Viewed as a challenge to state ideology, 
an estimated 15,000 at least were imprisoned between 1661 and 1685, 
with estimates ranging as high as 60,000 imprisoned and 5,000 killed.108 
Quakers also proselytized throughout the colonial world, from North 
America to the West Indies, and sought out new spaces to practice their 
religion. By the time Pennsylvania was created Quakers had already 
established a presence in the colonies. And persecuted within England, 
Quakers sought out a new land to create their utopian world. 
Penn’s connections granted him this space, and while Penn’s ultimate 
goal was to create a society of religious freedom in which Quakers and 
other denominations could practice freely, he also lived in a world 
going through a transition to capitalism, with lineages of a feudal past 
still holding on. This shaped Penn’s approach to land distribution and 
settlement. While Penn saved some manorial lands for his future heirs, 
and distributed some to manor lords who promised to develop the land, 
much of the land was distributed to settlers who would, in turn, pay 
quitrents to Penn.109 Quitrents were a form of tenancy inherited from 
pre-capitalist England, and continued on as a historical structure into 
this period.110 But they overlapped with emerging capitalist relations 
of commodified land markets. In this sense, Penn’s social actions rep-
resented something closer to capitalism than feudalism. Selling land 
and collecting quitrents was a method of profit generation for the Penn 
family. But the social relations that formed on the Pennsylvania frontier 
were not necessarily capitalist. As Gottfried Achenwall reported to a 
German audience after interviewing Benjamin Franklin:
In Pennsylvania, where the Penn family own all the land, anyone who 
wants to improve the land, chooses a piece, pays the landlord for 100 
acres 10 Pound Sterling local money, and binds himself to pay an 
annual rent of half a penny for each acre—he then becomes absolute 
owner, and the little ground rent can never be increased. Sometimes 
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the hunter builds a wooden hut, and the nearest neighbors in the 
wilderness help cut the timber, build the log hut, fill the crevices with 
mud, put on the roof and put in windows and doors, and in return the 
owner pays them with a gallon of brandy.111
While Penn’s deed gave him “possession” rather than ownership of 
the land, it was quickly subdivided into commodified shapes that could 
be sold for a profit.112 Perhaps the greatest example of this is Philadel-
phia. Penn saw that a successful colony would need a central commercial 
city, just as England had London. He commissioned Thomas Holme, 
surveyor general of the providence, to lay out a plan for the city. Penn’s 
idea was to develop a commercial center with small lots of land given 
out, surrounded by larger lots as suburbs. Purchasers would buy lots by 
lottery, and the space itself would be designed in a grid pattern, facilitat-
ing rational flows of capital and people.113 
The population of the Philadelphia region rose from 2,200 in 1700 to 
19,000 by 1760 as the population of Pennsylvania rose from 18,000 to 
over 200,000 during this period. A class structure formed around the 
city’s international mercantile connections. Merchants comprised an 
important segment of the population and were linked into circuits of 
capital extending to Africa, the West Indies, and Europe. But the majority 
of merchants in the latter part of the eighteenth century were not wealthy 
gentlemen, but of middle and lower classes, while perhaps 15 percent 
were part of the Philadelphia elite. Next to merchants formed a group 
of shopkeepers along with artisans, apprentices, laborers, sailors, slaves, 
and other social groups. Perhaps 10 percent of the working population 
consisted of mariners and dock laborers, including black workers and 
occasionally Native American workers.114 And, of course, there were also 
the poor and destitute, served by the cities almshouses.
While Philadelphia was planned as a kind of capitalist city from the 
start, its development used a variety of labor forms. In some cases, slaves 
were imported, first primarily from the West Indies, and by the middle 
of the century merchants were trading directly between the city and the 
African coast.115 More common than slaves were indentured servants. In 
the middle of the eighteenth century, approximately half of all laborers 
in Philadelphia were some form of unfree labor (servants or slaves) and 
two-thirds of servants were purchased by artisans. But during the Revo-
lutionary War, the pace of servants transported across the ocean slowed. 
It picked up again later, and was followed by a 1788 British ban on the 
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emigration of skilled workers from Britain and Ireland, and the Passenger 
Act of 1803 that reduced the number of immigrants a merchant could 
carry. These policies, along with the confusion of the Napoleonic Wars, 
limited the number of new servants, encouraging producers to rely 
more heavily on wage laborers. At the same time, economic problems 
hurt the artisan class, forcing them to sell their labor power for wages. A 
depression hit in 1765 following the Seven Years’ War, and between 1765 
and 1769 prices decreased, putting artisans out of work. From the end of 
the 1760s through the 1790s, wages for cordwainers, tailors, journeymen 
printers, and others tended to decline. In this context, master mechanics 
found it more profitable to invest in the growing wage labor force, rather 
than hire servants.116 And prison labor was also used.117
While Philadelphia was a city destined towards capitalist develop-
ment from its origins, it became a central node on broader relations of 
uneven development throughout the rest of the territory. Further west 
what developed was not simply a New England style society of English 
immigrants, but complex creole cultures mixed together.118 In particular, 
besides the English, Scotch-Irish and German settlers poured into 
Pennsylvania. For instance, between the settlement of the colony and 
the American Revolution, perhaps 111,000 German colonialists made 
their way to Delaware Bay, and while early on more Germans than Irish 
migrated, by the end of the eighteenth century as many Irish appear to 
have been arriving as Germans, as German immigration during this era 
hit its peak in the 1750s, and Irish immigration in the 1780s. While in 
some cases families immigrated, perhaps half of all German immigrants 
came over as indentured laborers. Commonly, young single men came 
over, and to pay for the cost of their travel, upon arrival the merchant 
who filled his extra space (besides goods) with potential servants sold 
them to a buyer. Their contracts, in this case, were not negotiated in 
advance, but upon arrival. These “redemptioners” might be sold to a 
variety of people. Artisans might need an extra hand, or households an 
extra laborer. Or speculators hired servants to clear and improve their 
land, using servants as an investment to generate profits.119 
Capitalist relations also formed in the iron industry. In the early 1700s, 
large plantation manor owners were hiring workers to produce iron.120 
And soon after this, investors pooled their capital in companies such 
as the Durham Iron Works, built in 1727, to produce iron for profit. A 
variety of labor forms were used in this industry, scattered throughout 
early southeast Pennsylvania, including wage laborers, indentured 
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servants, apprentices, and slaves and free blacks. Due to labor shortages, 
for example, in 1727 a petition was created to eliminate duties on black 
slaves brought into the colony to work in the iron industry, and although 
it failed, duties were reduced two years later.121
In the west, instead, the social relations that formed took on a variety 
of not-so-capitalist characteristics. The Moravians provide an example 
in contrast to the capitalistically forming Philadelphia landscape. Under 
Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf, they purchased 500 acres in 
Pennsylvania in 1741 and started the town of Bethlehem. Moravians 
organized their age, gender, and labor relations around “choirs”; little 
girls and boys choirs, older boys and girls choirs, single brothers and 
sisters choirs, married couples choirs, and so on. They ate and slept in 
choirs, worked in choirs, and often worshiped in choirs. They also raised 
children communally, rather than living in nuclear families.122 Within 
the choir system, women tended to have positions of power alien to other 
parts of the colony. They could participate in governing bodies, give 
sermons, and so on although the top leadership was all male. In sum, the 
Moravians organized a communal society antithetical to capitalism. As 
one traveler noted: 
all manner of trades and manufactures are carried on in this place 
distinctly, and one of each branch; at these various occupations the 
young men are employed. Every one contributes his labor, and the 
profits arising from each goes to the general stock. These young men 
receive no wages, but are supplied with all necessities from the various 
branches of trade. They have no cares about the usual concerns of life, 
and their whole time is spent in prayer and labor; their only relaxation 
being concerts, which they perform every evening.123
But over time Moravians became integrated into the expanding 
hegemony of capital. Most significantly, the colony had acquired debts 
that they were not able to pay off. This was coupled with an ideological 
shift in which Moravian leaders became increasingly dissatisfied with 
elements of communalism, such as the collective raising of children. 
In the 1760s, the colony began to make changes to cope with these 
pressures, and by the early 1770s families were reorganized to live 
together and some industries began to operate privately. While some 
parts of the colony were kept communal at first, such as stores, inns, 
farms, blacksmithing, and pottery production, some farms were leased 
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to tenant farmers as privatization was introduced. In 1771 the colony 
also started its first constitution that, among other things, set prices and 
wages and prevented land leased by the colony to be purchased or sold 
to landholders without the colony’s permission.124 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the original Moravian 
dream began to collapse. The Revolutionary War disrupted the colony as 
many men left to fight in the war, and pressures from within and without 
the colony forced a series of changes in the structure of governance. For 
example, in 1818 a General Synod was held for the first time in seventeen 
years that would, among other things, reduce the degree of commercial 
regulation. As time passed, the community could not resist the changing 
world around them as, for example, coal was discovered around the 
area and developed into an industry by the Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company, and as Bethlehem increasingly found itself linked into new 
networks of transportation and circuits of capital. So in 1844 the Board 
of Supervision finally decided to dismantle the lease ownership system, 
open the city up to non-Moravians, and adopt a secular government, 
enacted the next year.125 
Westward expansion early on was driven by similar forces as elsewhere: 
population increases, decreasing land availability, and rising land prices 
placed limits on the ability of patriarchal, independent households to 
reproduce their means of production, forcing younger generations to 
commodify their labor or move further south or west. Lancaster, for 
example, was initially developed by Andrew Hamilton, an associate 
of the Penn family, who acquired the land through a complex set of 
maneuvers. Aware that the land was the designated seat of the newly 
created Lancaster County, he gave money to a friend, James Steel, who 
purchased the rights to the land from an Englishman who still held them, 
and sold it to his son, who obtained a patent from the Penn family in 
1735.126 Like many developers on the “urban frontier,” Hamilton desired 
to turn the land into profit.127 Soon after the developing town was settled 
by a primarily German population. Settlers were granted titles upon an 
agreement of building a substantial house within one year and paying 
regular ground rents to Hamilton. Additionally, some settlers appear to 
have attempted to profit from Hamilton’s own speculation by purchasing 
several lots, building houses, then selling the lots for profit.128
While profit-seeking activity through the commodification and 
distribution of land played a role in settlement itself, the social rela-
tions from below were not necessarily organized along capitalist lines. 
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Prospective husbands for the most part did not come of age until 21, 
although occasionally married earlier. Generally, at 21, if working as an 
apprentice, their time would be over, and often fathers supplied sons 
with some combination of land, tools, livestock, or money to start their 
own independent family lives. Women often married younger than men, 
sometimes in their late teens, although marriage ages tended to rise grad-
ually between the 1740s and 1800s, and, upon marriage, were also given 
inheritances.129 Before a man married—and as marriage was viewed as 
a way to quell the potentially violent tendencies of masculinity—it was 
expected that he would be well on his way towards obtaining the means 
necessary to build an independent patriarchal family. But over time the 
patriarchal household mode of social life remained difficult to maintain. 
Land warrants were given out at decreasing rates, and the size of the 
holdings also decreased. For example, in Lancaster County between 
1771 and1780, 665 warrants were given out, with 45 percent of those 
being under 100 acres. In contrast, from 1791 to 1800, 119 warrants were 
given out and 70 percent of those were under 100 acres.130 This land also 
increased in price, raising the costs to begin a new family, and forcing 
younger generations to move elsewhere in search of cheaper land. 
Further west, the reflection of non-capitalist relations in the region 
around Pittsburgh, for example, can be seen in the wills left by those 
who died. These wills dictated the distribution of property after death, 
and, given the coverture laws of the era, this meant that a husband, as in 
one case, would even specify to leave a wife’s clothes to her own use.131 
Generally, though, fathers would distribute land to their sons, often 
giving a larger portion to the first born who would also be designated the 
role of providing for the widow and potentially other sons and daughters, 
while daughters were given other more liquid assets such as livestock, 
clothing, and other valuables, although there were also exceptions in 
which land was left to daughters.132
Squatters, settlers, and class conflict
As settlers moved west, tensions arose from a variety of angles in western 
Pennsylvania. While Penn may have attempted to develop a “peaceable 
kingdom” in which land would only be acquired from native populations 
through their cooperation, settlers on the frontier did not have the same 
attitude. Tensions between French and British imperial aspirations also 
deepened as the French pushed their claims to frontier land, culminating 
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in the French and Indian War and, following this, Pontiac’s Rebellion.133 
In the countryside, frontier squatters resisted competing claims of 
landowners and restrictions against western expansion which might 
create conflicts with native peoples. By 1730 Scotch-Irish immigrants 
from Ulster, Ireland, were squatting in Conestoga Manor. James Logan, 
who was secretary of the providence, gained the support of Reverend 
James Anderson of Donegal Church to remove the squatters. Anderson 
recruited a volunteer force and, with the help of the magistrates of 
Lancaster County and the sheriff, burned down about thirty cabins and 
evicted the settlers.134 Over the next decades, tensions between frontier 
settlers and state and speculative capitalist forces would set the contours 
of class conflict and capitalist development in the region. 
White-settler colonialism also entailed the removal of native peoples. 
This land was acquired through the typical American colonial pattern 
of using violence against the natives, deceiving them, and forcing them 
to sign treaties with the colonialists. In Pennsylvania, perhaps the most 
famous case of this was the Walking Purchase of 1737. Although objective 
evidence was never fully demonstrated, Quaker folklore suggested that 
at some point William Penn and the Delaware Indians had made an 
agreement in which Penn, along with Delaware representatives, were to 
walk for three days west of the Delaware River, at the end agreeing upon 
a boundary, after which Penn would buy it in exchange for a particular 
amount of goods.135 And while the Delawares also had some socially 
collected, somewhat vague memories of a land agreement with Penn, it 
was nothing close to the final decision that was forced upon them. 
Penn’s heirs, under pressures of debt, decided to expand their holdings 
of Pennsylvania territory, which meant widening their control into 
this area. Thomas Penn produced a 1686 document that he argued 
was evidence for the Delaware-Penn agreement west of the river. The 
native peoples were hesitant to settle to an agreement based upon the 
document. Following this, Andrew Hamilton drew a map that was 
both inaccurately scaled to misrepresent the amount of territory the 
settlers claimed, and documented only the Delaware and Lehigh Rivers. 
Between these, though, lay the Tohickon Creek, purposely left out of the 
picture so that the natives would mistake the Lehigh for the Tohickon. 
Thomas Penn used this map to get the Delawares to agree to a purchase, 
based on an agreement in which the Delawares would get to stay on any 
land they previously occupied within the purchase. Following this, Penn 
hired three groups of walker surveyors to head west and northwest to 
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map out the territory determined by the length they could walk in three 
days, in doing so acquiring 710,000 acres of land.136 As settlers moved 
to the area, over time, the Delawares were pushed out of the territory as 
their pleas against the injustice of the land acquisition were ignored by 
white settlers. 
While whites in pursuit of land and speculative profit pushed the 
natives west, some settlers became “white Indians,” mingling with native 
populations in something closer to Richard White’s “middle ground” 
than strict, clearly delineated racial and cultural borders.137 In some 
cases, squatters asked permission from natives to settle the land. They 
also engaged in small-scale trading of products such as corn, tobacco, 
and alcohol. And settlers even rented land from Indians as tenant 
farmers.138 But settlers also commonly warred with native peoples. 
Perhaps the most famous case of this is the Conestoga massacre by the 
Paxton Boys in 1763. 
The Conestogas lived in territory granted to them by William Penn, 
but by the middle of the eighteenth century Penn’s more benevolent type 
of colonialism (if such a thing can exist) was supplanted by a more brutal 
form. On December 14, about fifty settlers burned down Conestoga 
Town and killed six natives. The Conestogas regrouped in Lancaster, 
but thirteen days later the Paxton Boys rode into town and slaughtered 
the remaining fourteen. The boys then began to march to Philadel-
phia to inform the government of their grievances, but were stopped in 
Germantown by a contingent of Philadelphia’s leading political figures, 
to whom they left two spokesmen to present their case. This was a crucial 
turning point in the history of Pennsylvania as “for the first time in the 
providence’s history, a group of colonialists engaged in an extralegal, 
large-scale, and organized act of racial violence.”139 
This violence came after the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War 
(or the French-Indian War). The war severely disrupted native-settler 
relations as throughout the region Delawares attacked settler farms, 
killing hundreds. This challenged the patriarchal authority of settler 
colonialists. It threatened their status as “men” striving for economic 
“competency” based upon control and improvement of land, and the 
labor of their children, wives, and indentured servants (and rarely, 
slaves). It also encouraged settlers to increasingly group the ethnically 
diverse native peoples into one overarching racial category.140 
In addition to facing indigenous peoples, settlers and squatters also 
had to contest with an emerging capitalist American social formation. 
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For example, in 1804 a surveyor under the employment of Pennsylva-
nia land speculators was shot dead by a group of an estimated eighteen 
white people wearing native garb.141 He was one of many killed by white 
settlers fighting off emerging capitalist forces as settlers fought against 
large-scale speculators taking control of land they believed they had 
the right to. Throughout the eighteenth century, squatters were con-
tinually purged by the government. For example, in 1748 local justices 
of the peace, along with several Shamokin Indians, expelled squatters 
from Sherman’s Creek, the Juniata Valley, and Great Cove. They found 
sixty-one illegal dwellings, and agreed to burn down the settlements. For 
the authorities, the land had to be legitimately purchased before it could 
be settled.142 
In 1768, the Fort Stanwix treaty was signed, giving Thomas Penn 
the right to claim land in the Wyoming Valley and Shamokin region. 
The Penn family hoped to profit from the land and hired speculators to 
settle and develop it in return for land grants. But those hoping to profit 
from the territory soon clashed with white squatters who claimed the 
land for themselves. While the settlers sent letters pleading their case, 
claiming to have purchased the land from the natives, the Penn family 
viewed their claims as illegitimate. These claims were also located in a 
broader struggle between Pennsylvania and Connecticut to control the 
region. Connecticut settlers feared that the new treaty would deprive 
them of their settlements and sent a letter signed by sixty-three of them, 
including Lazarus Stewart, previous leader of the Paxton Boys, pleading 
to sustain control of the land they settled.143 Conflict between Pennsyl-
vania and Connecticut claims would continue until the Trenton decree 
of 1782, fully enforced in the next four years, which stated that the land 
belonged to Pennsylvania, although Connecticut settlers already there 
could stay.
By 1790 nearly 13,000 white settlers lived in the western counties of 
Allegheny, Washington, Fayette, Westmoreland, and Bedford. Perhaps 
37 percent were English, 7 percent Welsh, 17 percent Scotch, 19 percent 
Irish, and 12 percent German, among other nationalities and eth-
nicities.144 However, compared to other parts of the western frontier, 
Pennsylvania tended to have a relatively high percentage of landless 
peoples. For example, during the Revolutionary War many soldiers 
were paid in land grants, yet many of these grants were sold to specula-
tors.145 By 1780 around one-third of Pennsylvania’s population did not 
own land.146 And many of those who did own land were still producing 
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little beyond subsistence. In the 1780s perhaps 75 acres were needed to 
produce surplus product, depending on the quality of land. The median 
taxable person held about 100 acres of land. Additionally, much of the 
land that was held was still not cleared, thus agriculture could not be 
produced on it.147 Overall, this suggests that while market relations of 
course existed, for many settlers they remained marginal to the social 
reproduction of the family. Traveling at the foot of the Alleghenies, 
finding a tavern or house to stay each night, one traveler said “of these 
articles, the coffee was only not the produce of their own land! What 
people, therefore, can be more independent?”148 And another stated, 
the Pensylvanians are an industrious and hardy people, they are most 
of them substantial, but cannot be considered rich, it being rarely the 
case with landed people. However, they are well lodged, fed, and clad, 
and the latter at an easy rate, as the inferior people manufacture most 
of their own apparel, both linnens and woolens, and are more indus-
trious of themselves, having but few blacks among them.149
Through the 1790s the patterns of landholding continued to consol-
idate in fewer hands. In Fayette and Washington counties, for instance, 
around 59 percent of the taxable population owned land. In addition, the 
size of landholdings for poor and middling farmers tended to diminish, 
in part due to the fact that as fathers passed land on to their male heirs, 
the size of the lots decreased. At the same time, large-scale landowners 
tended to increase the size of their lots. In Washington and Fayette, 
for example, from the mid-1780s to mid-1790s the top 10 percent of 
landowners raised their control of land.150 Increasingly, the population 
had to find other means of social reproduction. Tenants as a percentage 
of the population may have been as high as 12 percent in the 1780s and 20 
percent in the 1790s.151 Others found work as artisans or, in some cases, 
wage laborers, although these class categories were not always clearly 
delineated as, for example, artisans were also sometimes landowners. 
These shifting conditions in western Pennsylvania set the basis for the 
Whiskey Rebellion of 1791–94. Through the 1780s and 1790s, settlers 
were increasingly economically squeezed as landlessness rose, plot sizes 
decreased, and living standards worsened.152 Meanwhile, political power 
was increasingly centered in the hands of the eastern elite. This was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The convention 
was a response to several factors. First, many of the so-called founding 
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fathers themselves were bondholders and part of the ruling class elite. 
Yet those in debt called on individual states to print money to lower their 
debts. One goal of the convention was to disallow states from producing 
bills to lower the value of these debts. The constitution also solidified 
a balance between northern states increasingly dissatisfied with slavery 
and southern slaveholders who viewed it as a part of their liberty.153 
But, perhaps most importantly, Shays’ Rebellion in western Massachu-
setts brought George Washington out of retirement and sent a message 
to the American elite that something had to be done to quell what they 
commonly called an “excess of democracy.”154 With the doors locked and 
guarded, the so-called founding fathers constructed a constitution that 
centralized governmental power and would insulate policy making from 
popular pressures. The new constitution itself was unconstitutional, 
according to the previous Articles of Confederation. It was accepted as 
soon as it was approved by nine states, although the articles stated that 
all states had to accept these changes. Overall, “the convention decided 
to make the new national government considerably less responsive to 
the popular will than any of its state level counterparts.”155 Among other 
things, the remade government would have the direct ability to levy taxes 
from citizens and construct a large standing army that could be used to 
quell outbreaks of violence, such as Shays’ Rebellion.156 
For western settlers, struggling with wars against the natives and 
economic poverty, whiskey was the one commodity they could count 
on for market exchange. They could convert their surplus grains into 
whiskey production, a sustainable and in-demand commodity. Short of 
specie, whiskey also served as a form of currency. Thus, a tax on whiskey 
was, in essence, a challenge to the basic livelihood of settler yeomen. 
But for a newly formed, struggling federal government, a tax on whiskey 
appeared to be a reasonable way to increase state finances. Between 1790 
and 1796, for example, five-sixths of the federal operating budget went 
towards war; especially Indian wars, as the United States tried to clear 
the frontier of natives through a series of wars in the early 1790s cul-
minating in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. For Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton, then, whiskey excise taxes seemed to fit 
into part of a practical strategy to fund the new state.157 
By 1791, western frontiersmen were sending letters to the government 
to reject Hamilton’s proposed excise tax, under pressures of wars with 
natives, lack of profitable outlets to sell their surplus production to, and 
lack of specie. In particular, the state wanted to drain what specie was 
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available in the region to pay for the wars. These pressures culminated in 
resistance to the tax. The first major meeting protesting the tax occurred 
at Redstone Old Fort on July 17, 1791. Leaders gathered and resolved to 
appoint delegates to investigate their respective counties to get a sense of 
public sentiment and meet again in Pittsburgh in September, although it 
was not until eleven months later that the meeting was held.158 Early on, 
then, much of the protest was in legal, civil forms, and only later would 
violence break out on a large scale. 
By the summer of 1792, a year and a half after the tax had been passed, 
no attempt to collect it had been made. But in August, inspector John 
Neville hired newcomer William Faulkner to host a place to process 
taxes at his residence. Neville placed an advertisement in the Pittsburgh 
Gazette saying they were prepared to process whiskey stills at Faulkner’s 
place. Several days later approximately twenty men in war paint traveled 
to Faulkner’s place and shot holes through a sign on the front of his house, 
and shot the ceiling in every room in the house. They also considered 
burning down his house, but decided against it for fear it might start a fire 
that would catch other houses, and instead drew a knife and threatened 
to tar and feather Faulkner if he kept the inspection office open. Neville 
continued to have trouble renting a place to register and process taxes. 
In June 1794, for instance, John Lynn agree to lease Neville a part of his 
house. Following this, twelve men in blackface visited Lynn and took 
him to a remote forest where they cut his hair off, removed his clothes, 
and tarred and feathered him. These are just two of many cases of gangs 
visiting those who complied with the tax, or rented space to enforce it, 
that were met with racialized and gendered forms of violence as whites 
disguised themselves as natives, blacks, or women to hide their identity. 
By the middle of 1794, the international situation had changed. The 
French Revolution had triggered a shifting of circumstances, leading 
American politicians to fear the possibility of war with Spain and Britain. 
And General Anthony Wayne’s victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers 
opened up a new space in the west for speculators to profit from. In this 
context, fed up with years of resistance to the whiskey tax, Alexander 
Hamilton and other leading American politicians began to consider 
more extreme techniques to subdue the rebels. District Attorney William 
Rawle ordered the appearance of more than sixty distillers, and on June 
22 Marshal David Lenox journeyed west to serve the notices. After an 
exchange at the home of William Miller in which Lenox and Neville 
attempted to give Miller a copy of the summons, and three or four dozen 
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settlers chased the two off, Lenox fled to Pittsburgh and Neville to Bower 
Hill. Two days later, in search of Lenox, rebels surrounded Neville’s place, 
believing Lenox to be there. Neville ordered them to stand back, and 
fired, killing Oliver Miller. More shots rang out on both sides, and several 
of the protestors were injured. Miller’s death set a new precedent in the 
conflict whereby settlers moved beyond the law to fight for their cause. 
Another assault on Neville’s home led to the death of James McFarlane, a 
hero of the American Revolution, further adding fire to the rebels’ cause. 
The violence continued to grow, spreading to Maryland, and at its peak 
7,000 rebels gathered for a meeting at Braddock’s Field on August 1. As 
violence and protest spread, the federal government used 12,500 troops 
to quell the rebellion.159
The rebellion is often thought of as a conflict between farmers and the 
eastern elite, but in many respects it represents social and class conflict 
arising from patterns of uneven development. While settlers wanted to 
be involved in market relations, and whiskey was a method of doing 
this, many of them were more generally protesting the overall social 
conditions in which they found themselves. While George Washington 
(a major western land speculator himself) and Alexander Hamilton 
were fighting for a rational, organized, increasingly capitalistic society, 
the rebels fought for control of their land and livelihood, fighting for 
something closer to a patriarchal household mode of social reproduction 
rather than full on capitalism. 
The convention of 1787 and subsequent crushing of the Whiskey 
Rebellion (and Fries Rebellion in 1799) set the basis for the destruc-
tion of less market-dependent household relations in the west.160 As 
taxes were enforced, specie increasingly necessary, and the monopoly of 
force controlled by the federal government, producers became engaged 
in “petty-commodity production”; that is, increasingly integrated into 
and dependent upon market relations even if the restructuring of the 
organization of production itself was a slow process to develop. In other 
words, capital inserted itself into these preexisting patriarchal household 
relations and gradually transformed them. 
By 1800 the frontier era of Pennsylvania’s history was coming to a 
close. By then, what land was left unsettled was primarily that of unpro-
ductive soil and rugged terrain.161 But settlers would continue to move 
west to produce new spaces of empire. By the early 1800s Pittsburgh, for 
example, was on a path to capitalist development on the urban frontier. In 
what might be considered an early form of military-industrial complex, 
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deputy quartermaster and military storekeeper Issac Craig, who also 
helped start the first glass manufactory in the region and owned land 
on which he worked tenant farmers, encouraged local production for 
military uses, in doing so stimulating the economic growth of Pittsburgh. 
Craig might be considered as a nascent capitalist subjugating the frontier 
to capitalism. Brought to the frontier through his military service, he 
remained, channeling capital to profitable uses. In 1803, for example, he 
wrote to Samuel Hodgdon discussing the establishment of the manufac-
tory, the costs of which exceeded expectations as he organized skilled 
workers (who were apparently not as skilled as he would have hoped) 
and built lodgings for their families.162 Besides investing in manufac-
turing, Craig also owned land which he rented to tenant farmers.163 But 
while tenant farming was a for-profit mode of production, given the 
paucity of money and rough frontier conditions, Craig also accepted 
other mediums of exchange. This is due to the fact that his letters reflect 
collecting rents from frontier farmers was a continual struggle for 
wannabe capitalists. In one case, for example, he mentions he “would 
take A good Horse if brought here and a few well grown hog.”164 Thus, 
even frontier capitalists resorted to non-monetary means of compensa-
tion, as the money supply was not large enough and market relations too 
undeveloped to guarantee paper money as a measure of value and means 
of circulation. 
Overall, capitalism in the early northwest developed gradually and 
incrementally, with some zones, particularly cities such as Boston, 
Philadelphia, and New York, forming as urban centers of capitalism 
as eastern capital expanded west and gradually pressed against small 
farmers. The formal subsumption of settlers by capital meant that the 
power of profit-seeking behavior slowly and gradually took a larger and 
larger role in the dictation of social life. As the next chapter will show, 
however, by the early 1800s in both the American north, south, and grey 
area between, expansion was not yet necessarily overdetermined by the 
power of capitalism. 
3
Kentucky and Ohio
For minister Lyman Beecher: 
The West is a young empire of mind, and power, and wealth, and free 
institutions, rushing up to a giant manhood, with a rapidity and a 
power never before witnessed below the sun. And if she carries with 
her the elements of her preservation, the experiment will be glorious—
the joy of the nation—the joy of the whole earth, as she rises in the 
majesty of her intelligence and benevolence, and enterprise, for the 
emancipation of the world.1 
Through expansion the United States would realize and extend its 
powerful masculinity over “she”; the west. And for Frederick Jackson 
Turner, famously, the vast western space was where American democracy 
was realized and reproduced: “American social development has been 
continually beginning over again on the frontier.”2 The primitive 
conditions frontier settlers found themselves in renewed the individu-
alist American culture characteristic of American democracy.3 In other 
words, the culture of American “democratic” Empire was continually 
renewed through westward expansion. 
This chapter will continue the story of capitalism and coloniza-
tion into Kentucky and Ohio. The reproduction of manhood through 
empire drove settlers into these territories for a variety of reasons, from 
patriarchs establishing personal domain over their families to building 
an empire of slavery. Between formed a complex borderland of inter-
changeable labor forms, including free workers and slaves, as slavery was 
not simply “one” form of social life in itself, but took on unique charac-
teristics in different parts of the United States. 
Geographically, “the west” was continually redefined. By the early 
1800s it was, for instance, “that part of the United States, which has 
received the term Western, relatively to the part east of the Aleghany 
mountains, lies entirely in the valley of the Mississippi, and the Basin of 
the Canadian Lakes.”4 But the west was also more than geography and 
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ecology. Over a hundred years ago Turner viewed the west socially rather 
than geographically. For the writer, “the west, at bottom, is a form of 
society, rather than as area.”5 And for westerners writing in their own 
times, they were the west; the edge of the frontier.6 But rather than using 
“west” as a social category, it has more often than not been used as a geo-
graphical category. To put it in other terms, the geographical concept of 
“the west” which was reconstructed after the frontier had closed stopped 
referring to the west as it was, and transposed a historical-geographical 
category “the west” on to a history in which the real “west” was lost.7 In 
this context, this chapter also examines the ways that Kentucky and Ohio 
were the wests of their own time, and suggests both entered into the 
American union somewhere between capitalism and non-capitalism.8 
The origins of American movement into the Ohio Valley emerged out 
of a long history of competition for power between the French, British, 
and Native Americans. By the time the French arrived, down from the 
Great Lakes, in the last half of the seventeenth century, they encoun-
tered native groups devastated by the spread of European disease, and 
the Iroquois offensive of the 1650s and 1660s that pushed other native 
populations away from the Great Lakes region.9 From then on, the 
native peoples, and most significantly, the Iroquois confederacy, found 
themselves caught between Anglo-French interimperial rivalry. But by 
the 1740s the balance between these forces began to falter, and over the 
next four decades, shifted. The Ohio Valley transformed from a space 
of competing and cooperating interactions, to one of Anglo dominance 
as the American Revolution set the stage for the ethnic cleansing of the 
native peoples and establishment of white-settler dominance over the 
region.10 
In 1742, the Iroquois agreed to the Treaty of Easton, granting land 
previously held by the Delawares to the Penn family. Two years later, in 
1744, they agreed to the Treaty of Lancaster. In return for 800 pounds of 
currency, 300 pounds of gold, recognition of Iroquois leadership over 
native tribes, and the right of Iroquois to pass through the land to battle 
Cherokees and Catawbas, they gave up their rights to remaining claims 
on land in Virginia and Maryland. These treaties were pushed by the 
desire for western Anglo speculators to profit from western lands; by 
1745, Virginia granted close to a third of a million acres around the Ohio 
River to a syndicate of speculators.11 As the British became increasingly 
active, pressuring the balance of power in the Ohio Valley and beyond, 
the War of Austrian Secession spilled over into King George’s War from 
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1744 to 1748. During the war, the British blocked goods shipped for New 
France, making it increasingly difficult for French traders to compete 
with British traders. As a result, some native groups shifted their 
allegiance away from the French towards the British. For example, the 
Miami leader La Demoiselle shifted alliance from France to Britain, and 
established Pickawilly to trade with the British. As a response to British 
pressure, from both Virginia speculators and Pennsylvania traders, and 
shifting native allegiances, following King George’s War the French inten-
sified their efforts to exert control over the Ohio Valley. This was in large 
part due to the fact that the French wanted to maintain a geographical 
link between their empires in Canadian and Louisianan territory. So in 
1752, the Marquis de Duquesne arrived in Quebec with orders to drive 
the British from French claimed territory by mobilizing the Canadian 
militia to build a series of forts in Ohio country, two of which were under 
construction by the next spring. 
In reaction to increased French militancy—as a result of increased 
British presence into territory the French saw as theirs—and the gradual 
hollowing out of the Euro-Native American middle ground, British 
politicians back home grew more worried about French dominance on 
the frontier of their North American Empire. This was also caused by 
increased British fear after the War of Austrian Secession returned to 
the status quo with the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle, but weakened the 
British-Austrian alliance. As a result, the British, led by the Duke of 
Newcastle and Lord Halifax, pushed further to assert their control over 
the empire across the ocean. Influenced by reports coming over from 
the colony, the king agreed to support the colonists in constructing forts 
in the contested area and, if the French attempted to interfere, use force, 
provided that the British colonists were defending themselves from the 
supposed French aggressors. Tensions increased after French Ensign 
Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville and thirty-five men traveled to warn 
the British against their incursions into French territory in late May of 
1754. Famously, led by George Washington in alliance with the Mingos, 
and the Half King Tanaghrisson, the British attacked the French, killing 
Jumonville and triggering the beginnings of the war which evolved, 
more broadly, into the Seven Years’ War (or the French-Indian War).12 
The war ended in 1763 with British victory. And it was through the 
attempt to consolidate the British Empire in North America that policies 
were put in place, such as the Proclamation of 1763 and Stamp Act of 
kentucky and ohio . 85
1765, that led to the gradual transition from “resistance to revolution” 
which culminated in the American Revolution.13 
Settling Kentucky
Following 1763, for the next decade, the main populations entering into 
what became the state of Kentucky were Native Americans and Long 
Hunters. The latter often traveled in groups to the territory with the goal 
of making profits from hunting furs and skins. Following the treaties of 
Hard Labor and Fort Stanwix, white settlement across the Appalachians 
led to the first permanent settlements in Kentucky. The atmosphere also 
changed after the appointment of Lord Dunmore as governor of Virginia. 
At the end of 1772, Dunmore granted Thomas Bullitt the right to survey 
Kentucky. Bullitt organized a group of over thirty men to survey the land. 
After a conflict, in which William Preston, surveyor of Fincastle County 
(in which Kentucky was located) refused to accept Bullitt’s expedition 
surveys, Dunmore overrode part of Preston’s complaint by issuing 
patents around the Falls of Ohio based upon surveys by Bullitt’s team.14 
As white settlers ventured into the Ohio Valley tensions also rose 
between natives and settlers. This culminated in a series of violent 
conflicts in March and April of 1774. Additionally, the Shawnees did 
not recognize the treaties of Hard Labor or Fort Stanwix, which had 
been negotiated with the Cherokees and Iroquois. They still considered 
Kentucky their rightful hunting ground. These tensions culminated 
in Lord Dunmore’s War. The war consisted of one major battle: The 
Battle of Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774, in which white colonial-
ists, headed by Andrew Lewis, led an expedition of around 1,300 troops, 
fought the Shawnee, headed by Cornstock. After the loss of much life on 
both sides, Cornstock retreated and in the subsequent Treaty of Camp 
Charlotte, agreed to allow the colonists to remain south of the Ohio.15 
But conflict and violence between settler and native would continue for 
some years to come. 
The first full-fledged white settlement in Kentucky was Harrodsburg, 
started by James Harrod (who had participated in Bullitt’s expedition) 
in 1774. The settlement was short-lived though. In July of that year, 
following Shawnee attacks, the settlers fled the colony.16 The next year, 
Harrod returned to his town, finding another group of settlers, the 
McAfee brothers, nearby. But the most famous of early settlements was 
Boonesborough, started by Daniel Boone. Although Virginia and North 
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Carolina made it illegal for private individuals to purchase land from 
natives, the Transylvania Company, led by Richard Henderson, made an 
agreement with Cherokee chiefs for the land. Under the company’s spon-
sorship, Boone was to create a road into Kentucky and start an initial 
settlement, in return for a personal allotment of land.17 Here the logics of 
capital and settlement came together: while the company was interested 
in developing the land as a commodity, settlers, more interested in 
obtaining their own land and living “competently,” pushed westward. 
Boone and his expedition set out on March 10, and as quickly as March 
25 were attacked by natives. Two of the expedition were killed, and some 
went back. But those who stayed located a place to build a fort—Boon-
esborough—and began to plant crops and survive by hunting local 
buffalo herds.18 Thousands of settlers would follow Boone’s Wilderness 
Trail through the Cumberland Gap as Kentucky became a part of what 
was, after the conclusion of the American Revolution, an expanding 
American state. 
Early expansion into Kentucky was driven by two main forces. On 
one side, settlers flooded in to create a patriarchal world of competency 
and independence. On the other, speculators viewed the vast space as a 
potential commodity to make profits. These dual forces, and the class 
struggle that evolved between them, shaped the early history of the state. 
The Virginia land act of 1779 attempted to reconcile this difference. It 
granted preemptive rights to settlers who could purchase 400 acres below 
non-resident prices. If improvements were made, they could preempt 
an additional 1,000 acres at a higher rate. All other lands not settled or 
designated for soldiers were put up for sale through Treasury warrants 
for the price of 100 acres for 40 shillings.19 
The selling of warrants, particularly as the value of Virginia’s currency 
depreciated, encouraged speculation. Within a year, Treasury warrants 
for almost 2 million acres were sold. And “land jobbers” established 
these claims by stacking logs in a square and calling it a cabin, or clearing 
a small portion of land, so that speculators could claim to improve it, 
justifying their purchases to the state. Additionally, a wide range of con-
flicting and overlapping claims formed. As a result, a commission was 
set up that, in the winter of 1779, heard over 1,400 claims and dispensed 
1,334,050 acres of land. But many of these claims remained vague, 
with borders not clearly defined or surveyed, and for decades to come, 
disputes over Kentucky land claims would continue. Conflict over land 
also led to a somewhat different landownership pattern compared to 
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other parts of the frontier. Most significantly, by 1792, the year Kentucky 
became independent from Virginia, two-thirds of white male adults did 
not legally own land.20 And these landownership patterns would shape 
the contours of capitalist and non-capitalist relations in this part of the 
United States. 
The origins of capitalism in Kentucky
Some scholars have argued capitalism came with white settlers from the 
start. For one author, “Kentucky farmers, whether or not they had slaves, 
were profit-minded. Like most enterprising American farmers, they were 
not satisfied with the idyllic little self-sufficient homesteads of agrarian 
myth.”21 And another writer suggests, “the eager multitudes journeying 
to western Kentucky raised families, governed themselves, and created 
a society in America’s mythic wilderness: the west, the frontier. Rich or 
poor, these pioneers came to western Kentucky committed to private 
property and capitalism.”22 Other scholars are not so convinced that 
capitalism dominated the early white-settler Kentucky landscape. 
Stephen Aron, for example, sees expansion into Kentucky as driven, on 
the one hand, by profit-seeking speculators, and on the other, by home-
steaders and patriarchs in search of land to obtain independence and 
competency, and reproduce their masculine independence.23 And Craig 
Thomas Friend criticizes the binary between capitalist (or market, as in 
much of the debate the two are conflated) and non-capitalist relations, 
instead arguing that early Kentucky was characterized by a mix of 
relations in which, while profit-seeking activity occurred, farmers also 
participated in market relations to reproduce their community obliga-
tions and relations that were not-so-capitalist.24 This section suggests 
that the latter are correct. While the power of capital did penetrate 
Kentucky early on, at the same time, many settlers came with other 
less-capitalist motivations. But, as elsewhere in the country, over many 
decades, capitalist relations eventually won out. 
By 1790, Kentucky had a total population of 73,077 out of which 11,830 
were slaves and 114 free blacks. By 1800, the population was 220,955 
with 40,343 slaves and 741 free blacks. The population continued to 
skyrocket, and by 1860, the state had 1,155,684 people; 225,483 were 
slaves and 10,684 were free blacks.25 But Kentucky’s early population 
defied anything clearly resembling a “pure” capitalist or non-capitalist 
order. Most significantly, Kentucky landownership patterns—and social 
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property rights—took on a character unique to the state due to its legacy 
as a part of Virginia. While between 1792 and 1802 the rate of landless-
ness decreased from two-thirds to one-half, at the start of the century, 
many farmers found themselves to be dependent tenant farmers rather 
than fee simple landowners.26 The prominence of tenant farming created 
a situation in which, although many farmers traveled to Kentucky in 
hopes of obtaining competency through safety-first farming, they could 
only do so through tenant farming and market production. As Friend 
puts it:
familial and communal obligations required older residents to pass 
property on to the next generation. Land, therefore, held a premarket 
value, a communal significance integral to the stability of society. Yet, 
because land early became a commodity exchanged by profiteering 
speculators, property also took on a monetary association that could 
not be ignored. In a society where less than one half of the household-
ers owned land, the need for capital to purchase land and create a farm 
compromised aspirations to live in self-sufficiency.27 
For speculator landowners, tenant farming was the most reasonable 
way to make profit from the land they owned. In this sense, it represented 
a formal subsumption of labor to capital, in which capital—through 
tenant farming—subordinated patriarchal households, and forced these 
households towards market production, but did not control the organ-
ization of labor itself. In other words, capital leached on to, but did not 
transform, the means of production. Tenants were also often required 
to make payments in currency, rather than in kind, forcing them to 
develop a mixture of subsistence and commercial production.28 Overall, 
for tenant farmers, it was not that farmers came with capitalist motiva-
tions: rather, they were subsumed under a kind of capitalist dominance 
through the lack of means to live outside of dependence.
From the start, speculators viewed the western land as a space poten-
tially subsumable to capital; a space of great potential profit. For example, 
Samuel Beall and John May teamed up to speculate in Kentucky. May 
writing to Beall, as early as 1799, stated, 
I wrote to you yesterday proposing a Scheme for purchasing the Land 
which is British Property in Kentucky County as I have Reason to 
believe, from the Scarcity of Money in that County, that it will sell 
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lower than the State Price; it is Choice Land, at any Rate would be a 
profitable Purchase.29 
By the next year May wrote, 
I have met with Col Logan from Kentucky who brings me a Letter 
from my Brother George who writes me a very great Profit may now 
be made by the Purchase of Settlement & Preemption claims, as many 
of the Claimants have not yet money to clear out their lands.30 
Early on, capitalists like May looked for frontier settlements held by 
settlers who perhaps would not have the money to purchase the land 
they worked. May, for example, regularly complained of those who 
obtained land without warrant. The speculators bought up Treasury 
warrants produced by the state as well as military warrants given to those 
who fought in the Revolutionary War but sold their land claims (which 
they were given in lieu of wages). For instance, “My Brother George has 
been very industrious in procuring Locations & has enabled me to enter 
all our military Warrants, I believe very well; and I hope I shall procure 
Locations enough for the others as well as for the Treasury Warrants.”31
May also brought a slave with him to the frontier, as slaves provided 
labor for empire building. At one point his slave even escaped, although 
soon found the harsh frontier conditions perhaps no better than his 
other life, as May wrote:
he is a most valuable Slave and one that I thought I could have trusted 
with any Thing and any where, but when I left … Falls last October 
I left him too much in the Way of Temptation and he fell in ith some 
worthless Negroes who pursuaded him to run away & attempt to get 
with the Indians; however after ten Days Absence he thought it prudent 
to return. I fear this will be a bad place to bring Slaves to, being so near 
… Indians that they will frequently find their way to them.32
For settlers looking to profit from the land in particular, access to 
markets was a central concern. General William Henry’s correspondence 
from the early decades of the 1800s, for example, repeatedly discusses 
the market opportunities provided by settling in different locations with 
family members. In 1817, for instance, he wrote to his brother regarding 
the latter’s apparent migration to Missouri in which he says that the 
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distance from the market there is so far that “the farmer will be a drudge 
one half of the year to make a subsistence for his family … the other half 
on dealing it out to them.”33 He goes on to say that while the distance to 
the market is also far in Kentucky, in Missouri commerce is especially 
difficult as it faces an uphill current and a disadvantaged geography, thus 
“You never can be eminently commercial.”34 
This logic of capitalist rationalism seems to have guided many of 
Henry’s calculations. For example, in another letter he writes, “the widest 
door stands open for profitable speculation than can be found in many 
other sections of the U.S.”35 After purchasing land in Kentucky he rented 
it out to a farmer in return for improvements. Believing that the land in 
the region would greatly increase in value as the population increased, 
for Henry land was a commodity to generate profit from. Yet the worker, 
in this case, was not a wage laborer but a tenant farmer who did not 
pay anything, but improved the land with his labor in order to increase 
its value. Surplus value was generated from this labor—realized in the 
improved value of land containing the labor of this worker—but was in 
the form of non-waged labor. A logic of capitalist “self-interest” was also 
discussed by other frontier settlers. As one letters states, 
He wishes for your Orders as to the price & manner of disposing of it. 
Not being improbable, but that in a little time we Shall have some Salt 
of our own for Sale, I have concluded on consideration that it would 
not do so well with us, as we must in point of duty to Mr. B, as well as 
Self Interest give the preference of Sale to his.36 
Additionally, for Henry, “patriarchal longevity” and “independence” 
were not separate from capitalism; far from it. Writing a reflection 
on his thirtieth birthday, he wrote, “the cares and wants of my family 
are increasing apace, but they shall only incite me to … efforts for the 
attainment of that solid independence, ‘without which,’ … ‘no man can 
be happy, nor even honest.’”37 While he used the language of “independ-
ence,” he attempted to realize this primarily through speculation in 
commodified land.
The complexities of early capitalism in Kentucky might also be seen 
through the life of Annie Christian.38 After her husband died in 1786, 
she wrote to her brother Patrick Henry: “we are enjoying blessings of 
peace here and a great plenty of every necessity and I hope I shall always 
be independent, as my dear deceased friend has left us all possessed of 
kentucky and ohio . 91
an ample support.”39 But for Christian being independent did not mean 
living self-sufficiently or outside the market; quite to the contrary. Her 
husband left her with a variety of capital, including a saltworks and 
slaves, which she worked to produce a profit to pay off her family’s debts 
and sustain her children. This meant hiring workers to produce salt and 
regularly renting out slaves. In a representative passage, for example, she 
writes to her mom,
Yesterday our Negroes, were hired out, Mr. Wallace got Hannibal at 
14, & he is to have a thousand weight of Pork at 6.0.0 which pays a 
debt for him to Capt. Taylors Estate I sent Woodfolk after the Negroes 
were hired, to collect what money he cou’d for Mr. Wallace, & as soon 
as the weather permits I shall have some salt brought here for sale.40 
While Christian aimed to make a profit to obtain independence, she also 
complained of a scarcity of money, writing, for instance, 
I had not seen Mr. Bullitt for more than a year till now, he has directed 
me to have Salt sold for Cash at what ever it may bring, Money being 
so scare in our Country , as occasiond (!) me to sell hetherto (!) upon 
Credit Salt to the amount of 640 pounds due next fall.41 
But while money was a necessary part of capital accumulation, often 
times given the paucity of paper money, other means of exchange were 
used to realize surplus value. 
Christian’s example also went against what historians have often 
assumed are characteristic of gender roles on the frontier; specifically, 
women’s subordination to husbands. After her husband died, Christian 
herself took control of their means of production and management of 
resources, although she continued to engage in some traditional women’s 
roles. For example, she wrote to her sister, “I rec’d yours per John Duglass 
with the books which I am highly obliged (!) to you for, Altho’ I have 
been so busie making our Negroes Cloaths (!) I have not had time to give 
them a reading yet.”42 Thus, she did take on the typical role of producing 
clothes for the slaves in the household, even as she defied what is the 
often assumed position of frontier white-settler women. More generally, 
gender roles on the frontier tended to be perhaps less clearly defined 
than sometimes suggested. For instance, Will Trigg writes of a Mr. 
Wallace who remarried, saying:
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She is about 4 feet 2 inches high, well set, weighing near or quite 220, 
aged 50, has traveled as much as Cook whose voyages you have read, 
remarkable shrude and cunning, has consequently learned all the 
manners, ingenuities Generalships & tricks common in any and all 
the Countries, is well Versed in Sea phrases, understands all the tacks 
& turns of the Wind and its perfectly acquainted with the management 
of all the rigging from the Bough Spirt to the rudder (don’t you think 
this is information enough for the Old man) She is remarkable neat & 
I believe kind to the children.43 
Descriptions such as this suggest that variations of socially acceptable 
femininity may be broader than otherwise conceived. But empire itself 
was often driven by masculine dreams of control. William Fleming 
wrote, for example, “I can not be see the advantages of moving as soon as 
it can be done with saftey to this Country and would be willing to know 
the Country tho roughly before I fix on a plan to move my Famely to.”44 
As in this instance, often husbands first went west, in some cases with 
slaves, to search for land and security for their families before bringing 
their families to the western edge of empire. 
Tensions between speculative profits and patriarchal independ-
ence also shaped the formation of the state.45 If the capitalist state is a 
“condensation of class” and social forces, then, in this case, the state in 
a society becoming capitalist represented the working out of a variety 
of class and social forces that, in the long run, enabled and supported 
capitalist development.46 Throughout the 1780s Kentucky politics differ-
entiated into three loosely defined “parties.” The partisans, representing 
“the rabble,” at their peak made up perhaps as much as half of the state’s 
(in becoming) population.47 By 1783–84, partisans were in support of 
separation from Virginia, with the hopes that Virginia’s large, speculative 
land claims might be annulled. During these years they even settled on 
land claimed under Virginia land grants, with the hope that they could 
claim this land through headright after independence. The Court Party, 
called so because it contained many lawyers and those engaged in legal 
and political professions, in contrast, was an elite party of Kentucky capi-
talists, and often more urban based. They had a strong economic interest 
in separation with the hopes of developing state policies to promote 
what might retrospectively be called import substitution industrializa-
tion strategies. They also, for example, started the Kentucky Society for 
Promoting Manufactures in 1789, and imported machinery from Phila-
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delphia and cotton from Tennessee to manufacture cloth. This same year, 
members of the society went so far as to agree not to purchase luxuries 
from other states, with the goal of promoting the production of liquor, 
clothes, and so on within Kentucky. Finally, the county party was a more 
rural-based elite party, including plantation owners, who were interested 
in protecting their Virginia land grants. And many of the members were 
land surveyors themselves.48 
The Kentucky constitution of 1792 (and its update in 1799) enshrined 
the rights of the Kentucky elite to private property. It also legally 
protected their rights to own slaves, and for immigrants to bring new 
slaves into the state, although it was not legal to bring in slaves as mer-
chandise. But it did not resolve the land disputes, which continued well 
into the nineteenth century. Throughout the 1790s settlers and squatters 
continued to hold land in Kentucky they did not own. In 1795, for 
example, the legislature passed a bill making it possible for settlers to 
purchase preemption ownership of land of 200 acres at the cost of $30 
for each 100 acres. This was done based on the idea that settlers would 
not be able to obtain the same rights to the land, but settlers ignored this 
and expanded their unowned holdings. The state continued to legislate 
based upon these developments as they arose. For example, two years 
later, in February 1797, a law was passed allowing settlers in the Green 
River area, who moved there before July 1798, to preempt either 100 or 
200 acres at either $40 or $60 per 100 acres, depending on the quality of 
land. Settlers were given a year to pay, and by 1799 a mess of claims and 
debts was amassed, so that one auditor estimated $352,612 was owed by 
settlers to the state.49 
Often times, through a state-capital network, those who controlled the 
emergent government also profited from these positions using familial 
and personal connections.50 People in positions of political power and 
in control of land distribution directly worked with, and profited from, 
the commodification and sale of land as state formation and capitalist 
development were deeply intertwined in personal networks. Kentucky 
capitalists also created a Society for the Encouragement of Domestic 
Manufactures in 1817.51 The primary stated agenda of the society was 
to promote the domestic consumption of manufactures and become 
less dependent upon foreign importations, so building up the national 
political economy of the emerging empire. Institution building such as 
this suggests a concerted effort on the part of the elite classes to promote 
economic growth through capitalist development. Circuit court judge 
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Adam Beatty, for example, produced a variety of agricultural goods and 
his letters reflect that he was continually concerned with the status of 
the world market. He also wrote a variety of essays commenting on the 
application of science to agriculture and how to produce more efficiently 
beginning in the 1830s, reflecting the capitalist obsession/necessity with 
productivity increases.52
Overall, the formation of the state protected the private property 
rights of Kentucky capitalists while also providing some space for settlers 
and yeomen with limited degrees of integration into Kentucky capitalism 
to continue to find patriarchal independence through the ownership 
of land plots and limited market dependence. In this sense, the space 
of state was a space of class conflict and cooperation wherein a variety 
of class forces could find a balance, albeit one in which the capitalist 
elite ruled the state and assumed they would continue to do so in the 
developing capitalist state. 
Economic development, gender, and slavery
Following its state independence, capitalist development, linked into 
broader world market relations, continued unevenly in Kentucky. On 
the one hand, white men grew rich through agriculture and livestock 
production, from selling hemp bags to Louisiana to shipping cotton 
to Britain to importing and producing cattle, hogs, mules, and even 
racehorses. On the other, the labor that built Kentucky within the United 
States was constructed from the efforts of chattel slaves and women 
who worked to reproduce and expand the white, masculine controlled 
empire. 
By the fall of 1784, the first Kentucky crops were transported on 
flatboats down the Mississippi River.53 From the 1780s and 1790s onward, 
after a short era of close to self-sufficiency, agricultural production in 
the state increasingly took on higher degrees of market participation.54 
And parts of the state, such as north-central Kentucky, became more and 
more commercialized from the 1790s onward. Kentucky yeomen found 
themselves in an area between the moral and the market economy.55 
While, on the one hand, they tended to engage in safety-first agriculture, 
placing patriarchal household and community obligations and relations 
over production for the market, over time small farmers became increas-
ingly integrated into, and dependent on, merchants and the commercial 
economy. As Friend again puts it:
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customers traded homespun, butter, and wood for books, refined 
clothes, and European goods. In many ways, a network of dependency 
tied the merchant to those customers who provided him with 
foodstuffs as well as profit. Indeed, an argument may be made that 
even as the use of barter and account-book credit satisfied commercial 
relations between merchants and customers, they also symbolized 
the communal obligations between friends and neighbors. Although 
they consistently advertised for cash in order to meet the demands 
of eastern suppliers, local merchants never abandoned barter—the 
exchange of one commodity for another—as a transaction. Although 
the cash supply in Kentucky fluctuated, the continued use of barter 
suggests that citizens still operated with some premarket notions of 
economic exchange.56 
This went hand-in-hand with increased demand for imported goods. 
From early white colonial settlement, Kentucky was not separated from 
world market relations. By 1775, Richard Henderson, for instance, 
opened a store at Fort Boonesborough selling commodities on credit. 
Pioneer women tended to bring with them goods, including china, 
that reminded them of their more “civilized” lives back home.57 And by 
1802, one estimate by François Michaux suggested that seven-tenths of 
Kentucky goods were imported from England, and goods came from 
as far as India and the Caribbean.58 It was not unusual for relatively 
self-sufficient yeomen to trade with merchants for goods including 
higher end English garments or ceramics that they could not produce 
domestically. Overall, “consumption of manufactured goods and met-
ropolitan styles thus transformed the Kentucky backwoods into a 
consumer frontier: an economic border region situated between subsist-
ence and capitalist modes of production, containing elements of both 
economic systems.”59 
But outside of this limited market integration, other social classes in 
Kentucky developed relations that might somewhat more “purely” be 
considered capitalist. By 1810, manufacturing had taken off in the state. 
That year listed were 15 cotton factories, 13 hemp mills, 38 ropewalks, 33 
fulling mills, 4 furnaces, 3 forges, 11 naileries, 267 tanneries, 9 flaxseed 
oil mills, 2,000 distilleries, 6 paper mills, 63 gunpowder mills, and 36 
saltworks.60 By 1840, $5,945,000 was invested in manufacturing, and by 
1860 that number was $20,256,000. Additionally, by this time, the state 
had 3,450 manufacturing establishments that paid out a total of over $6 
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million in wages. While the majority of workers in Kentucky manufac-
turing were white men, white women and black slaves also labored for 
Kentucky’s capitalist class and slaves were even used in textile mills and 
hemp factories.61 Besides manufacturing, farm production became a 
major component of early Kentucky capitalism. While early on farmers 
operating for profit focused on producing crops such as corn, tobacco, 
and hemp, by the mid-1830s, livestock production dominated.62 By 1835, 
Bourbon County alone exported 40,000 hogs, 10,000 cattle, and 3,000 
horses and mules.63 Kentucky capitalists such as Henry Clay, in search of 
higher profits through increased technological development, also started 
a scientific farming movement. The second Kentucky Agricultural 
Society, between 1838 and 1842, for instance, lobbied the government 
to start an agricultural school, conduct a geological survey, and collect 
agricultural statistics.64 Or, to take another example, Kentucky cattle 
producers invested in new scales in the 1850s to increase productivity.65 
Capitalist development was also facilitated by the state. As early as 
1797, Kentucky’s General Assembly passed legislation forcing all males 
over 16 years of age to labor a certain number of days each year on road 
construction and repair, and over the next half century many roads 
were built and maintained using this system.66 Of course, while the state 
wanted to build roads (often times with the goal of linking farmers more 
deeply with the market), many of the resources for this were in private 
hands. One solution to this was to construct toll roads, which was done 
in 1797 on the Wilderness Road. Additionally, in 1817 the Kentucky 
legislature authorized two turnpikes, one from Lexington to Louisville, 
and one from Lexington to Maysville to be underwritten by selling 
stock at $100 each, to get the $350,000 necessary for the construction, 
although the plan failed after the economic crisis two years later.67 This 
set a precedent, though, as selling stock to private holders to finance toll 
roads became an important strategy in future projects. And it was out 
of the battle for federal funding (as leaders like Henry Clay pushed for 
internal improvements) that Andrew Jackson vetoed federal funding for 
the Maysville Road, putting in motion a legal precedent against federal 
funding for roads as unconstitutional. The state, though, continued to 
locate ways to channel capital into roads, creating a Board of Internal 
Improvements in 1835 and hiring engineers to supervise projects and 
improve engineering practices.68 And both the state and private capital 
invested in hard-surfaced, stone roads, so by 1837 the state had invested 
$2.5 million, and private investors $2 million in these roads.69 
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Kentucky also contained a vast network of rivers, and the deepening 
of Kentucky capitalism (and Kentucky’s deepening integration with 
a developing capitalist United States and world market and interstate 
system) was further facilitated by the rise of steamboats. The first 
upriver trip to Kentucky from New Orleans to Louisville appears to have 
been in 1815, and after this a group of Lexington capitalists financed 
a commercial steamboat which left for New Orleans, although it did 
not return.70 Through the 1820s steamboats began to compete with, 
and eventual win out over, keelboats and flatboats, and soon an entire 
economy developed around them as warehouses and watering holes 
lined the rivers where steamboats commonly traveled. Steamboats 
regularly took Kentucky hemp, among other commodities, down to New 
Orleans so that southern cotton could be put in hemp bags and shipped 
to England. Over time, boats that could traverse more shallow water 
were constructed, and the state also facilitated the steamboat industry. In 
1836 Kentucky began work on a series of locks which opened in 1842.71 
Here, as with roads, public investment stimulated the further advance-
ment of Kentucky capitalism. 
By 1830, Lexington, not near a major river, found itself left out of the 
steamboat boom. As a response, investors began to channel their capital 
into a new technological frontier: railroads. By October of that year, the 
first tracks were laid, and by the summer of 1832 a half mile of track was 
ready for operation.72 From here on, private capital flowed into railroads 
and by 1860 the state had close to 600 miles of operative tracks. Much 
of the initiative for this construction came from private hands, although 
occasionally local governments did support the process.73
As with other states in the south, Kentucky was a slave state. Much 
of the labor that built the United States came from their muscles and 
minds. By 1790, Kentucky had 11,830 slaves, and that number was 
225,483 by 1860. The relative peak of Kentucky slavery was around 
1830, when 24 percent of the population were black slaves. The average 
slaveowner held about 5.4 slaves.74 And overall, as of 1850, a little over 
a quarter of white families owned slaves.75 Kentucky was less a land of 
large plantations and more a land of smaller slaveowners. For example, 
in 1850, 9,244 people owned one slave, 13,284 families owned one to five 
slaves, 1,198 families held twenty to fifty slaves, 53 families had fifty to a 
hundred slaves, and five families owned over a hundred slaves.76 Slaves 
were brought to Kentucky with the first white settlements. The census 
of Harrod’s Fort, for instance, found twelve slaves over 10 years old, and 
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seven below 10 years old.77 And it was not unusual for slaves to be the 
vanguard of expansion. For example, masters would, in some cases, send 
an overseer to manage slaves to land purchased a year or two before the 
master moved there, to clear the ground, plant crops, construct houses, 
and so on.78 
While some large plantations did exist in Kentucky, particularly in 
the Bluegrass region, it tended to be a land of small-scale slaveowners, 
with some exceptions such as Robert Wickliffe, the largest slaveowner 
in the state, who had 200 slaves. These plantation kings tended to focus 
on producing livestock, and often hemp, perhaps the crop that was most 
suited to plantations in Kentucky.79 But large-scale monoculture never 
took off in Kentucky as it did further south, although cereals (corn 
especially), tobacco, and hemp were the main crops cultivated. Cereal 
producers, though, found that it could often be more profitable to 
substitute temporary white seasonal labor, rather than fully owned slaves, 
to harvest their product. And, as noted, many producers shifted their 
capital into livestock and industry that did not depend on large-scale 
slaveowning.80 Overall, slaves were an important part of the Kentucky 
economy but many slaves were also incorporated into smaller scale 
family production, rather than large-scale capitalist plantations. 
And, as throughout the United States, expansion was built on a 
foundation of women’s oppression. As elsewhere, marriage remained a 
relationship of dispossession. Richard Sears, for example, tells the story 
of Sarah Burnam. In 1859 Burnam sued for divorce from her husband. 
As the author puts it, 
Sarah K. Burnam testified that her husband had taken control of all 
her property, including her slaves and dower land, from which he 
was receiving all the proceeds. She claimed Harrison Burnam had 
defrauded her of all lawful rent for use of her land, which had belonged 
to her previous husband.81 
And while Harrison Burnam admitted he rented out slaves she brought 
into the marriage and kept the proceeds, the court ruled in his favor: 
after all, when a woman was married all her property became legally his 
and he had the right to profit from it. These laws stayed in place until 
1894, when married women gained the right to own their own property, 
and 1900, when they were granted titles to their own earnings.82 
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The deepening of capitalism in the state also changed women’s 
role in the household. On the frontier women often engaged in more 
muscle-intensive manual labor.83 They also participated in market 
production. It was not unusual for women to produce goods, such as 
textiles, to sell on the market to obtain small luxuries. But over time, 
as capitalist relations deepened, so did the separation between “home” 
and “workplace,” and “public” and “private.” Women were increasingly 
pushed into the private realm: to be a good woman meant to be a good 
mother and housekeeper. Women in Kentucky, as in other parts of the 
south, were now supposed to be submissive appendages to their proud 
and honorable husbands. Thus, “the image of the self-sufficient frontier 
woman receded in antebellum Kentucky with the emergence of the 
dependent southern belle and her matronly counterpart, the southern 
lady.”84 The deepening of capitalism made women into invisible workers 
in the private sphere, subordinated to their masters: white men. 
Ohio
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Ohio territory emerged as a key 
pivot in the international battle for empire waged between the British 
and French. Additionally, many of the native populations within Ohio 
had only recently settled there, as migration of Delawares, Shawnees, 
and Senecas increased after the 1720s, pushed by white colonialism and 
conflict between native groups.85 From the seventeenth century onward, 
there was a series of Anglo-French wars for control over North America 
including King William’s War, Queen Anne’s War, and King George’s 
War.86 These, as mentioned, ended with the French-Indian (Seven 
Years’) War and British victory, which then set the basis for the American 
Revolution as the British attempted to augment their control over a 
colony that increasingly saw British taxes and control as unnecessary. 
After the French-Indian War and Pontiac’s Rebellion, which resulted 
in the British Proclamation line of 1763, against British authority settlers, 
“lawless banditti”, continued to move into Trans-Appalachia. In 1774, an 
estimated 50,000 whites lived on this frontier. On the native side, while 
the Treaty of Fort Stanwix was signed in 1768 with the Iroquois, it was 
not agreed upon by the Shawnees, who attempted to create an alliance 
with other native groups against colonial incursion. Tensions continued 
to rise between settler and native, and on May 3, 1774 a group of 
Virginians murdered several innocent Mingos after offering them liquor, 
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then murdered eight more who came in search of them including, most 
likely, war chief Logan’s mother. Under Logan’s call (and against others 
such as Cornstock who warned against such aggressive behavior) the 
Shawnees aligned with the Mingos and began to attack settlers below the 
Ohio River on the Pennsylvania frontier. Settlers responded as Captain 
John Connolly, with the support of Lord Dunmore, and interested in 
land speculation, fought back culminating in the battle of Point Pleasant 
on October 10, 1774. The result was settler victory as the Shawnees were 
forced to accept the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.87 
The Revolutionary War also brought violence to Ohio territory. For 
many native communities, the British appeared a stronger potential ally 
than the expanding Americans. Then in 1777, Shawnee chief Cornstock, 
his son, and two others were murdered by a white militia. This led to six 
years of war in Ohio country between Americans and native peoples.88 
Following the end of the Revolutionary War, as the emerging United 
States played off European powers to acquire as much North American 
territory as possible, the 1783 Treaty of Paris gave the United States about 
900,000 square miles of territory, about 70 percent of which was west of 
the British 1763 line.89 With the American Revolution over, the stage was 
set for the white settlement of Trans-Appalachia and the ethnic cleansing 
of indigenous peoples. And after decades of violence, the last natives left 
Ohio after the Wyandot Treaty of 1842, in which the Wyandots traded 
all of their Ohio lands for 148,000 acres west of the Mississippi, $10,000, 
and an annual sum of $17,500, payments for improvements, and their 
debt of $23,860 was taken over.90 
By 1783, Ohio was part of the frontier borderland.91 Incorporating the 
territory more deeply into the American state first meant dispossessing 
and removing the native peoples. But Native Americans were not the only 
population that needed to be eliminated in order for the United States 
to gain control of Ohio territory. There were also the “white Indians”; 
squatters and frontier families who settled the land without care for the 
capitalist privatization of the land pushed by speculators such as George 
Washington. These “white Indians” were white by ethnicity, but living 
in a cultural way too similar to Indians to be considered “white” enough 
to become members of the emerging racialized, white dominated 
United States.92
During and after the American Revolution, squatters continued to 
head west in search of open land. One traveler noted in Ohio, 
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the first clearers, or squatters, as they are called, look out to a situation 
where they can find it, and clear and cultivate a piece of land. A second 
class come after them, who have got a little money, and they buy up 
the improvements of the first settlers, and add to them, but without 
buying the land. A third and last class generally come for permanent 
settlement, and buy both the land and improvements.93 
And later he encountered 
an emigrant family, consisting of a man, his wife, and two children. 
They had travelled far in a quest of settlement, and their means 
being exhausted, they were obliged to stop short at this place, where 
they meant to sit down and clear and cultivate a piece of land. In the 
language of the country, they were squatters.94 
These settlers were not so much concerned with the state and its private 
property laws, and their view on land itself seems to be more oriented 
towards the use value of land rather than state sanctioned law.95 Land 
was livelihood, their source of freedom and independence.96 In other 
words, the aim of these squatters on the frontier was to live in patri-
archal household relations of social reproduction, and while they may 
have supported absolute property ownership, these were not property 
relations controlled under the power of capital and the capitalist state 
and legal system. 
Both squatters and natives practiced a different “mode of foreign 
relations” than the developing American state pushed.97 While natives, 
for example, had concepts of personal property, they did not view land 
as private property.98 Native life was organized around kinship, reciproc-
ity, and use values, rather than capital and exchange values. Squatters 
also tended to use land as a use value, and exchange with the purpose 
of obtaining the necessities—and perhaps occasional luxuries—of life, 
as whether or not the state laid down the law, squatters’ ownership came 
from settlement and use of the land, not state jurisdiction and monopoly 
on violence. Out of differing relations of production, they developed 
different structures and ideas of inter-community relations, inconsistent 
with the law of the American state. In the case of Ohio, these modes of 
foreign relations proved to be unable to deflect the foreign relations of 
the expanding country, in which state law, rather than use value, was the 
absolute authority. 
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The settlement of Ohio
After signing the Treaty of Fort McIntosh in January of 1785, under 
orders from the federal government, Colonial Josiah Harmer began 
to drive squatters off illegally occupied land. Throughout the next 
two years, the army located settlers’ homes and forced them to leave, 
burning down their houses and destroying their crops. But squatters 
continued to move into Ohio territory, although, as one author notes, 
“if the squatters could not be driven off the land, their society would 
be restructured in ways that would insure that they would behave as 
the citizens of a model republic.”99 This was part of the function of the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The Ordinance was the most important 
in a series (others were in 1784, 1785, and 1790) which set the structure 
of American colonial policy. Most importantly, it enshrined the rights of 
private property holders in the Northwest Territory, and created a system 
in which the United States could spread and incorporate new territories. 
Among other things, the Ordinance disallowed slavery in the territory, 
although it did institute a fugitive slave law.100 It also set a three-stage 
process for a territory to become a state. First, the state would be admin-
istered by a governor, secretary, and three judges until the population 
reached 5,000. At that point, an assembly with an elected House of Rep-
resentatives and congressionally selected legislative council would be set 
up, and a congressional delegate without voting power selected. Finally, 
with a population of over 60,000 a territory (or space within a broader 
administered territory) could become a state, on equal terms with other 
states.101 The Ordinance also further institutionalized the 1785 survey 
system, which placed land into townships of 36 square miles, each parcel 
subdivided into 6 mile by 6 mile squares.102 This gave the American 
territory a grid-like pattern that remains to this day, facilitating flows of 
capital and preventing the sort of claims problems that existed in states 
such as Kentucky. 
The spatial expansion of American power was organized in order that 
the state could sell land to serve as a source of federal finance. Addition-
ally, it created a legal structure which speculators could take advantage 
of and provided a way for small farmers to purchase, legally, fee simple 
land titles. And in Ohio, both the federal state and power of capital over 
the territory and population were strengthened by the methods used to 
incorporate the territory into the young state. The most significant way 
this came out was through war. Often the American military-industrial 
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complex seems to have its origins in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, symbolized by Eisenhower’s famous warning. But the link between 
military spending and private profit goes back to an early era of US 
history in regions such as Ohio. 
In the first half of the 1790s, the federal government, under Secretary 
of War Henry Knox, waged a series of wars against Ohio natives that 
resulted in, first, humiliation, and secondly, victory. Throughout 
the 1770s and 1780s, violence between native and settlers continued 
throughout the entire Ohio country region. Natives, for example, often 
targeted settlers’ possessions, such as stealing horses, while settlers also 
attacked natives, creating an insecure environment on the frontier. To 
address this problem, Knox increased the American military presence in 
Ohio country. In 1790, with federal funds and 320 trained soldiers out 
of an army of 1,500, otherwise comprised of mostly untrained militia, 
Josiah Harmer led an expedition against the Ohio Indians.103 Harmer 
and his troops burned Indian crops and settlements, but he lost control 
of much of his army, who were prone to looting or fleeing at the sound of 
battle. Harmer’s army was relatively unsuccessful. In one battle alone, for 
example, it lost 75 regulars and 108 militia troops against perhaps 100 
natives. Harmer’s expedition was followed by Arthur St. Clair’s the next 
year. St. Clair’s army, little larger than Harmer’s, also failed to subdue the 
Indians. St. Clair lost hundreds of troops, many killed in a single battle, 
led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, on November 4, 1791, considered 
by some the worst (or best) defeat of American troops by indigenous 
peoples. Two years later, led by Anthony Wayne, the United States 
launched another expedition into Ohio country. Wayne commanded 
an army of over 5,000, and made one final push to move Ohio from a 
borderland to a key component of the United States. They were finally 
victorious with the Battle of Fallen Timbers and subsequent Treaty of 
Greenville signed on August 3, 1795. In exchange for $20,000 in presents, 
an annual annuity of $9,500, and an exchange of prisoners, the United 
States gained control of much of the greater Ohio territory, including 
present day Detroit and Chicago, among other places.104 
The American victory was not just a win for settlers, speculators, and 
the state, but merchants who made profits from the military presence 
in an early form of military-industrial complex. Merchants supplied 
the military’s needs, such as food and clothes, and links were formed 
between the military and merchants wherein “the military received 
supplies, while settlers and businessmen benefited from enhanced 
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security.”105 Military forces contracted out supply purchases, and con-
tractors also contracted out to sub-contractors as military spending 
stimulated economic growth. This also led to increased state investment 
in infrastructure. For instance, in the 1790s Kentucky invested in 
roads, connecting Frankfort and Cincinnati, and Virginia built a road 
from Clarksburg to Marietta for cattle driving.106 In these ways, war, 
commerce, and states worked together to create the infrastructure for 
imperial and economic expansion. 
The conquest and remaking of space was always central to American 
expansion. In 1785 US geographer Thomas Hutchins led a team to survey 
the Seven Ranges in eastern Ohio.107 The township line surveys for four 
of the ranges were completed by February of 1787, and the state began to 
sell the lands, although the sales went slower than anticipated, with none 
of the townships being sold in whole, and 108,431 acres sold between 
September and October of that year for $117,108, much of which came 
as government securities that had depreciated in value to begin with.108 
More generally, though, this started the trend of the federal government 
surveying western lands and selling them (often to private speculators) 
to generate state finances: in this sense, the early American state and 
capital aligned over territorial expansion. 
Ohio country was a land of many claims. Initially, four eastern states 
had claims to the land. New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts gave up 
their claims beginning in 1780, while Connecticut held on to its “western 
reserve.” On the reserve, 
the agriculturalists are mostly occupied in raising supplies for internal 
consumption of the inhabitants, who manufacture nearly all their own 
clothing, in their respective families, so that there is little commerce: 
the chief trade is in salt, and a few ornamental imported goods. The 
principle exports are cattle and cheese.109 
Additionally, Virginia held on to some land to allot to soldiers as 
payment for serving in the military in what was called the Virginia 
Military District. Besides this, the federal government controlled land, 
some of which was reserved for military veterans. Land was also sold 
to private speculative companies. The Ohio Company of Associates 
gained 1,781,760 acres purchased from the federal government, partly 
through devalued securities, for instance.110 The Scioto Company, led 
by New York capitalist William Duer, gained an option on part of the 
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Ohio Company’s grant, and began to sell claims to the land in France, 
although the over 500 French who arrived in Ohio territory later learned 
that they had not, in fact, legally purchased land from the company as 
the town Gallipolis turned out to be outside the Scioto Company’s grant. 
Eventually though, they were given grant to the land in 1795.111 Besides 
the Ohio Company, Judge John Cleaves Symmes also developed a plan to 
sell lands from the Miami Purchase. While initially attempting to secure 
a patent of 2 million, then 1 million acres, eventually he was issued a 
patent in 1794 for 311,682 acres. But, among other things, Symmes sold 
land that he did not have a claim to and, after much legal trouble, died 
in poverty in 1814.112 
For St. Clair, governor of the territory in its second stage, Ohio 
settlers were “indignant” and “ignorant” people who did not understand 
the importance of the federal government. St. Clair filled government 
positions with Federalists like himself who viewed a strong state as 
necessary to bring Ohio into the United States. But for settlers, and Ohio 
capitalists, St. Clair’s regime was seen as aristocratic and paternal. Leaders 
for Ohio statehood such as Thomas Worthington, Nathaniel Massie, and 
Edward Triffin (who became the state of Ohio’s first governor) themselves 
were all invested in capitalist speculation in land, as were many of their 
allies.113 With their lobbying, and following Thomas Jefferson’s victory 
and defeat of Federalism, in 1802 the Enabling Act was signed granting 
Ohio statehood. 
The forces which pushed Ohio statehood, and development, then, 
were several fold. Speculators were interested in profit. The state was 
interested in using western space as a way to finance the government, and 
also secure its territory against internal and external threats. And settlers 
were interested in cheap land and patriarchal independence. How this 
played out led to, in the long run, the development of capitalism in Ohio, 
articulated through both the national and world market. 
If the related, but not equivalent, factors of market integration 
and capitalist development might be seen as a spectrum, rather than 
definitive lines, then Ohio’s development presented an uneven develop-
ment of different relations. William Cooper Howells’ story is an example 
of these degrees of capitalism and not-so-capitalism. Howells’ father, a 
Quaker, took the family to eastern Ohio in 1813. After moving to Mount 
Pleasant, he joined a textile spinning partnership that soon dissolved. 
Following this, he went out on his own, with credit from a local English 
merchant, and obtained machinery for carding and spinning wool to sell 
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on the local market. As a boy, Howells also helped tend the machines, 
as the family was the reproductive economic unit. Howells’ father, in 
addition to family labor, also hired hands. Through these twists and 
turns, eventually Howells’ father, on credit, bought 40 acres of land for 
$600 about 5 miles from Steubenville. While the land had been improved 
by the previous owner, more work was needed, so Howells’ father 
continued to do factory work during the transitional period. On the 
farm (while Howells’ father continued also to work in the city mill) the 
family practiced composite farming. For example, they grew peaches, 
many of which they sold in Steubenville. At the same time, they planted 
wheat (with the help of hired hands) which they used to produce bread 
for themselves. They also had livestock, such as pigs and cows, as part of 
their household production. After three years, though, Howells’ father 
sold the farm and the family moved to another farm closer to the city, 
where Howells’ father could more easily maintain his urban work along 
with their dream of owning a family farm.114 
While the Howells family moved to one of the more economically 
advanced parts of the state, the story of Worthington, Ohio, a Scioto 
Company settlement, tells a similar story. Here, labor was performed in 
a variety of more or less capitalist forms. As two authors put it, 
household labor was evident in women’s weaving and in seasonal 
activities by farmers such as broommaking and carving wooden 
handles for tools; itinerant workers were available for common labor 
and skills such as shoemaking and dressmaking; work was exchanged 
for needs such as carpentry or the use of a cider press; craftsmen 
working in their homes produced items as diverse as chairs and hats.115
Most families, then, did not live outside the market, like squatters of 
the earlier generation, nor did they live in a way fully subsumed and 
dispossessed by the law of value; their social form was somewhere in 
between. 
As throughout the United States, patriarchy was also a deeply 
embedded historical structure. In 1826 Anna Briggs Bentley and 
her husband moved from Maryland to Columbiana County, Ohio, 
a relatively rural area. Bentley’s story is one in which the majority of 
production was organized in the household for family use. On their farm 
they grew wheat and corn, along with watermelons, cantaloupes, squash, 
pumpkins, beans, and cucumbers, and also had a variety of fruit trees. 
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Besides this, the family had livestock such as chickens, and a cow for 
dairy products (Bentley, for example, made her own butter).116 For labor 
which could not be done in the household alone, the community banded 
together, as in the case of logrolling, which consisted of “rolling in large 
heaps with the levers the largest saw logs and then piling on the brush 
and firing it.”117 In return, all that was expected was that supper would 
be provided for everyone involved. The Bentley family, though, was not 
completely divorced from the market. But money in this community 
was scarce, and only used to get the most basic of items, and occasional 
luxury, such as textiles that could not be easily produced at home. The 
majority of production, in general, was organized by household gender 
roles as Bentley produced the majority of household necessities, cooked 
the family’s meals, and so on. 
But the development of higher degrees of capitalist relations trans-
formed gender roles, as represented by the story of Celestia Rice Colby. 
Her parents moved to Ashtabula County and by 1830 settled in Andover 
with perhaps around 25 families in the area.118 Her father worked in a 
variety of roles, such as a merchant, farmer, and speculator, and their 
family occasionally hired hands to help with production. Colby was 
raised in a society becoming increasingly capitalist, and her attitude 
towards gender reflected this as she viewed women’s space as private, as 
she put it in 1854, 
we doubt not that her presence and influence in the councils of our 
nation would have a purifying effect, yet her influence at home is 
the lever with which she may sway the destinies of the world. If the 
great mass of our sex fully understood their duty, and were prepared 
to fulfill it, how soon, how very soon would the moral aspects of the 
world be changed for the better.119 
Colby, during this time, appeared to accept the hegemony of capitalist 
patriarchy, where the woman’s place was to purify the home and save the 
man, against the pressures of work and politics outside the home. Inter-
estingly, five years later her writings reflected the opposite opinion, and 
Colby’s writings pushed for equal rights for men and women, against the 
idea of women being confined to the home, as she broke with patriarchal 
hegemony to a degree and embraced what might be considered a liberal 
feminism, for her time.120 
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Race and capitalist hegemony in Ohio
In the 1820s, the degree of capitalism in Ohio grew as the population 
became subordinated to the law of value. In agriculture, increasingly 
“market-minded agrarianism” prevailed. For example, when Aaron 
Miller and his brother Daniel traveled to Ohio in 1832, their goal was to 
locate land that could profitably produce wheat, so that their extended 
families could move to the region and engage in for-profit production, 
even if much of the production was still done by the family, rather than 
a dispossessed working class.121 More generally, when the first US census 
of manufactures was conducted in 1822 it showed that several areas, such 
as Muskingum County, where Zanesville was located, Hamilton County, 
with Cincinnati, and Ross County, where Chillicothe was located, for 
example, all had significant manufacturing, with Muskingum having 
approximately half a million dollars of capital invested.122 After the middle 
of the 1820s, in particular, Ohio’s connections with the national—and 
world—market increased as social relations within the state, articulated 
unevenly with a variety of spatial economic scales, deepened capitalism 
further in Ohio, connected to wider market relations.123 
Central to this were new transportation technologies and networks. 
Following the model of New York’s Erie Canal, by 1833 two major canals 
in Ohio were completed: one from Cleveland to Portsmouth and another 
from Cincinnati to Dayton. In addition to canals, the national road 
extended to Columbus by 1833, and to Indiana by 1840. New routes of 
transportation compressed time and space, and additionally themselves 
provided a source of jobs for wage workers, which gradually became a 
more predominant form of labor.124 But canal building also represented 
the poverty of capitalism, as 
the laborers who constructed them endured long hours of 
back-breaking work, for they literally dug the canals with picks and 
shovels. Disease, including cholera and typhus, raged periodically. 
Food and shelter were usually deplorable ... immigrants and local farm 
boys nonetheless showed up eager, at least initially, to make enough 
money to buy some land.125
These canals were also in part dug by Irish immigrants, and convict labor 
was used in at least one instance. Additionally, steamboat production 
and use took off, from 1811 to 1825, when twenty-six steamboats were 
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launched from Cincinnati. And these developments were later followed 
by railroad construction. Railroad construction in Ohio was primarily 
privately funded, but state chartered, and while construction began in 
the 1830s, between 1841 and 1850 seventy-six companies were chartered 
(although many of these did not succeed, or even build). By 1860, the 
state had 2,974 miles of railroad.126
Cincinnati also grew as a center of capitalism in the old northwest. 
The city’s initial growth was due to its location by Fort Washington at 
the end of the eighteenth century, when city merchants profited from 
military spending. Soon traders were traveling between Cincinnati 
and other cities such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and New Orleans as 
Cincinnati became integrated into circuits of capital and commodity 
chains stretching across the country.127 The city itself also became a 
center of manufacturing, as even before the panic of 1819, a variety 
of industries developed including textile spinning factories, potteries, 
foundries, breweries, and distilleries. By 1819 the city produced more 
than a million dollars of goods a year.128 And the development of 
steamboat and capital goods production also became an important part 
of the economy; one estimate from 1829 suggests that the city exported 
over $225,000 of steam engines, textile machinery, and sugar mills, the 
city becoming a producer of not just consumer, but capital goods.129
Cincinnati’s growth also resulted in class inequality. For instance, 
the majority of the city’s population were either lower-middle or lower 
class. While on the top, the merchant and capitalist elite ruled, below 
were clerks, skilled workers, small store owners, and, below them, poor 
immigrant workers, transients, and manual labors.130 As a response to 
the increased pressures of class society, laborers also began to organize. 
In 1836, for example, workers from a variety of professions including 
coopers, cordwainers, hatters, tin plate workers, and tailors, among 
others, began the General Trades’ Union of Cincinnati, and in this year a 
newspaper titled Working Man’s Friend was in circulation.131
By 1838, the city had 2,559 people who owned a total of $4,935,500 
worth of real estate. This represented about 6 percent of the population 
or one out of every five white male adults. And over half, 55.4 percent, 
of this property was held in 256 hands.132 By the census of 1840 the city 
was said to have a working population of 14,544. Within this, 80 people 
worked in agriculture, 2,044 in commerce, 10,287 in manufacturing 
and trades, 1,756 in navigation, and 377 in “professions” (physicians, 
teachers, attorneys, clergyman, and so on).133 But by this time the city may 
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still have been going through a transition from “artisans to workers.”134 
Within manufacturing and industrial production, for example, out 
of 1,614 establishments, over half had under five workers and only a 
quarter of the total population of 10,287 workers in the manufacturing 
and trades category worked in institutions with over fifteen.135 By 1840, 
Cincinnati was increasingly becoming a city organized under the law of 
value, in which larger proportions of the population were dispossessed, 
although the age of the artisan was not yet over. As a dispossessed prole-
tariat developed, prison labor was also used. As recorded by Joseph John 
Gurney in the early 1840s, reporting from Columbus, Ohio, at the state 
prison:
during the day they are employed in their respective working rooms, 
in large companies, all in silence—as busy a scene as I ever witnessed—
carriage-lace weaving, tailoring, shoemaking, manufacturing saddle 
trees, carpentering, working in iron, and stone cutting … the several 
divisions of men were employed in executing the orders of certain 
joint-stock companies engaged in their respective trades; and I was 
assured that the payments for the work defrayed the whole expense 
of the prison.136
Prisoners who broke the silence were whipped as unpaid labor generated 
profits for companies and revenue for the prison. 
Beyond the city, by 1819 Ohio had twenty-eight state chartered banks 
and by 1820 it was third, behind New York and Pennsylvania, in terms 
of the overall value of manufactured commodities. The War of 1812 also 
stimulated increased production. For instance, in Dayton from 1814 to 
1821, fifteen new manufacturing operations began. And in Steuben-
ville by 1815, 1,200 yards of cloth were produced each month, a steam 
powered flour mill was in operation, and a brewery was being constructed 
as capitalists in the city were discussing building a steamboat to more 
easily sell to the world market.137 The state’s vast ecological environment 
also provided resources for economic growth. Timber, for example, was 
readily available, as were salt licks, coal, clay, and shale. The meatpacking 
industry also grew quickly, and by the 1820s Cincinnati was processing 
as many as 30,000 hogs a year. And as early as 1804 an iron furnace was 
set up near Youngstown, followed by their spread throughout the eastern 
and southern parts of the state.138 
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Whereas Ohio’s path to capitalist development enriched a white elite, 
black workers suffered under the “freedom” of Ohio’s entrance into 
the Union as a non-slave state under the Northwest Ordinance. To call 
blacks in Ohio “free labor” would be an exaggeration. As a continuum 
of racialized and gendered labor forms have always been central to the 
history of capitalism, it was also the case in Ohio. Some former slaves 
were brought across the Ohio River and forced to sign contracts of 
indentured servitude. If they refused to sign, their masters would likely 
have sold them before moving.139 And the borderland between chattel 
slavery in Kentucky and free labor in Ohio was also a region in which 
capital exploited a variety of labor forms as “while some of these men 
and women earned wages as free laborers, others paid their wages back 
to their owners, and still others earned no wages at all, toiling as enslaved 
workers.”140 Kentucky slaves were also hired out; for example, one author 
notes as many as 2,000 slaves were hired out to Ohio from 1800 to 1810.141 
And on the river itself it was not unusual for a variety of laborers to be 
used, from northern “free” blacks to slaves, interchangeably; after all, the 
goal of steamboat owners was profit, whatever labor forms surplus value 
was generated from. 
Ohio also adopted a series of “black codes.” The first of these was in 
1804, and it stipulated that counties in Ohio had to keep a registry of 
free blacks who each had to register.142 Additionally, more were passed 
in 1807, 1829, and 1830 and the black laws forbade blacks to enter the 
state without providing a $500 bond with signatures from two white 
men guaranteeing their appropriate and good behavior.143 But the black 
population continued to increase, and by 1829 they made up 9.4 percent 
of the total population of 24,148. Racialized violence towards Ohio’s 
blacks culminated in the race riots of 1829 in which, from August 15 to 
22, white mobs of 200 to 300 people attacked the black section of Cin-
cinnati’s Fourth Ward, and, as police provided no protection against the 
white riots, between 1,100 to 1,500 African Americans fled the city.144 
Gradually, Kentucky and Ohio, along with the rest of the country, 
became more and more capitalist. Frontier towns evolved into thriving 
market-driven cities, work became organized by capital, and, in Kentucky, 
slavery provided the economic basis for the state’s power elite. While 
many may have entered into these territories without entirely capitalist 
motivations, over the decades their social relations became increasingly 
shaped by capital. Meanwhile, even further south, slavery would push 
the expansion of empire.
4
Slavery and Capitalism
For W.E.B. Du Bois capitalism, race, empire, and American slavery were 
part of the same historical process. Slaves themselves were part of the 
mass proletariat, divided by race, which capital exploited. As he argued, 
“out of the exploitation of the dark proletariat comes the Surplus Value 
filched from human beasts which, in cultured lands, the Machine and 
harnessed Power veil and conceal.”1 For Du Bois, the black slave prole-
tariat was the laboring foundation of the modern, capitalist social order.2 
Black labor became the foundation stone not only of the Southern 
social structure, but of Northern manufacture and commerce, of the 
English factory system, of European commerce, of buying and selling 
on a world-scale; new cities were built on the results of black labor, 
and a new labor problem, involving all white labor, arose both in 
Europe and America.3 
They were the foundation of an Atlantic world-system which entailed 
“new dreams of power and visions of empire.”4 And it was this link 
between capitalist slavery and empire which was at the root of the Civil 
War. For Du Bois, “it was a war to determine how far industry in the 
United States should be carried on under a system where the capitalist 
owns not only the nation’s raw material, not only the land, but also the 
laborer himself.”5 
This chapter picks up on Du Bois’ insights to unpack the dynamics of 
the history of imperialism and capitalism in the old south. Specifically, it 
aims to reevaluate the extent to which the south was capitalist or not by 
examining southern development in light of the dynamics of the uneven 
class structure of the south, emphasizing in particular the fact that “the 
south” was not one thing, but a complex uneven variety of relations.6 
Specifically, the question I contend with is: to what extent did capitalist 
relations exist in parts of the south—particularly in plantation slavery—
and how did they drive expansion? How did these social relations co-exist 
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and interact with poor farmers and “plain folk”; whites who organized 
themselves around perhaps something closer to the northern frontier 
household rather than the plantation?7 In other words, was the old south 
a society with capitalism or a capitalist society? 
Slavery as capitalist? 
The debate over the question of slavery and capitalism has been long 
running and wide ranging. For some scholars, most influentially Eugene 
Genovese, southern slavery was not capitalist. Slaves were not “free to 
choose” to sell their labor power for a wage, and were not guided by 
the indirect coercion of the invisible hand, but by the direct violence 
of the whip. Masters were not owners of large corporations and banks, 
but kings of self-sustaining agrarian complexes based upon forced labor. 
They aimed to live like aristocrats using the labor of others, guided by 
an ethos of southern gentility. Overall, “the planters, in truth, grew into 
the closest thing to feudal lords imaginable in a nineteenth century 
bourgeois republic.”8 Another position suggests, “perhaps the solution is 
to regard the South as a society transitional with respects to capitalism, 
but one in which the transition has never been able to progress beyond 
a certain point.”9 Thus, while plantation slavery moved towards a type of 
capitalism, it became stuck or frozen at a point where the transition was 
not complete. A related point of view argues that “it was a hybrid type 
of enterprise, with modern features (looking forward to the industrial 
‘plant’) but a basis in extra-economic compulsion.”10 Slavery was not 
fully capitalist, but partially capitalist and partly something else. 
Yet other scholars have argued plantations were in fact capitalist 
institutions. Most influentially and contentiously Fogel and Engerman, 
professional economists, argued that slavery was capitalist because 
slaveowners were rational profit calculators aiming to maximize their 
profits from slave labor.11 And many recent works of the “new” history of 
capitalism also emphasize the capitalist nature of the plantation south.12 
That being said, these recent works have somehow managed to make a 
case about capitalism while avoiding clear definitions of it, or, perhaps 
more importantly, engaging with the long history of debate over, meth-
odologically, how to understand capitalism historically.13 This approach 
raises a conundrum which both Marx and Weber, among others, spent 
their lives trying to understand. Concepts do not just build themselves; 
we collectively construct them to make sense of the world. While, as 
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noted in the introduction, constructing a definition creates a risk in that 
it may be the case that “capitalist” exceptions may be found in almost any 
definition of capitalism, it is necessary to have some definition, however 
precise or loose. Much of this recent work has either fallen back on loose 
definitions that focus on markets and finance, or, more often, neglected 
clear definitions and, perhaps more importantly, explanations of meth-
odological processes through which concepts are created in the first 
place. In other words, to write a supposed history of capitalism without 
clearly engaging with the conceptual and methodological processes of 
clarifying what capitalism is in the first place is not to write a history of 
capitalism at all, but a description of something that could potentially be 
called capitalism while avoiding naming the system in a clear way. 
Having presented a definition in the introduction of this book, the 
rest of this chapter will make a case for why plantations were, essen-
tially, capitalist institutions. That being said, there has been a tendency 
to equate all of “the south” with plantation slavery. But this was not the 
case. Just as in the states so far discussed, in the history of the American 
Empire there tended to be less clear-cut divides between capitalism and 
non-capitalism, so much as complex articulations of different types of 
relations, and the same can be said for the south. So while plantation 
slavery was capitalist, not all of the south was capitalist. As much as the 
shadow of slavery hung over all aspects of the south, it was the presence 
of interactions between capitalism and non-capitalism that character-
ized southern empire building. Like capitalism further north, the south 
was a complex amalgam of different types of social labor. And this social 
order was held together through gendered and racialized social relations. 
Slavery and labor
Slaves like Charles Ball were well aware of their economic value to 
planters. As he put it in his post-escape narrative, “regarding the negroes 
merely as objects of property like prudent calculators, they study how 
to render this property of greatest value, and to obtain the greatest 
yearly income, from the capital invested in the slaves, and the lands they 
cultivate.”14 For most slaveowners, slaves were capital; an investment. 
This has also raised a conceptual question: what type of capital were 
slaves? For example, some have argued that slaves were fixed capital.15 
This would mean slaves were not circulating capital that, through labor, 
created value, but investments more similar to industrial machines, the 
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product of human labor power, which transfer value to the finished good 
and contain the results of labor, but don’t create value directly.16 But if 
slaves were fixed capital they could not have been value producers by 
their own collective labor which, in fact, would suggest value, or surplus 
value, was not being produced in the south at all. This, in a way, would 
also have made it impossible for masters to profit from slave labor. 
Rather, it makes more sense to argue that slaves were a form of variable 
and circulating capital who collectively produced surplus value and 
transferred it to the commodities they produced, from the cotton they 
picked and processed, to the railroads they built, to the factories they 
worked in. In this sense, as Du Bois noted, slaves were productive of 
surplus value. And slave labor itself was more flexible than is sometimes 
discussed. For one, slaves could be, and often were, bought and sold 
and slaves were sometimes traded to different masters throughout their 
lives for a variety of reasons from debts to death. Slaves were regularly 
hired out, a way for planters to profit from slaves during slack times. 
Some slave capital went into industry, where slaves worked alongside, 
or instead of, wage laborers. And slaves themselves were also a specula-
tive investment that had a tendency to increase in value over time, and 
they provided the capital basis for the southern credit system, stretching 
across the Atlantic Ocean. 
First, there was the interstate slave trade itself.17 Overall, estimates 
suggest about 835,000 slaves were moved during this period, with some 
estimations suggesting over a million. While we many never precisely 
know, following Jonathan Pritchett and taking one estimate of half of all 
slaves moved as a benchmark, it may be likely that over 400,000 slaves 
were sold in the interstate slave trade.18 A vast institutional complex 
formed in order to profit from the movement of black bodies across 
long distances. These pathways centralized in the Louisiana slave market 
where slaves were stored in pens to be sold, either through auctions or 
else individual sales. And southern newspapers such as New Orleans’ 
The Daily Crescent regularly posted advertisements for the buying and 
selling of slaves. To take one of countless examples, an advertisement for 
J. Buddy’s Slave Depot says, 
house servants and field hands for sale at all times. Slaves will be 
received on board or sold on favorable terms. The building is a large, 
three-story brick house, and very commodious as a Slave Depot. 
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Particular attention will be paid to the health and cleanliness of all the 
slaves placed in the Yard.19 
For merchant capitalists, slaves were a form of liquid capital to buy cheap 
and sell dear, and this movement of slaves fueled the making of capitalist 
slavery in the south. 
Slave hiring was also a regular practice throughout the south. 
Estimates as to the percentage of slaves hired out for the south as a whole 
range from 5 to 15 percent, with particular counties hiring out one-third 
of all slaves.20 Hiring out slaves gave slaveowners a certain degree of flexi-
bility with their slave capital. For slaveowning capitalists, hiring out labor 
was a central way to add flexibility to the slave system, and transform 
supposedly “fixed” slave labor into a more liquid, circulating form of 
variable capital. Hired slaves experienced slavery in a variety of ways. 
And while, on the one hand, it might seem hired out slaves were closer to 
wage labor than slavery, on the other hand, it could be the opposite case 
at times: rather than hired slaves having an easier life than non-hired 
slaves, hired slaves could be subject to just as much brutality.21 For the 
slaveowner, the goal was to generate profit by hiring a slave out, with 
hopes that the slave would not be so damaged that they would contin-
ually be usable for profits. For a slave hirer, most often using one year 
contracts, the goal was to get as much value out of the slave as possible 
within that time period; that is, work the slave as hard as possible. In 
these conditions, slaves would be treated just as cruelly as if not hired out; 
perhaps even more so. For instance, the economy of Washington, DC in 
the antebellum period used a variety of labor forms. While many of the 
workers in the city itself were free blacks, along with Irish and German 
workers, slaveowners who lived directly outside the city regularly hired 
their slaves to work in the city.22
Slave hiring had a variety of dimensions. For example, poor white 
farmers who could not afford to purchase slaves themselves could hire 
them temporarily. Slaveowners could rent them to other slaveowners if 
they thought they might have trouble profiting from the labor on their 
own plantation. Even industrial companies hired slaves and used hired 
slave labor interchangeably with white, especially Irish, wage laborers. 
In Frederick Law Olmstead’s travels across the south, for example, he 
came across a slaveowner, Mr. C., who hired Irish workers to dig ditches, 
although he preferred black slave labor for most tasks, given that the 
Irish were supposedly more dishonest and needed closer supervision.23 
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And industries in Virginia, for instance, used a variety of types of labor. 
For example, Olmstead notes:
yesterday I visited a coal-pit: the majority of the mining laborers 
are slaves, and uncommonly athletic and fine-looking negroes; but 
a considerable number of white hands are also employed, and they 
occupy all reasonable posts. The slaves are, some of them, owned by 
the Mining Company; but the most are hired of their owners, at from 
$120 to $200 a year, the company boarding and clothing them (I have 
the impression that I heard it was customary to give them a certain 
allowance of money and let them find their own board).24 
Slaves in some cases were also able to hire themselves out on their day 
off to poor whites to earn money.25 Olmstead even mentions at one point 
that it was so profitable to hire slaves out to tobacco factories and to build 
railroads that slaveowners hired out too many, and, in turn, had to tem-
porarily hire white workers to replace them.26 One reason why planters 
may have at times hired white Irish workers over their slaves was because 
they did not want to risk the value of their slave capital on dangerous 
jobs. He mentions one case of an Irish gang being hired to drain land in 
which the reply was, “it’s too dangerous work (unhealthy?), and a negro’s 
life is too valuable to be risked at it. If a negro dies, it’s a considerable 
loss, you know.”27 Or as a mate on a cotton shipping boat put it, “the 
niggers are worth too much to be risked here; if the Paddies are knocked 
overboard, or get their backs broke, nobody loses anything!”28
The story continues as both company owned and hired slaves worked 
interchangeably with Irish and German immigrant labor in many 
industries. For instance, Olmstead encountered a glue manufacture who 
“said that, in his factory, they had formally employed slaves; had since 
used Irishmen, and now employed Germans altogether.”29 Perhaps the 
slaves that got the closest to living in “quasi” slavery, or “half ” freedom 
were self-hired slaves. While most states had laws against self-hire, it was 
not unusual for these laws to be ignored. Self-hire was most common 
in larger cities such as Charleston and Richmond, where a demand for 
flexible, semi-skilled labor was higher than in the country. Self-hired 
slaves effectively paid a “body rent”; in other words, they were allowed 
to hire themselves out as wage laborers provided they paid their masters 
a continual fee. For masters, these slaves became an easy way to profit 
simply by ownership. For slaves, this meant, at times, a greater degree 
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of independence. Some, for example, even rented their own homes and 
saved money to purchase their freedom. But whatever degree of “quasi” 
freedom some may have had, a slave was still a slave, and more often than 
not treated as such. Self-hired slaves, for instance, made up a large portion 
of revolts led by Gabriel Prosser in 1800 and that led by Denmark Vesey 
in 1822, not content with their supposedly half-free situation.30 And the 
term half freedom may have been used in some cases as, for example, 
Linda Jacob’s narrative records being scolded for knowing how to read 
with “who writes to you? Half free niggers?”31 Although it is not entirely 
clear in this context whether half free refers to free blacks or perhaps 
self-hired slaves, it appears, perhaps, the distinction between slavery and 
freedom was not always entirely clear-cut. For example, Simon Gray, a 
slave, was hired out to Andrew Brown and Company where he worked 
first in the sawmilling industry and eventually as the company’s chief 
boatman.32 As one scholar puts it:
as a captain, Simon Gray exercised a degree of authority that is 
surprising to the modern student of slavery. His crews, usually 
numbering between ten and twenty men, were made up of both Negro 
slaves and white rivermen. Some of the slaves were the property of 
the company, while others, like Gray himself, were hired from their 
owners by the firm. The white crewmen, on the other hand, were 
employed by the Negro, who kept their records, paid their expenses, 
lent them money, and sometimes paid their wages.33 
Eventually, while a slave his renter even allowed him to engage in his 
own private business ventures in his free time. Thus, while technically a 
slave, Gray was perhaps as free as many supposedly “free” white workers. 
Most slaves lived and worked in agriculture but not all slave capital 
was tied up in the countryside. Slaves were used in a variety of industrial 
enterprises. While industrialization itself started in the south almost as 
early as the north, its rate of growth was substantially slower. The number 
of industrial workers increased in the south about 72 percent from 1820 
to 1860, and nearly 400 percent during that period in the north.34 In total, 
in the 1840s and 1850s, it has been estimated that perhaps 5 percent of 
the south’s 4 million slaves worked in industry, and on the eve of the Civil 
War the south controlled about 15 percent of the country’s industrial 
capacity.35 While lagging far behind the north, then, a significant amount 
of industry did develop in the south, some of it worked by slaves. 
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In fact, from its origins, American industry used a variety of labor 
forms including slave labor. For example, Alexander Spotswood, 
lieutenant governor of Virginia, purchased African slaves to work on the 
Tuball Iron Works as early as 1720. The Principo Iron Works, outside of 
present day Baltimore, also used slaves among a variety of types of labor. 
In 1723, the company employed thirteen slaves, ten white servants, 
and twenty-six other white workers.36 Throughout the antebellum 
period slaves continued to labor in a wide variety of industrial projects. 
Southern textile producers, for example, used combinations of “free” 
and “unfree” labor, and in 1860 cotton and woolen industries employed 
over 5,000 slaves.37 In general, slaves worked in mining, ironworks, 
textile, hemp, and tobacco factories, built canals and railroads, and 
were employed in basically every form of southern industry. Joseph 
John Gurney, in his journey from Ohio to Virginia, for example, found 
slaves working in saltworks around the Kenahwa.38 And Loughton Smith 
found “a company has associated for purposes of navigation by cutting 
a canal along the river. Ninety negroes are constantly employed, with 
four overseers and a head manager.”39 In addition, while industry and 
agriculture are often considered two different realms, in practice there 
tended to be a blurry line between them. For example, the production 
of sugar is often considered a rural activity, but in the Louisiana sugar 
industry the number of acres cultivated per hand rose from 2 in 1802 to 
over 5, in some cases as high as 6.6 in the years before the Civil War.40 
Much of this productivity stemmed from a rising organic composition 
of capital in the sugar industry. This involved, for example, using moving 
conveyer belts in sugar processing industries in an assembly line fashion 
with labor organized around clock time.41 It also involved using steam 
power, as by the 1860s, 80 percent of sugar plantations were using this 
new technology.42 Louisiana planters also invested in railroads, in some 
cases creating integrated production facilities in which small railroads 
shipped sugar cane, as it went through its processing stages, to different 
facilities on the plantation. 
Slaves comprised the largest section of unskilled labor throughout 
southern cities, but also engaged in skilled labor. This was demon-
strated in the overwork system. With overwork, slaves were required 
to produce a certain amount: beyond that they were paid a bonus for 
their production. Wages from overwork could be used for slaves to 
purchase a life beyond the subsistence level the majority of slaves lived 
at. For example, Sam Williams of Buffalo Forge received $5 per extra 
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ton of iron he finished. He, along with other slaves, also held a plot of 
land on the company’s territory that he could work and sell produce 
for a profit. Using proceeds from these, Williams regularly purchased 
coffee and sugar, opened a savings account at Lexington bank, and lived 
a life that might be considered “quasi” free; albeit still a slave.43 Other 
slaves saved money to visit families living elsewhere, or even to try and 
purchase freedom. In all these cases, capital had an interest in investing 
in slaves, and treating them as not purely “unfree” labor but along a labor 
form continuum. 
Slavery, race, gender, and empire
Slavery, of course, was held together by racism. By viewing slaves and 
Native Americans as the racialized other, the master class were able to 
defend expansion and the “peculiar institution” as well as build white 
supremacist solidarity amongst different classes of whites.44 As traveler 
Francis Grund put it:
the progress of the white race is the soul of universal history; for it 
is the white race which produced all the changes, and acted as the 
animating principle on the rest of mankind. The other nations 
remained stationary, bound by the limits which nature had set to their 
progress; the white race alone was possessed of the courage to overleap 
them and to traverse the ocean in a quest for new land.45 
The white race was supposedly the motivating race behind all signifi-
cant achievements in human history. Thomas Jefferson thought, while 
black-skinned people may have a fine ability to remember ideas and 
actions, they lacked the creative intellectual capacity to create new 
human innovations, as he says, “it appears to me that in memory they 
are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior.”46 The spread of the 
white race across the expanding American Empire, then, was practically 
inevitable. As Grund again put it, “every race has feared the contact of 
the whites, in the same manner as a weaker animal dreads to meet one 
which is more powerful.”47 While it may have been (somewhat) sad or 
regrettable for the imperial mind that the indigenous peoples were killed 
and conquered, it was simply the result of the movement of civilization 
across the North American continent. 
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When Thomas R. Gray wrote Nat Turner’s “confessions” after inter-
viewing him, he included in the introduction of his book, “Nat Turner, 
the leader of this ferocious band, whose name has resounded throughout 
our widely extended empire, was captured.”48 For Gray, Turner’s rebellion 
was a challenge to empire. And in the south, empire could be seen as 
stretching from the household to the polity. As the Marquis de Chastellux 
put it, more critically, “I mean to speak of slavery; not that it is any mark 
of distinction, or peculiar privilege to possess negroes, but because the 
empire men exercise over them cherishes vanity and sloth.”49 Thus, 
for some, the “empire” of slavery was not something to celebrate, but 
to criticize. Compared to the more prosperous and economical north, 
southern slavery tarnished human potential, encouraging arrogant 
behavior and idleness through the exercise of personal slave empires.
Slavery was, of course, not only racialized, but gendered. American 
slavery was unique in that it developed into a self-reproducing system, 
so that, even with the formal abolition of the slave trade, slavery could 
continue to expand south and west. Often slave women worked in 
the fields, the same as men, although in some cases their gender was 
preferred for household tasks. And, as recorded in the story of Harriet 
Jacobs, female slaves were also regularly raped.50 The result of this, along 
with the fact that free blacks and whites did occasionally copulate on 
consensual terms, led to years of debate over who, exactly, was “black.” 
Milton Clarke’s narrative, for example, reveals he was called a “white 
nigger.”51 And one record of racial categories in New Orleans shows a 
complexity of racial categories: 
Sacatra griffe and negress.
Griffe negro and mulatto.
Marabon mulatto and griffe.
Mulatto white and negro.
Quartcron white and mulatto.
Metif white and quarteron.
Meamelouc white and motif.
Quarteron white and meamelouc.
Sang-mele white and quarteron.52
The racial categories of the south were white, black, and red, but they 
also contained a variety of complexity, albeit one in which if someone 
was partially black they were considered ripe slave material. In fact, in 
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some cases, young light-skinned female slaves were even sold directly 
for sexual exploitation, given their lighter skin made them supposedly 
more desirable for the white master race. And the value of female slaves, 
“breeding wenches,” as they were called, was also dependent upon their 
potential fertility.53 A female slave could give a master a high return on 
his investment if it produced more slaves who, by the fact that their 
mother was a slave, were legally made slaves themselves. 
From Virginia to Texas, slavery spread across the land as the illusion 
of northerners that “diffusion” would gradually lead to the end of slavery 
was exposed. White masculine dreams of the profits of empire pushed 
expansion further along the western frontier, driven most significantly 
by the cotton boom which supported British industrialization across 
the Atlantic.54 Travelers recorded zones of overused, desolate land and 
abandoned farms in the east while massive slave plantation complexes 
flourished in the west. As Gurney wrote with disgust, 
The plain fact is, that the lands of North Carolina and Virginia, have 
been for so many years under a process of exhaustion by slave-labor, 
that this labor is no longer a source of profit. The negroes themselves 
are now the only profitable article on the estate, and to breed them for 
sale insensibly becomes the regular business of the country.55 
And passing through Virginia, Charles Ball observed of tobacco, 
this destructive crop ruins the best land in a short time; and in all 
the lower parts of Maryland and Virginia the traveller will see large 
old family mansions, of weather-beaten and neglected appearance, 
standing in the middle of vast fields of many hundred acres, the fences 
of which have rotted away.56
But slavery was also an adaptive system. In Virginia, for instance, some 
producers switched to crops such as wheat or, as noted, employed their 
slaves in industry. But hundreds of thousands were sent further south and 
west through the interstate slave trade. Here, white-slave-settler coloni-
alism in the west provided capital with a “spatial fix” against declining 
profits due to over-exploitation of the land in the east.57 For plantation 
owners to move west to search out new profits they would either have 
to bring over their own slaves, or else purchase new ones after arrival. 
Moving could also mean a capitalist’s slaves were held from circulating 
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for a portion of time. To soften this, and keep slaves as circulating capital, 
slaveowners would, in some cases, send their slaves ahead. For example, 
slaveowner John Breckinridge moved from Virginia to Kentucky but 
sent his slaves to the new state nearly a year before he left. He then put 
them under control of Samuel Meredith and William Russell to hire out 
in the time before he arrived.58 In other cases, capitalists moved west 
and left their slaves behind in trusted hands, to be hired out until the 
capitalist was settled and ready to use them profitably. Additionally, 
it was not unusual for new settlers to hire slaves upon arrival to work 
towards setting up their new homes. In all these cases, slaves as circulat-
ing capital contributed to the expansion of the westward and southward 
frontier. The slave south was far from a static system: it was a dynamic 
and shifting modern social order. Capital continually moved from region 
to region, and from crop to crop, in order to generate surplus value. It 
has been suggested that as much as 30 percent of the south’s economic 
growth from 1840 to 1860 was due to the movement of population from 
the old south to the new.59 In other words, imperialism was profitable. 
The movement of capital southwest opened up new avenues for profits, 
particularly in the cotton kingdom. This was also driven by the ability 
of slaveowners to shift to new crops when profit rates declined in the 
old south: from tobacco to indigo, rice, and sugar, to cotton. In all these 
cases, slave capital changed forms, either geographically or in terms of 
what product was produced.
Expansion was a key method for increasing profits from slavery. Spe-
cifically, the movement from less fertile, overworked soils in the east to 
nutrient-rich soil in the west likely contributed to increased productivity. 
As Olmstead and Rhode note, the center of the cotton world shifted from 
west central Alabama in 1839 to west of the Mississippi-Alabama border 
by 1859. In this new territory picking rates increased more than in the 
east, between 1811 to 1862 rising by approximately 1.52 percent a year in 
the old south, and 2.13 percent a year in the new south.60 The movement 
west opened up new lands, further increasing the productivity of slave 
society. Finally, it is useful to note that it was not until nearly a century 
after the end of slavery that the mechanical cotton picker replaced the 
field hand in the south.61 This suggests the problem was not one of a lack 
of desire on the part of slaveowners to invest in more efficient means 
of production, but that the technological capacities to do so simply did 
not exist, and would not until well into the age of the generalization of 
supposedly “capitalist” relations. 
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Recent research has also highlighted the extent to which plantation 
slavery was perhaps more economically rational and efficient than some 
previous perspectives suggested. Olmstead and Rhode’s calculations 
suggest that in the six decades before the Civil War productivity on cotton 
plantations may have increased fourfold.62 Increases in the efficiency of 
production under slavery were both continual and gradual: the product 
of countless capitalists experimenting with new biological varieties of 
crops and production organizational techniques. In Maryland between 
the 1640s and the 1690s, for example, the mean per hand production 
of tobacco rose from £900 to close to £1,900. Farmers invented new 
techniques, combining European with African and Native American 
techniques. Additionally, slaves were gradually introduced, replacing 
indentured servants, and the skills they brought from Africa may have 
contributed to this, along with the introduction of labor gangs. This 
also likely contributed to the declining price of tobacco as the costs of 
production decreased.63 
Beyond the cotton gin, productivity increases in the cotton industry 
were the result of countless farmers experimenting with new breeds of 
cotton. Initially, there were two main breeds, Sea Island, which grew 
around the coastal regions and islands of South Carolina and Georgia, 
and Upland cotton that proved to be more resilient further inland. 
Farmers continued to experiment, in time creating many new breeds 
through cross breeding and importing new forms of cotton seed, such 
as Black Seed cotton, imported from Siam in the 1730s. One successful 
example was Mexican cotton, brought to the Mississippi Valley as early 
as 1806. It had a relatively short time to ripen, could be easily picked, 
and was resistant to disease. Petit Gulf, perhaps the most famous cotton 
breed, emerged out of this in the late 1820s, developed by Dr. Rush Nutt, 
and soon spread widely as a regional market for cotton seeds grew.64 
Innovation continued up through the 1850s, contributing to increased 
productivity.65
Capitalist slavery pushed racialized and gendered imperial relations 
across the southern half of the United States until the Civil War. Yet 
the social structure of the south itself—and the social forces driving 
empire—were more complex than this picture alone shows. On the verge 
of the Civil War, in fact, only about a quarter of southern white families 
owned slaves, down from as high as around 35 percent three decades 
previously.66 And many families that did own slaves owned very few. 
In many parts of the south, in the sandy regions, poorly or un-drained 
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marshes, and the pine barrens and upcountry where the land was 
cheaper and less fertile—and less conducive to plantation slavery—“poor 
white trash” and “plain folk” lived in relations in many ways closer to 
the northern frontier patriarchal household mode of social reproduction 
than the capitalist plantation system.67
Social class in the south
The white component of the southern social structure was divided 
along class lines.68 There were poor whites, barley producing above 
subsistence, middling whites, petty-commodity producers engaging 
in “safety-first” farming, and small-scale planters with lesser numbers 
of slaves than large-scale plantation complexes. There were also white 
wage laborers, white artisans, and so on. Demographically, before the 
Civil War, the total population of the United States was 31.4 million. 
There were around 4 million slaves, perhaps 6 percent of them living 
in cities, while the total white population was around 27 million. And 
overall, there were about 8 million whites in the south. The planter class, 
defined as owners of twenty or more slaves, was around 225,000 people, 
and around 10,000 planters owned fifty or more slaves, while perhaps 
40 percent of slaveowners owned five to nineteen slaves. Around 3–4.5 
million whites were small landholders, owning either no slaves, or below 
five slaves, while perhaps 2.4–4 million whites did not own land at all. 
And there were almost half a million free blacks.69 
So “the south” was an uneven place, much more complex than 
plantation slavery alone. And it was out of these complex social relations 
that the southern half of the American Empire was built. In other 
words, southern white-settler colonialism was driven both by capitalist 
plantation slavery as well as non-capitalist farmer households, which 
intersected through a relation in which small farmers were regularly 
pushed west as plantation owners moved to more fertile grounds in 
the west, taking control of the land, with the whole social order linked 
together through a system of white supremacy.70 
Those who lived in the south were well aware of the large class of 
poor whites they regularly encountered. For slaves, poor whites at times 
provided an opportunity for trade. For planters, among other things, 
they could serve as patrollers—“paddyrollers”—out to capture slaves 
who might escape in the dead of night. As one traveler observed, 
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humanity has still more to suffer from the state of poverty, in which a 
great number of white people live in Virginia. It is this country that I 
saw poor persons, for the first time, after I passed the sea; for, in the 
midst of those rich plantations, where the negro alone is wretched, 
miserable huts are often to be met with, inhabited by whites, whose 
wane looks, and ragged garments, bespeak poverty.71 
Another observed in North Carolina, “the inhabitants are mostly 
farmers, and produce on their farms every necessity of life.”72 And as 
escaped slave Charles Ball wrote, in the south there was a “third order” 
of white men, 
in my opinion, there is no order of men in any part of the United States, 
with which I have any acquaintance, who are in a more debased and 
humiliated state of moral servitude, than are those white people who 
inhabit that part of the southern country, where the landed property 
is all, or nearly all, held by the great planters. Many of these people live 
in wretched cabins, not half so good as the houses which judicious 
planters provide for their slaves.73 
Lastly, as Olmstead wrote, 
I have been once or twice told that the poor white people, meaning 
those, I suppose, who bring nothing to market to exchange for money 
but their labor, although they may own a cabin and a little furniture, 
and cultivate land enough to supply themselves with (maize) bread, 
are worse in almost all respects than the slaves.74
For poorer and low-middling whites, the “farm economy meant a 
diversified, self-sufficient type of agriculture, where the money crops 
were subordinated to food crops, and where the labor was performed 
by the family or the family aided by a few slaves.”75 In some cases, they 
even squatted on the land, often living in no more than a poorly con-
structed log cabin.76 The south might be characterized, then, as Stephen 
Hahn suggests, as a “dual society” where “alongside the commercialized 
Plantation Belt arose areas characterized by small farms, relatively few 
slaves, and diversified agriculture.”77 Regions such as “Western North 
Carolina, eastern Tennessee, the hilly sections of Georgia, Alabama, and 
Louisiana, as well as southern Mississippi and Georgia, among others, 
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remained isolated enclaves or on the periphery of the staple economy.”78 
While in some cases, poor whites lived near plantation regions, 
producing small amounts of cotton to sell on the market, in other 
regions the geography of the south organized along class and ecological 
lines. And in parts of South Carolina, yeomen tended to congregate in 
the piney land where they were, as Stephanie McCurry puts it, “masters 
of small worlds”; small farmers who occasionally owned slaves and 
engaged in market production, but tended to put the sufficiency of the 
household first.79 
But it would be a stretch to argue that yeomen did not want to become 
capitalists, or were fully insulated from capitalist pressures. A variety 
of works have come out showing that, in fact, yeomen may have been 
more market oriented than otherwise argued. In some cases, small and 
medium slaveowners appear to operate in a similar way to plantation 
owners. Benton H. Miller of Georgia, William Harris argues, moved 
from Mississippi to Georgia in 1858 after collecting slaves and debts 
from the former region. By 1860 he owned fourteen slaves and 900 acres 
of land.80 Similar to larger plantations, Miller produced sizeable amounts 
of cotton for the market, and also planted other crops, especially corn, 
to make his farm relatively self-sufficient. In some ways, his activities 
reflected yeoman behavior: participating in reciprocal farm work with 
the local community, for example, and working alongside slaves in the 
fields. But he almost produced as much cotton as corn, devoting 32.5 
acres to the former and 44 acres to the latter.81 Corn and cotton were also 
useful crops because they had different growing seasons, and provided 
a way to keep slaves busy throughout the year. Overall, much of Miller’s 
orientation seems to be towards capitalist production. 
In Maryland the situation may have been similar, and it may have 
even been the case that some slaveholding yeomen were more dependent 
on the market than larger planters.82 In the Mississippi piney woods a 
similar story also appears to be the case. In Covington, Jones, and Perry 
counties small farmers did not practice “safety-first” production. First, 
between one-half and three-quarters of farmers did not produce all the 
manufactured goods they needed to subsist and relied on the market 
for those. Secondly, many farmers specialized in raising cattle and hogs 
for the market. In other words, they used land and labor resources that 
could have been devoted to sufficiency, deciding instead to produce for 
the market, often to the extent to which they did not produce enough 
grain to subsist without purchasing food. There was a risk in that if 
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the grain crop they produced was not enough, it would not feed their 
families, or the livestock they raised. But many took this risk in order 
to gain a surplus they could use to purchase more land. Some farmers 
were successful, and between 1850 and 1860 it appears that farmers, 
in some cases, were able to increase the size of their landholdings and 
shift away from livestock towards cotton production.83 And in Missouri, 
as will be discussed in next chapter, mixed farming (partly for sub-
sistence, partly for the market) developed from the earliest American 
immigrants. By the 1820s, particularly along zones close to rivers, much 
market activity occurred and would continue to grow. Small farmers led 
this as they practiced “composite farming.”84 This meant farmers diver-
sified between domestic and market production, from producing for the 
family, bartering with neighbors, and buying and selling from traveling 
merchants.85 
Overall, variations on composite farming, with some tending towards 
more self-sufficiency and some towards a higher degree of market 
dependence, seemed to be the norm for yeomen plain folk. Of course, it 
was not just middling yeomen and planters that moved west. Poor whites 
also migrated with the hope of obtaining a cheap piece of land. Often 
they squatted, hoping preemption laws would eventually allow them to 
buy cheap land, although, perhaps more often than not, they were not 
able to gather the money to fight off land speculators. Landless whites 
often became tenants or, in some cases, transient wage workers whose 
lives are not well documented. In 1850, for example, in northeast Mis-
sissippi as much as 40 percent of the population were landless farmers, 
living as squatters or working for absentee landlords.86 
In summary, the social forces that drove and built the southern 
American Empire were diverse and uneven. While many small farmers 
practiced composite farming, depending on the location of the farm 
family, different techniques seem to have been practiced, with a wide 
variety of degrees of market dependence or independence. And, as 
importantly, simply because these farmers were integrated into the 
market does not mean that they were automatically pursuing capitalist 
production. For one, the extent to which an exploited, dispossessed class 
existed that yeomen could use to produce surplus value was limited. 
While some yeomen owned less than five slaves, this labor was used as 
often to supplement household labor as it was to produce for profits. 
Slaves, in other words, could be integrated into the patriarchal household 
mode of social reproduction. Additionally, the extent to which these 
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social forms were dominated by the law of value was also limited. In 
fact, most yeomen families could shift towards taking care of their needs 
as opposed to producing for the market, an action that, often times, 
remained supplemental to household production, albeit in some regions 
less than others. And, as the next chapter will show, up until the Civil 
War, while capitalist plantation slavery would overshadow the contours 
of the southern political-economic system, “the south” was not necessar-
ily entirely capitalist. 
5
The Progress of Empire
The western course of empire continued to expand and by the early 1800s 
frontier settlers penetrated halfway through the continent into many ter-
ritories on their way to becoming states. For Henry Schoolcraft, who 
wrote one of the first thoroughly documented accounts of the region, 
Missouri and the old west were driven by what he called the “progress 
of empire.”1 And by 1870 L.U. Reavis commented on the “sublime march 
of the American people in the course of the star of empire in its majestic 
career across the continent.”2 St. Louis was to be celebrated as the center 
of growing empire in the west, comparable to New York City in the 
empire state back east. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the westward movement 
of empire into the southern antebellum frontier.3 I focus specifically on 
three territories: Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas. All three states were the 
“wests” of their time. As Thomas Hart Benton, editor of the St. Louis 
Enquirer, wrote in 1819, “it is time that western men had some share in 
the destinies of this Republic.”4 The southwestern frontier was, like other 
parts of the country, a society with capitalism. As one commentator put 
it, “The farmers of the West are independent in feeling, plain in dress, 
simply in manners, frank and hospitable in their dwellings, and soon 
acquire a competency by moderate labor.”5 But this population quickly 
intersected with mining and railroad companies, and others seeking out 
western space for profitable use. As the same writer explains, western 
settlers tended to emigrate in three waves; first, pioneer families would 
occupy land and build log cabins, secondly, settlers who purchased the 
land built more sophisticated dwellings and cleared the land, and third, 
“The men of capital and enterprise come. The ‘settler’ is ready to sell out, 
and take the advantage of the rise of property—push farther into the 
interior, and become himself, a man of capital and enterprise in turn.”6 
In other words, these territories emerged in an era in which the logic of 
capital was gradually coming to increasingly organize human social life 
and continued to push against non-capitalist frontier relations. 
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This chapter aims to explore these complexities on the southwestern 
frontier of white-settler colonialism. Rather than focusing on the more 
commonly discussed slave states such as Mississippi, by concentrating on 
the complexities of Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas, the chapter provides 
a lens to understand the ways “the south,” a complex social formation, 
was both an empire of slavery and something more multi-layered 
than regional generalizations based solely upon the deep south might 
account for. 
The French and Spanish eras
The fur trade was a central vanguard of North American white 
expansion.7 Demand for North American furs, particularly beaver felts 
which provided material for European hats, linked the frontier back-
country to the Atlantic world market. By 1673, when Jesuit Father 
Jacques Marquette and trader Louis Jolliet made their venture to 
Missouri territory, the fur trade, along with missionary activity, had 
pushed explorers west.8 From the start of European settler expansion, 
French merchants were the dominant white influence in the territory 
that became the state of Missouri, often times living in a middle ground 
with native peoples, such as the Missouris, Sac and Foxes, and the 
Osages. French settlement shaped both the commercial orientation of 
early settlements and property and production patterns. 
French expansion into Missouri was driven by a combination of 
motives: the fur trade, the search for precious metals, exploration for the 
fabled Northwest Passage, religiously civilizing the supposedly savage 
peoples, and interimperialist rivalry as the English increasingly took 
control of the eastern part of the continent.9 And like much of French 
exploration and trade, the colonizers inserted themselves in preexisting 
and in-motion relations with native peoples, transforming the natives’ 
ways of living as they incorporated European goods—perhaps most 
influentially weapons and alcohol—into their modes of production, 
altering them without fundamentally transforming them in a capitalist 
direction. For example, French traders quickly allied with the Osages, 
trading guns and other goods in return for skins and furs, and sometimes 
native slaves and horses. Osages responded by raiding western natives to 
acquire slaves and horses for further trade. Pushed by demand to acquire 
more trade goods, they also extended the length of their hunting season 
and the territory covered, and even altered marriage and kinship patterns 
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as men took on more wives to take care of chores and cleaning furs, and 
hunting brought young warriors increased presence and prestige.10 
Following these initial expeditions, French Canadians soon began 
to build villages in the first decades of the eighteenth century. They 
organized landholdings into fee simple land. Villagers owned strips of 
land (incidentally called “commons”) which they farmed, and beyond 
this, villages were surrounded with collectively controlled commons 
which they used to graze livestock and collect wood and resources. By 
a 1732 census, 471 people lived in what was considered Illinois County. 
The census also recorded 164 people of African heritage, and by 1737, 
314 slaves lived in the region.11 While slavery in Missouri never reached 
such proportions as, say, in Mississippi, it did shape the social structure 
from the start. French capitalists were also interested in the region from 
an early time. For instance, the French Company of the West saw the 
territory as potentially profitable in the early 1700s: “A Company, incor-
porated with such ample rights and privileges, did not fail to draw upon 
it the attention of the speculative, or to enlist the aid of the enterprising 
capitalists of the French metropolis.”12
In November 1762, France ceded the territory to Spain, but it was not 
until over three years later, in March of 1766, that Spanish administra-
tors began to arrive. By that time Missouri had two primary settlements, 
Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis. For Spain, though, control of Louisiana 
was less about settlement, and more about politics. They continued the 
tradition of giving gifts to natives, set up several forts, and attempted 
to limit British fur trader incursions into the territory. But throughout 
the Spanish period, American settlers gradually began to flow into the 
region. The conclusion of the American Revolution and end of British 
limits on expansion past Trans-Appalachia meant Americans were free 
to migrate west, no matter what populations inhabited the land they 
wanted. Spain’s initial reaction was one of hostility towards Americans. 
In 1784, for example, they closed the Mississippi River to Americans. 
But realizing they could not stop the population inflow, the Spanish 
soon changed their course. They began to allow Americans to sell goods 
down the river, for a duty, and built settlement policies, hoping that, 
by allowing Americans to settle, they could turn them into subjects of 
the Spanish Crown.13 The Spanish offered Americans land grants to 
pobladors (populators) with the hope that they would build communities 
in the territory. And by the time of the Louisiana Purchase, around 6,000 
Americans lived in the region.14
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Famously in 1803, the United States purchased Louisiana from 
France, effectively doubling the size of the country, although at the 
time, the borders of the purchase were still relatively undefined. The 
purchase resulted from the failure of the French to control the Haitian 
Revolution.15 Having lost France’s most profitable Caribbean colony, 
Napoleon agreed to sell Louisiana to the Americans for $15 million, 
$3.75 million of which went to pay off French debts to the United States 
after attacks on travel and trade in the 1790s. Although the federal budget 
was $10 million a year, the Americans could not pass up the offer.16 Of 
course, there was one small problem with this: when the Spanish agreed 
to transfer Louisiana with the Treaty of Saint Ildefonso on October 1, 
1800, they did so with the agreement that France would not alienate the 
territory to another power. Nevertheless, Napoleon made the decision 
and the Spanish were in no position to successfully contest it. Thus, the 
formal political arrangements were put in place to expand the American 
Empire halfway across the continent. 
Social relations in the west
When Schoolcraft traveled around Missouri territory in 1818–19 it 
was still very much the frontier era. His travels brought him between 
scattered white settlements and cabins and Native American controlled 
territory. In his encounters with frontier settlers, he was quickly surprised 
by the gender relations he encountered. For instance, while traveling he 
stopped at the home of a settler family and found 
The owner of the cabin was not himself in when we first arrived, but 
his wife very readily gave us every information respecting the direction 
of the trace, the streams we were to cross, the game we might expect 
to find for our subsistence, and other particulars, evincing a perfect 
acquaintance with the subject.17 
Schoolcraft was surprised by this. 
She told us, also, that our guns were not well adapted to our journey; 
that we should have rifles; and pointed out some other errors in our 
dress, equipment, and mode of travelling, while we stood in aston-
ishment to hear a woman direct us in matters which we had before 
thought the peculiar and exclusive province of men.18 
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On visiting another family he wrote, 
In the course of the evening I tried to engage our hostess and her 
daughters in small-talk, such as passes current in every social corner; 
but, for the first time, found I should not recommend myself in that 
way. They could only talk of bears, hunting, and the like. The rude 
pursuits, and the coarse enjoyment of the hunter state, were all they 
knew.19 
The women he encountered defied eastern standards of femininity as he 
found rugged and strong frontier women adjusted to the conditions of 
their settlements as opposed to the dainty, white middle class women of 
the east. As he put it, 
They have ruddy complexions, but, in other respects, are rather gross, 
as they live chiefly on animal food. Being deprived of all advantages of 
dress, possessed by our fair country-women in the east, they are by no 
means calculated to inspire admiration, but on the contrary disgust; 
their whole wardrobe, until the age of twelve, consisting of one greasy 
buckskin frock, which is renewed whenever worn out.20 
Meanwhile, frontier settlement reproduced masculinity, for example, 
Hunting is the principal, the most honourable, and the most profitable 
employment. To excel in the chace procures fame, and a man’s 
reputation is measured by his skill as a marksman, his agility and 
strength, his boldness and dexterity in killing game, and his patient 
endurance and contempt of the hardships of the hunter’s life.21
Throughout Trans-Appalachia, three general forms of agriculture pre-
dominated: “subsistence agriculture, surplus agriculture, and staple crop 
agriculture.”22 Most American settlers in Missouri would practice some 
form or combination of the first two of these in the early settlement years. 
As a traveler put it in the early 1800s, “By far the greater proportion of 
the population was engaged in agriculture; in fact, it was the business of 
all, since the surplus produce of the country was too inconsiderable to be 
depended upon.”23 Often times the first settlers to head west were frontier 
families, clearing land and building temporary cabins, barely living above 
subsistence and separated, for the most part, from market relations. As 
more settlers came, market relations deepened, and over time interacted 
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with the development of increasingly capitalist productive relations in 
early western industries. As one advice for emigrants book from the 
1830s put it, “Of new comers, there are two tolerably distinct classes: the 
one comprising farmers, mechanics, and indeed all those who calculate 
on obtaining a subsistence by manual industry; and other is composed 
of professional men, tradesmen, and adventurers of every description.”24 
The settlement of Missouri represented this variety of relations as, 
gradually, incorporation into the world market and the development of 
capitalist production relations articulated through each other. And while 
the French organized themselves into villages, Americans preferred 
to settle in more scattered homesteads and clusters.25 Settlers headed 
into unknown territory, carrying guns, axes, and basic foods, locating 
properties which they cleared and built cabins on. They hunted, fished, 
and grew crops, most importantly corn. 
Many emigrants came to obtain competency. They were driven west 
by the abundance of relatively cheap, fertile land, and often came through 
family networks. More generally, as the population increased and land 
was decreasingly available and more expensive, patriarchs brought their 
families west to earn competency and obtain land, which, on death, could 
be parceled out to children to earn competency themselves.26 In Perry 
County, for example, as late as 1850, farmers were living with relative 
self-sufficiency.27 Like most Missouri yeomen, the staple of their diet was 
corn and hog, although they produced a variety of other crops including 
wheat, oats, peas, beans, barley, potatoes, and so on, and raised sheep, 
hunted, and engaged in other activities to reproduce the household. One 
reverend, for instance, encountered a family on the outskirts of the Ste. 
Genevieve District he referred to as “a specimen of the squatter race 
found on the extreme frontiers.”28 
But while some lived outside the market, more commonly, settlers 
practiced an economy that “was neither fully capitalistic or subsistence, 
but situated somewhere between these two forms of production.”29 As late 
as the 1840s, for instance, farmers in the Ozarks, one of the more isolated 
and subsistence farming-based parts of the state, regularly purchased 
fabrics and clothes, food, coffee, whiskey, salt, gun powder, and other 
goods.30 As Walter Schroeder discusses, the territory developed around 
space and social forms in an uneven way:
at the core were the large cities of the East where goods were 
consumed, business transactions made, strategy laid out, and wealth 
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transferred. Surrounding the core was intensively used land of high 
value that provided products for direct sale in the cities, including 
more perishable products. Successively outward were zones of land 
use of correspondingly less intensively used land, because the value of 
land, in general, diminished with the distance from the core. Beyond 
was unoccupied and little-used land, viewed as part of this centralized 
economic system.31 
In this sense, it is difficult to categorize the early settlement of Missouri 
as purely capitalist or non-capitalist; rather, it was a system of integrated 
relationships with gradations of capitalist behavior, from more capitalist 
urban centers to less capitalist rural petty-commodity producers. 
While some settlers came for independent competency, others came 
for profit through, most significantly, mining. Schoolcraft, for example, 
also surveyed possible profitable deposits of metals for potential capital-
ists. He wrote that information regarding the geography and resources 
of the west was of interest to both the “man of business” and the “man 
of science” as the space of empire was mapped to chart the course of 
future investment. Towns such as Ste. Genevieve, Herculaneum, (most 
symbolically) Potosi, Mine á Breton, and St. Michael were quickly built 
up around the lead mining industry in particular.32 By 1720 black slaves 
were being used to mine the main metal located in the region: lead.33 
And Moses Austin obtained a concession from the Spanish authorities to 
mine lead in Mine á Breton in 1797.34 By the 1830s organizations such as 
the state chartered Missouri Iron Company built sophisticated corporate 
systems with large capital stock.35 So while frontier settlers moved west 
organizing patriarchal frontier households, this went hand-in-hand with 
businesses seeking to profit by exploiting the natural resources of the 
country.
These complexities were also apparent in the way the social property 
relations of land developed. On the one hand, the state reinforced land 
as commodified private property, and allowed capitalist speculators 
to profit from land purchases and sales. On the other, the commodifi-
cation of land provided a space for patriarchal households to own fee 
simple land, in doing so reproducing the patriarchal household mode 
of production. By the end of 1820 about 55,000 acres of government 
land were sold, a decade later that number was around 7 million and 
continued to grow.36 Just as a variety of people came to Missouri, from 
German farmers to American speculators, so different classes of people 
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used the land in different ways. While a farmer might obtain land with 
the purpose of raising a family and providing for future generations, for 
speculators land was a form of capital.37 One example of this came out 
of the New Madrid earthquakes of 1811–12. As a result of these quakes, 
in 1815 the New Madrid Act was passed to compensate settlers whose 
land and property were damaged by the quakes. Claimants were given 
the right to claim public land elsewhere in the state, as long as it was 
the same size as their damaged land, up to 640 acres. Yet the majority of 
claims ended up in the hands of speculators: out of 516 certificates, 385 
ended up owned by St. Louis speculators and only 4 percent of all grants 
were redeemed by the original recipients.38 Many of these claims were 
also used to obtain land in the most profitable parts of the state, such as 
Boon’s Lick County, and were opposed by squatters who were waiting for 
preemption rights on settled land. 
The question of land claims was also complicated by the legacy of 
Spanish land grants. In the Spanish era, large sections of land were 
granted to settlers through networks of personal, political relationships. 
The borders of these claims were often unclear and much larger pieces 
of land were granted than their owners could profitably use. And some 
claims themselves were fraudulent. In general, it was found, in some 
cases, that land concessions were backdated, which landowners used to 
increase the size of the holdings they claimed to own. To address this 
problem, in 1805 a Board of Land Commissioners was formed, and by 
1812 it confirmed 1,340 claims out of 3,340 in five previously Spanish 
districts.39 For decades to come, the legal question of Spanish land grants 
continued to be debated, particularly as landholders feared registering 
their land as their claim might be rejected. 
The most capitalistic behavior formed around the area most geograph-
ically connected to the world market, “little Dixie” on the Missouri River, 
particularly the counties of Clay, Lafayette, Saline, Cooper, Howard, 
Boone, and Callaway. Here, slaves rebuilt the ecology of the region by 
clearing land, growing corn, tobacco, and hemp, and eventually building 
railroads. For instance, one of the first settled areas was termed “Boon’s 
lick” due to its abundant salt resources. By 1814, around 526 white males 
lived in this area, and that year settlers petitioned Congress to remove 
native titles to the land, which was accomplished the following year. 
The population quickly increased, and by 1820 around 12,000 people 
lived in the region. The main reason settlers preferred this region was its 
fertile soil and access to commercial markets. And, besides patriarchal 
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farmers, capitalists and potential capitalists also moved into the area in 
the 1810s and 1820s. In some cases, businessmen focused on smaller 
business, such as taverns, and others on profits from trade. But in other 
cases, merchant capitalists invested in industry. For example, in the 
1820s William Lamme, a highly successful merchant, opened a tobacco 
factory in Franklin.40 Others opened gristmills and sawmills, and soon 
the region developed an uneven combination of relations that are not 
easy to characterize as fully capitalist, as much of production was still 
organized by patriarchal families, but in which families articulated with 
especially urban capitalist relations, linked through the Missouri and 
Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans and the world market. 
State formation was also central to the creation of the space in which 
capitalism could develop. The state played a role, for example, via the 
Board of Internal Improvements, reconnoitering and mapping the land 
in a way “as may be considered useful to the citizen, or tending to the 
development of the resources of the state.”41 And a “factory” system was 
put in place in Missouri. Factories were set up on the frontier so that 
government trading posts and privately licensed traders could deepen 
the commercial integration and political alliances with natives, particu-
larly the Osages, as their population could not so quickly be removed.42 
Of course, as the American population increased in Missouri, the factory 
system was replaced by the policy of removing the indigenous people 
from Missouri altogether.43 At the same time that the American Fur 
Company was exploring Upper Missouri in the early 1820s, the Santa 
Fe Trail was taking off, driven initially by American merchant capital. 
In 1825 George C. Sibley was appointed by the federal government to 
lead a survey from Fort Osage to Santa Fe. As one author suggests, “the 
Santa Fe Trail was as a result arguably the most successful of the early 
nineteenth century federal road-building programs, which sought to 
expand commerce and integrate distant regions into the national market 
economy.”44 In other words, the making of the Santa Fe Trail represented 
a clear example of the importance of the federal government in helping 
produce a link between the expansion of state space and the space of 
capital accumulation. 
Slavery in Missouri
When Missouri applied to become a full-fledged state, it had about 
10,000 blacks, 16 percent of the population, similar to New York’s slave 
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population in the colonial era. And just as northern whites readily 
adopted the ideology of black inferiority, much of the national debate 
over Missouri was less about abolition than it was about sustaining a 
political balance between southern and northern states. Northerners 
worried that adding another slave state, under the three-fifths clause, 
would offset the balance in favor of Slave Power. And Tallmadge’s 
amendment threatened southerners for the same reason, and, perhaps 
more importantly, because it would have outlawed slavery in the state all 
together: the foundation of the southern social order. Even southerners 
who were mildly dissatisfied with slavery supported slavery in Missouri 
for reasons of diffusion. The argument was if slavery was further diffused 
throughout the region, it would be a long-term step towards abolition.45 
The outcome of these debates was the Missouri Compromise: 
Missouri entered the Union as a slave state, slavery was banned north of 
the 36°30ʹ latitude, and Maine entered the United States as a free state. 
This solidified the state in Missouri as a producer of potentially capitalist 
space; in this case, capitalist slavery. But slavery in Missouri tended to 
be different than slavery in the deep south. While the centers of slavery, 
such as the Mississippi cotton industry, relied on large plantations, 
slavery in Missouri took on a smaller character. While, for example, the 
most slave intense parts of Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, 
and Virginia had populations comprised of as much as 50 percent slaves, 
Missouri’s slave population in 1850 was 12.9 percent. Additionally, the 
median average number of slaves owned that year was 20.6, but only 8.6 
in Missouri, second only to Delaware.46 
The highest concentration of slaves was in little Dixie. In contrast to 
the rest of the state, counties in this region contained slave populations 
ranging from 22 to 37 percent in 1860. And while some became large 
planters holding dozens of slaves, the average slaveowner in little Dixie 
held 6.1 slaves, as opposed to 12.7 overall, and 7.7 in the upper south.47 
Larger slaveowners focused on producing tobacco and hemp for the 
world market, in addition to the more commonly produced corn and 
livestock. Missouri tobacco made it as far as Europe, as did Missouri 
hemp which was made into bags and rope used to store and transport 
cotton. 
But while slaveowning capitalists focused on producing for local, 
regional, and world markets, some small slaveowners functioned less 
in a capitalist manner than through a patriarchal household mode of 
production which incorporated slavery. Many immigrants to the region 
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came from the upper south, and were slaveowners, or potential slaveo-
wners, of limited wealth: plain folk rather than planters.48 This was partly 
because of the climate. Cotton was difficult to grow in the region due 
to a relatively short growing season, discouraging large planters from 
immigrating to Missouri. And slaveowners may have been reluctant 
to transport their valuable commodities to a region surrounded by 
non-slave states, for fear of escape.49 
Many of these yeomen small slaveowning farmers organized their 
relations into a patriarchal household mode of production that included 
slaves. Thus, 
the marriages and family lives created by many small slaveholders ... in 
many ways better resembled the experiences of yeomen farmers than 
of planters. Whether they lived in the low country of South Carolina, 
the Nanticoke Valley of New York, or the prairies of Sugar Creek, 
Illinois, antebellum farm families hoped to ensure the economic sus-
tainability of their households before they heavily entered into the 
commercial marketplace.50 
A household might own a slave, or even three or four slaves, and still 
focus on composite and safety-first farming, rather than something 
closer to “pure” capitalist farming. In other words, while the south 
was organized around capitalist slavery, not all slavery was necessar-
ily capitalist. Yeomen slaveowners did produce for the market, selling 
tobacco, hemp, corn, wheat, and livestock down the river. And it was 
not unusual for profits from this market activity to be used to expand 
production, and perhaps even more slaves. Generally, the closer to the 
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, the denser slavery became, and the 
degree of market production tended to increase. But many producers 
were less large-scale capitalists, although yeomen contained the poten-
tiality to become so, then independent property owners, patriarchal 
household producers with a slave or two.51 
Urbanization, industrialization,  
and incorporation into the world market 
Missouri entered into the Union as a state becoming capitalist, in an 
empire becoming capitalist, in a world becoming capitalist. From the rise 
of industrial capitalism in the east, to the Santa Fe Trail, to the California 
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gold rush, the state found itself in the middle of a capitalist transfor-
mation, and gradually deepened its own capitalist tendencies. And the 
capitalist revolution went along with revolutions in both communi-
cations and transport: most importantly, steam power, the telegraph, 
and railroads. Daniel Walker Howe’s monumental study highlights the 
ways that these technological transformations opened up new avenues 
for the United States, although he neglects to discuss the ways that this 
“annihilation of space by time” takes on particular characteristics due 
to its capitalist organization.52 As David Harvey discusses, capitalism is 
characterized by “time-space compression.”53 Capital has a tendency to 
produce capitalist space, and speed up time, and in American history 
the communication and transportation revolutions reflected this. Spe-
cifically, the technologies developed by capital and for capital sped up 
the pace of accumulation, and quickening this pace broke down previous 
spatial barriers to capital’s circulation. This was also supported by the 
state which commodified and sold land along rational, grid patterns and 
invested in infrastructure to hasten flows of capital. 
The most important example of this before the railroad was the steam 
engine. Steam power connected Missouri to New Orleans, and to the 
world market, hastening and deepening its integration into an increas-
ingly capitalist world. Through articulations with the world market 
Missouri’s own social relations were remade through these intercon-
nected social processes operating at different levels. In other words, 
Missouri did not become capitalist due to its articulation in a broader 
world-system, nor because of relatively autonomous social transforma-
tion within the state, but because of the complex ways that these forces 
articulated through and transformed each other. The steam engine anni-
hilated space by time by revolutionizing the pace in which commodities 
circulated up and down the Mississippi River. The steamboat industry 
itself was also organized along capitalist lines. Steamboat owners invested 
and operated for a profit, drawing surplus value from the many slaves 
and laborers who worked on the boats themselves.54 The first steamboat 
docked in St. Louis in the summer of 1817, and two years later as many as 
thirty-one boats ran between Louisville and New Orleans. By the 1830s, 
much of Missouri was linked to the world market through commodity 
chains organized around networks of steam powered transportation. 
From the War of 1812 to this time, the prices of goods moving up river 
declined by 90 percent, and the prices of commodities such as sugar, 
coffee, and tea fell from half to 75 percent.55 Steamboats deepened the 
142 . how america became capitalist
market integration of much of the state as farmers and urban dwellers 
could more easily market their own goods, and more cheaply purchase 
commodities to improve their lives.
As steamboats and later railroads deepened Missouri’s market 
relations, industrial development also began to take off, and by 1860 
St. Louis was the country’s eighth largest city, producing $27 million a 
year in manufactured goods.56 The city developed a variety of industries 
including sugar refining, meat packing, beer brewing, soap making, 
candle making, and ironworks. At the same time, population increases 
meant that less good land was available for cultivation, particularly land 
near major commercial centers. As a response, families sent their boys 
and girls into the city to work. For instance, boys would be sent to work 
in brick plants, or girls to work as nursemaids or in kitchens. With new 
market opportunities, farmers also began to devote larger portions of 
production to the market. This is also reflected in that rural stores began 
to show a much greater diversity of goods sold, as products such as 
whiskey, butter, or candles that were previously produced at home were 
instead purchased.57 
Just as the path of expansion led to the crisis over Missouri statehood, 
similarly, in 1854, the expansion of the American frontier, and debate over 
what social form it should take, erupted again with the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act. These tensions, of course, led to the Civil War. While it might be an 
overstatement to consider Missouri a fully capitalist political economy 
by this time, Missouri was on its way to becoming so. Capitalist industry 
was expanding, and a larger proportion of the population was finding 
itself drawn into both market relations and capitalist relations, particu-
larly as younger generations moved to cities such as St. Louis to work, as 
the patriarchal mode of rural production became increasingly difficult 
to sustain, and became increasingly marketized. 
Arkansas
In the sixteenth century the first Spaniards arrived under Hernando de 
Soto, who explored the greater region in search of wealth from 1539 to 
1543.58 And while some French coureurs de bois traversed the region, 
even starting a trading post in 1686, the first serious attempt at colo-
nization came in 1720 after the territory was given to the Compagnie 
d’Occident in 1717, directed by Scottish financier John Law.59 Less than 
a hundred white settlers went to Law’s colony, which failed after he went 
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bankrupt, but it started a process of settlement, built around the Arkansas 
post, which was the primary colonial settlement up to post-Louisiana 
Purchase American colonization.60 
By 1814, the state had perhaps close to 1,600 people, but following the 
end of the War of 1812, as in much of the west, the colonizing population 
expanded greatly, to 14,273 by 1820, 1,613 of them slaves.61 Through 
the 1810s, Arkansas territory was brought into what the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives Robert Bean called “this remote part of the 
American empire.”62 And as in the case of Missouri and other states, 
much of the early colonization was driven not by capitalism, but hunters 
and relatively self-sufficient patriarchal households. Early on, many 
settlers lived in a middle ground with Indians, often considered more 
“savage” than “white.” Schoolcraft wrote, observing the region, “in 
manners, morals, customs, dress, contempt of labor and hospitality, the 
state of society is not essentially different from that which exists among 
the savages.”63 More generally, even decades later, Arkansas was plagued 
with a stereotype as a rough and lawless place. One traveler, for instance, 
said the state was populated by a “race of semi-barbarians” while others 
wrote of the lack of morality and law in the region.64 This reputation 
was secured through, among other events, a fight that broke out in 1837 
between the Speaker of the House John Wilson and State Representative 
Joseph J. Anthony in which Wilson killed Anthony with a knife on the 
House floor.65 
The territory that became the state of Arkansas developed as a dual 
economy.66 Frontier families and squatters came to find patriarchal inde-
pendence, and although not as inviting as other southern climates, social 
relations were shaped around ecological relations as in the upcountry 
regions the land proved to be less fertile, but the climate healthier for 
poor settlers. In the low country, the land was swampy but more fertile, 
and with some work could be made into cotton growing country. More 
generally, antebellum Arkansas was a patriarchal social order, and 
patriarchy drove imperialism. Particularly for the planter class and elite, 
masculine honor was central to the social order.67 Richard Slotkin argued 
that the history of American expansion is one of “regeneration through 
violence,” and this could well be said of masculinity in Arkansas. Dueling 
was common practice, especially in the first decades of settlement. 
Violence, potential and actual, could be a method of masculine rejuve-
nation. In 1836, for example, planter and lawyer Absalom and his rival 
Albert Pike both put together private militias and demonstrated in Little 
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Rock, although neither took their armies to the frontier. More signifi-
cantly, Pike, among others, organized companies to fight against Mexico 
in 1846 and joined Zachary Taylor’s army in the battle of Buena Vista 
in 1847.68 In this case, the war to expand the American frontier was, for 
the men involved, a personal quest to demonstrate one’s masculinity and 
honor. As one traveler discovered, Arkansas was settled by 
Gentlemen, who had taken the liberty to imitate the signatures of 
other persons; bankrupts, who were not disposed to be plundered by 
their creditors; homicides, horse-stealers, and gamblers, all admired 
Arkansas on account of the very gentle and tolerant state of public 
opinion which prevailed there in regard to such fundamental points 
as religion, morals, and property.69
White-settler colonialism in Arkansas
To include Arkansas in white-settler colonization, the middle ground 
between natives and colonists was gradually undermined. This was 
due to forces from above and from below. On one side, the increasing 
white population pushed against native control of territory. On the other 
side, state Indian removal policies solidified the dispossession of natives 
through the 1820s and 1830s. By the end, Arkansas was left open to be 
incorporated into the white patriarchal American structure. 
Throughout the 1820s tensions remained between the state, native 
populations, and white settlers. For example, in one case the government 
tried to remove several thousand settlers from territory the latter believed 
was public domain but in which the government had decided (although 
quickly to renege) would be granted to the natives. The settlers resisted, 
as in one observed case in 1825, 
about two hundred men assembled at Inglish’s for the purpose of 
making an attack on this post, the principle ringleaders, so far as I can 
learn, were William Brice, John Bowman and a man by the name of 
Pennington; I am not much versed in the law, but I should think, that 
it would at least, amount to an attempt to levy war against the United 
States, for which those three persons should be prosecuted.70 
While the Quapaws had traditionally held the territory, Indian removal 
further east had pushed other Indian groups into Arkansas, including 
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the Osages and Cherokee. As whites pushed forward, in 1816 Governor 
James Clark from Missouri sent representatives to warn settlers against 
infringing on Quapaw land. But by 1818, both politicians and settlers 
were increasingly in favor of removing them altogether. That summer, 
the Quapaw signed an alliance in which it was recognized they owned 
2 million acres of land. In exchange, they gave up rights to 30 million 
acres that they had previously used as hunting land. Seven years later the 
Quapaw were fully removed to Oklahoma.71
The Cherokee had also been pushed into the region. They were 
known as the most supposedly “civilized” of the native groups, having, 
for example, encouraged Protestant missionaries to set up a mission, 
the first school in Arkansas, in 1820. Many claimed to be Christian, and 
additionally they wore white style clothing, a significant portion had 
white blood, and some even owned slaves. They also had law, police, and 
courts.72 In this sense, they were the “whitest” of the Indians, but they 
never reached a status of honorary white to the extent that they would 
be free from the expanding white colonization process. In 1828, they too 
were pushed into Oklahoma. 
Through this period the Cherokee and Osages continued to battle. 
In 1817, for instance, the Cherokees killed sixty-nine Osages, and took 
100 prisoners after the Battle of Claremore Mound. Conflict between 
natives also posed a threat to the stability of the white man’s country, as 
did conflict between natives and settlers, for example, Osages occasion-
ally attacked white hunters. But before and during the 1830s, Arkansas 
was effectively cleared of Indians as the Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and 
Seminole were all forced into present day Oklahoma, along with the 
Osages and Quapaw.73 
Cleared of natives, Arkansas provided a space for immigrants to 
settle. The majority of settlers came from the south, three-quarters from 
Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, and Mississippi before 1850. After 1850, 
particularly as the Arkansas slave plantation cotton boom began to take 
off, a higher proportion of settlers came from states such as Georgia and 
Alabama. Generally, these settlers went to the low country to produce for 
a profit, in contrast to earlier settlers from the upper south who tended 
to come more to pursue independence rather than profits. In general, by 
the end of the 1850s, the population was evenly divided between upland 
and lowland, with the lowland population surpassing the upland in 
approximately 1858.74 This was also pushed by relatively easy land laws. 
In 1840 the Arkansas Land Donation Act promised land to anyone who 
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agreed to pay taxes in the future. And the homestead laws put in place 
the next decade provided settlers with 160 acres per family member, not 
just per head of family.75 
Sojourning through the territory in the 1840s, G.W. Featherstonhaugh 
found a scattered society of log cabins and dirty, uncivilized people which 
clashed with his British and northeastern American ideals of social 
life. The women of the country, for instance, lacked femininity. In one 
case, “On going into the house we were made acquainted with a person 
called Mrs. Meriwether, but who from her great height, which was six 
feet two inches, an extraordinary dark, bony, hairy face, and trimmings 
to match, I should have taken for some South American grenadier in 
women’s clothes.”76 Her husband, said to be one of the earliest settlers in 
the territory, “got along as well as he could by hunting, and trading, and 
raising a patch of corn.”77 Elsewhere, he came across a settler who “was 
a squalid, half-negro looking, piratical ruffian from Louisiana, living in 
a wretched, filthy cabin, with a wife to match, and a Caliban-looking 
negress and her two children, who were his slaves.”78 And in another case, 
Mr. Barkman we did not see, but I shall certainly not forget his lady 
soon, as I have never seen any one, as far as manners and exterior 
went, with less pretensions to be classed within the feminine gender 
… She chewed tobacco, she smoked a pipe, she drank whiskey, and 
cursed and swore as heartily as any backwoodsman, all at the same 
time.79
These frontier settlers lacked standards of civilized cleanliness as he 
found the Judge living in one of the most dirty and unprovided holes 
we had yet got into, in addition to which his children and himself too 
were just recovering from the malaria. I pitied them, for, bred up in 
dirt, it was evident they knew not what cleanliness meant.80
In the dual society, most yeomen and small planters went to live in the 
cheaper, less fertile, but healthier climates of the upcountry. “The settler 
in these wild countries plants to live, and not to take to market.”81 Far 
from the market, 
These worthy people think, if you are not looking for land to settle, 
that you must be pedlars: there are no markets or shopkeepers in the 
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country for them to go to, and therefore the markets come to them—
pedlars to sell goods, and tailors to cut out and make new clothes.82 
The Ozarks, for example, developed a reputation as a land of “hill 
folks.” Up until 1828 the Ozark region was formally in the hands of the 
Cherokee, but some whites had settled by then. After the Cherokees 
were removed, whites flooded in, so by 1840 around 20,000 people lived 
there, including some slaves, such as 1,515 in the most populous area, 
Washington County. As many as half of these came from Tennessee, and 
perhaps 20 percent from Missouri.83 
Settlers also clashed with speculators who saw “the agency of the 
almighty dollar, a superabundance of which being a substitute for other 
virtues, stands in place of all distinction. Wealth, therefore, since it 
implies virtue of every imaginable kind, must be had at any cost.”84 Those 
who saw the land as a space of profit clashed with those who viewed it 
as useful, and preemptively squatted on the land. Settlers, for example, 
outbid settlers for land—even on that which they had already settled 
and improved—and after bidding up the value, delayed payment so that 
the value of the land decreased to low government rates at which they 
purchased it before the settlers could. 
According to Brooks Blevins, the census of 1840 reveals a society of 
mostly self-sufficient farmers. They owned horses, mules, cattle, sheep, 
and hogs, and grew small amounts of wheat, oats, tobacco, and cotton 
beside their main staple, corn. For example, that year farmers grew 
1,105,652 bushels of corn, and only 59,618 pounds of tobacco and 133 
bales of cotton. As time went on, these farmers tended to deepen their 
market interactions, as did slaveowners who, although a minority, did 
produce for profit. For instance, in 1859 the Ozarks produced 450,000 
pounds of tobacco, and in 1860 produced 75,000 cattle, 190,000 hogs, 
56,000 sheep, and 30,000 mules and horses.85 Overall, this suggests that 
between 1840 and 1860 the degree of market integration in the region 
greatly increased, as larger amounts of agriculture and livestock were 
produced to supplement family and kinship relations of production. 
By 1860, according to census tax records, about 10 percent of the 
population was dispossessed, 70 percent yeomen (owning 80 acres and 
a small amount of livestock), 17 percent slaveholding yeomen, and 3 
percent large planters. About 10 percent of the population controlled 
70 percent of the taxable wealth.86 Arkansas yeomen lived similarly to 
yeomen elsewhere in the country, organized in a way in which, as one 
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author puts it, “women had no political rights, and educational and occu-
pational opportunities outside the home were almost nonexistent.”87 And 
like settlers elsewhere, most started by building a one-room log cabin, 
to which they gradually tended to expand, for example, adding second 
rooms for sleeping or cooking. Overall, yeoman life was organized into a 
patriarchal household mode of social reproduction.
Slavery and capitalist development in Arkansas
The most significant element of antebellum capitalist development in 
Arkansas occurred during the last two decades before the Civil War when, 
increasingly, settlers migrated from the lower south to the Arkansas low 
country to reproduce the plantation slavery system of the black belts of 
the old south. Slavery in the territory went back to the French colonial 
era and by 1798, 56 slaves lived amongst 393 people in total. It picked 
up in the twenty years before the Civil War, and by 1860, 111,115, or 26 
percent of the population, were slaves.88 
Arkansas’ slave code was legislated in 1837, a year after statehood was 
gained. It drew from regulations in the territorial era, along with slave 
codes from other southern states.89 As throughout the plantation south, 
slaves were restricted in virtually all aspects of social life. Of course, the 
slave code represented the problem of slave capital: black slaves were 
both capital and human. Much of the code restricted their movement, 
as, like elsewhere, slaves were prone to resist their masters and, in some 
cases, run away. In other cases, slaves attacked and killed their masters. 
J.W. Calvert, for example, had a brother murdered by a slave named 
Matilda. And, to take another example, as Donald McNeilly notes, the 
Arkansas State Gazette discussed a Mr. Henry Yerby who was killed by 
two of his slaves.90 
But most slaves likely saw large-scale rebellion as futile, and instead 
opted to try and make the best of their conditions by obtaining conces-
sions from their masters. Slaves insisted on masters providing for their 
basic needs of proper food and shelter, and beyond this challenged their 
master’s discipline by, for instance, slowing down and controlling the 
pace of work. They also complained of cruel overseers, under which they 
lowered their rate of production. And they negotiated free time to work 
on their own gardens, tend livestock, hunt and fish, and even marry and 
build families, as much as they could, given constraints. Slaves bargained 
for rights to visit their spouses (not legally sanctioned) on other nearby 
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plantations, and developed kinship relations both within and between 
plantations.91 But because Arkansas was new to slave culture, many 
families were ripped apart as slaves were brought to the territory, and 
so, it is likely that the nuclear slave family was less common in Arkansas 
than elsewhere.92
As in Missouri, in some parts of the state slaves were owned more 
by yeomen farmers than big planters. In these cases, slaves were incor-
porated into the patriarchal mode of production. For instance, Hardy 
Banks who lived in Yell County owned four slaves, who worked alongside 
his wife and two boys. They produced mainly for the household, while 
growing small amounts of cotton to supplement this mode of life, and 
occasionally selling horses on the market.93 Most slavery in the state, 
though, came in the late antebellum period with the slave population 
doubling between 1850 and 1860. 
Plantation slavery in Arkansas developed around two primary 
regions: the eastern part of the state on the Mississippi River, and by the 
Red River in the southwest, although it also developed to a lesser degree 
elsewhere. Overall, the amount of cotton production increased from 6 
million pounds in 1840 to close to 150 million by 1860.94 Slaves often 
were the first to work on raw land, and in doing so it was slaves that 
remade the ecological conditions for expansion by clearing the land and 
preparing it for cultivation.95 And, as elsewhere in the cotton kingdom, 
masters tended to organize their slaves into gangs, although most plan-
tations also assigned some proportion of slaves to task labor, as most 
plantations contained some variation of both forms of labor discipline. 
By the Civil War, capitalism was gradually developing in Arkansas, 
with capitalist plantation slavery taking the lead, but overall much of 
the state was in the hands of yeomen farmers gradually in the process 
of integrating more deeply into market relations. In particular, in the 
decade before the war, capitalist development in the state greatly acceler-
ated with, for example, the monetary value of farms rising six times. But 
industrial development was slow to take off. By this time, only Oregon 
had less railroad than Arkansas. Manufacturing was valued at a total of 
$3 million, well behind states with urban industrial centers, such as St. 
Louis, Missouri. This may be in part because the institutional infrastruc-
ture necessary for capitalist development was also lacking in Arkansas. 
The only significant attempt to build a stable banking system took place 
in the 1830s. After a legislative meeting in 1836, lawmakers agreed to 
start both a state bank and a real estate bank. The state bank would hold 
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state funds, print money, sell bonds, and give loans to promote business 
development. The real estate bank was designed also to promote capital 
accumulation by selling bonds, and by selling stock to be purchased 
with land or crops. Shareholders could use this stock to borrow up to 
one-half the share value. But these banks failed for a variety of reasons. 
First, corruption was rampant as large loans were, in some cases, given 
out even higher than the overall value of borrowers’ assets. More impor-
tantly, following the crisis of 1837, which reached Arkansas by 1839, 
land and crop prices dramatically dropped and the banks soon closed. 
Following this, the legislature amended the state constitution to disallow 
the state from incorporating banks.96 
Without a banking system, Arkansas capitalists had little credit to draw 
on for capitalist development. In addition to banking, the state did little 
to promote public works. The state did sponsor geological surveys with 
the explicit goal of locating resources that could profitably be invested in: 
But in how great an abundance these may be found and how profitably 
the capitalist may invest his means for their development, can only 
be determined and made known in a manner to command the 
confidence of the public at home and abroad, and by a careful survey 
by the state.97 
Arkansas did pass a public roads act in 1836, requisitioning men to 
work twelve days a year for the state building roads and bridges, and 
putting signs at crossings. But it appears that this act was never taken 
seriously. And education in Arkansas was also well behind other states, 
and the state did not have a university until after the Civil War.98 Overall, 
by 1860, capitalist development had occurred around the plantation 
slavery regions of the state, and market incorporation was increasing in 
pace elsewhere, but Arkansas still had some way to go before it might 
be considered “fully” capitalist. Meanwhile, other white colonialists were 
bypassing Arkansas for Texas. 
White colonization in Texas
In 1844, Sam Houston, President of Texas, speaking to state congress, 
said, “the Pacific alone will bound the mighty march of our race and 
our empire.”99 And in 1863, E.H. Cushing wrote, “Texas is an empire in 
itself.”100 Texas, from the early age of white-settler colonialism through 
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its integration into the United States, was viewed by locals as an empire, 
or an empire within an empire. 
As with much of the country, the territory that became the state 
of Texas was populated by natives, then later incorporated, to some 
degree, into the Spanish Empire. By 1519 the Spanish made it to the 
coast of Texas, and by 1528 they made the first recorded contact with 
the natives.101 As with most Spanish colonization, the goal of Spanish 
imperialists was to conquer rather than colonize. Missionaries gradually 
made their way up through Mexico to Texas, as did adventurers in search 
of riches, but by the 1821 census—the year of Mexican independence—
Texas had a little over 3,000 settlers.102 Of course, the natives had lived 
in Texas for centuries. By the time the Spanish arrived, the Apaches, 
Wichitas, Caddos, Tonkawas, and Karankawas were all in Texas, and 
around 1700 the Comanches also migrated there.103 Each of these groups 
also had their own modes of living, complicating any potential idea of an 
“Indian mode of production.”104 While some groups were more itinerant, 
Wichitas and Caddos, for example, were productive farmers, raised 
mules and horses, and produced hides and jerky from buffalo. Native 
groups also regularly traded with each other, recirculating corn, clothes, 
and animals between groups that had excesses or lacks. 
As elsewhere, natives were also devastated by European diseases. For 
instance, while there were an estimated 40,000 Comanches in the 1780s, 
by the 1840s there were perhaps 12,000. Overall, in 1820, approximately 
30,000 natives lived in Texas.105 Additionally, as the American frontier 
expanded to the west, natives from the east were also pushed into Texas 
territory. As Gary Clayton Anderson summarizes it:
Texas soon became a place like no other in North America. Its lands 
harbored a growing Indian ethnic milieu after 1820. Pressing from 
the east were Anglo-Americans, mingling with a few Tejano inhab-
itants who remained. Crossing into Texas from Arkansas were 
immigrant Indians possessing many of the same hopes and desires 
as their southern Anglo counterparts. To the west and in central 
Texas were Comanches, Wichitas, and Caddos concerned about their 
homeland and prepared to defend it. And in the south, mostly, were 
pockets of Tejanos ... hoping without much hope to reestablish a 
prosperous Texas.106 
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On March 21, 1801, the Spanish killed an American adventurer named 
Philip Nolan. Initially with Spanish approval, Nolan ventured into Texas 
to collect wild horses to sell in the New Orleans market. Following his 
initial explorations, in 1800 Nolan visited at the time of Vice President 
Thomas Jefferson, after which the Spanish removed approval fearing 
that, with Jefferson’s support, Nolan may have been planning for 
conquest for the United States. Nolan returned to Texas anyway, but was 
killed around what is today Blum, Texas.107 Nolan was the first recorded 
American adventurer in Texas, setting the basis for American advance 
into the territory and the violence this created. 
By the start of the 1820s, independent Mexico, controlling the lightly 
populated territory of Texas, began to allow white settlers into Texas 
under the empresario system. Empresarios were given land by the state, 
with the agreement that they would bring hundreds of settlers, loyal 
to Mexico, and formally (although not in practice) Catholic, to settle. 
This would set the basis for what Fehrenback calls “folk imperialism.”108 
Bottom-up white-settler folk imperialism, rather than the monarchical 
imperialism of the Spanish, would be the driving force behind the white 
colonization of Texas. It was eventually incorporated into the United 
States when folk imperialism, linked with the democratic imperialism 
of James K. Polk, came together in empire building from the bottom up 
and top down. 
The most well-known and influential empresario was Stephen 
Austin. Austin’s father, Moses Austin, a leader of the development of the 
Missouri mining industry at Mine á Breton, was ruined by the economic 
depression of 1819. Picking up his feet, Moses traveled to Béxar in the 
fall of 1820. Austin arranged a meeting with the governor, and, upon 
admitting he was American, the governor, wary of American filibusters, 
told Austin to leave that night or be arrested, regardless of the fact that 
Austin had Spanish citizenship papers. But by chance, after leaving the 
meeting, Austin ran into an old friend: Baron de Bastrop. With Bastrop’s 
influence, Austin was able to obtain empresario rights in Texas, based on 
the idea that, given the lack of Spanish and Mexican colonization, and 
the native threat, Americans loyal to the Spanish Crown might provide 
a buffer.109 
But Moses Austin died at the beginning of 1821, never living to see 
his project flourish. It was taken up by his son Stephen, who was a busi-
nessman, and there is no doubt that part of his motivation was to acquire 
a profit from the empresario. He quickly received hundreds of requests 
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for white settlement on the land; 297 grants were given, in some cases 
to farmers, in other cases to potential plantation owners seeking after a 
profit. Austin’s colony tended to discourage settlement by rugged fron-
tiersmen, instead bringing over middle and upper class whites in search 
of cheap land and profits. By 1825 Austin’s colony had 1,347 whites and 
443 slaves.110 
Following the Mexican Revolution, Mexico continued to grant empre-
sarios to American settlers. In 1822, for example, under the leadership 
of Robert Leftwich, the Texas Association was formed. The association 
itself tended to be comprised of doctors, lawyers, and merchants, rather 
than the farmers and artisans of Austin’s grant. Many of those involved 
were interested in profits from speculation, rather than settlement, seen 
in that, by 1830, only six out of seventy who had signed on to the associ-
ation went to Texas.111 Overall, from 1823 to 1835, forty-one empresarios 
were granted with Mexico, although not all succeeded. This was also 
made possible by the Colonization Law of 1824, which was removed 
six years later as tensions between Mexico and white American settlers 
developed.112 
Violence, dispossession, and the Republic of Texas
In 1835–36 colonists struggled against the government of Mexico, and 
in victory established the decade-long Republic of Texas. This came after 
fifteen years of policy changes, coups, and transitions within the Mexican 
government that had implications for the settlement of Texas. The direct 
causes of the Texas Revolution itself were multiple, including taxes and 
political control. One of the issues involved, also, was the question of 
slavery. As one author puts it, “the Mexican leaders found it extremely 
difficult to choose between the revolutionary ideal of liberty and the 
practical need to protect property interests and encourage settlement of 
their nation.”113 In other words, while Mexican authorities were critical 
of slavery, their policies vacillated from banning it to allowing it to grow 
with hesitation, and even during periods in which legal authority went 
against it, colonists found ways to circumvent the law. 
The first Colonization Law was passed in January of 1823.114 Article 
30 of the law stated that slaves brought into the territory may not be 
bought or sold, and children, at the age of 14, would be set free. This 
law was annulled the next month after Emperor Iturbide was removed 
from power, but under a new government in August of 1824 a new Col-
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onization Law was passed, followed by a new constitution. While this 
law did not discuss slavery, tacitly allowing it, the debate over slavery 
in Texas was not over. In 1827, for example, a law was put forward in 
which no one would be born a slave, and after six months, the introduc-
tion of slaves was illegal. Settlers responded by continuing to bring slaves 
into Texas, but making a legal change, calling them indentured servants 
rather than slaves. In other words, simply by altering the wording, the 
institution continued to grow.115 
On April 6 of 1830, under President Bustamante, Mexico issued a 
decree against allowing further immigration from the United States. 
This would stop settlers from coming in who were, as Mexico saw it, 
violating the Colonization Law. It was also a key moment in drawing 
further support away from Mexico towards rebellion against Mexico. In 
addition to banning immigration, the law called for duties and troop 
garrisons in Texas, and American-Texans were resistant to Mexican tax 
collection from the start. They began to hold conventions to repeal the 
laws. Finally, in January 1835, under President Santa Anna, soldiers went 
to Galveston Bay to support duty collection. With tensions continuing to 
rise, in October of that year fighting finally broke out as Texans argued 
war was the only way to defend the rights of the white-settler colonists.116 
The revolution against Mexico created the space for the development 
of capitalism in Texas in several ways. First, it legalized slavery, and 
plantation slavery became the leading force of capitalist development in 
Texas. Secondly, on a more general level, the state that formed after the 
revolution put in place a legal and institutional regime, led by merchant 
capitalists that allowed for the commodification of land and expansion 
of capitalist social property relations. The American dominated Texas 
also set the basis for the dispossession of Tejanos. David Montejano 
notes that along the Rio Grande in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
Tejano social structure was organized around patriarchal lines with 
landlords at the top. Land was owned according to ancestry and family, 
rather than individually. In this sense, the social order was not organized 
around profit, but the reproduction of hierarchical kinship-based social 
relations. Starting before, and continuing after the Civil War, American 
merchants and lawyers worked to dispossess the Tejanos through fraud 
and coercion. For instance, the state taxed land grants, and when the 
grant holder could not pay, the sheriff sold a portion of the land to cover 
the debt. In other cases, the Mexicans were simply pushed out through 
force.117 On top of this, dozens of Mexicans were killed by gangs of white 
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settlers on, for example, the San Antonio-Goliad highway where they 
worked transporting freight, with the state unwilling to arrest anyone. 
The incorporation of Texas into the American Empire also spurred 
debate regarding slavery, race, and empire. As one commentator put it, 
the “Addition of slave territory at the south-west has been our ‘Course of 
Empire.’”118 Thus, 
The American race was planted in the western world not merely to 
clear forests, dig canals, construct railroads, plant cotton, grow sugar 
and amass wealth. For higher and nobler objects were, we fondly 
hope, the foundations of this vast empire laid. To hold up to the 
world the spectacle of a great, free self-governed country, bearing for 
its motto equality and justice, a refuge for the oppressed of the old 
world, a warning to tyrants, and an incitement for the brave and good 
of every age.119 
For those opposing expansion, “Who will wish again to curtail the limits 
of this great republican empire, and again to dismember the glorious 
valley of the West?”120
Some of those opposed to slavery saw the incorporation of Texas 
into the United States as being fundamentally about the perpetuation of 
slavery. Benjamin Lundy, for instance, said:
It is susceptible of the clearest demonstration, that the immediate cause, 
and the leading object of this contest, originated in a settled design, 
among the slaveholders of this country, (with land speculators and 
slave-traders,) to wrest the large and valuable territory of Texas from the 
Mexican Republic, in order to re-establish the SYSTEM OF SLAVERY; 
to open a vast and profitable SLAVE MARKET therein; and ultimately 
to annex it to the United States.121 
And another commentator said, “The veil is rent, and fortunately rent in 
time—Texas is to be annexed, for the sole and only object of perpetuat-
ing slavery.”122 Orville Dewey also wrote, 
What is the precise question before us? Not whether it is right to hold 
the slaves we have, but whether it is right to accept as a component part 
of our social and political State, another body of slaves. Not whether it 
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is right to adhere to a compact with regard to slavery already existing, 
but whether it is right to legalize slavery anew.123
The roots of the war itself were also seen in racial terms as “it was, 
thus, reserved for the Mexicans, whose blood is mixed with that of an 
Arab ancestry, to exhibit the spectacle of continual domestic broils, and, 
latterly of a positive warfare against a nation whose friendly hand was the 
first to summon them into the pale of national independence.”124 This 
contrasted with Americans as “such a country naturally attracted the 
attention of the people of the United States, numbers of whom are always 
ready, with the adventurous spirit that characterises our race, to seek 
new lands and improve their fortunes by emigrating from the crowded 
places of their birth.”125 In this regard, white Americans were to build a 
new, more racially pure empire as “it was left for the Anglo-American 
inhabitants of the Western Continent to furnish a new mode of enlarging 
the bounds of empire, by the more natural tendency and operation of the 
principles of their free government.”126 
Finally, it was said, 
That Texas would add much to the geographical perfection of this 
Republican Empire, is certain; that it is a great and valuable country 
no less true; that it is likely to consitute a part of this Union, at a future 
day, may easily be believed; but a little reflection will show, that its 
immediate annexation as a slave State, will of necessity and rapidly 
revolutionize the commercial condition of the present slave States, 
and tend to impoverish them.127 
This was on top of the more general ethnic cleansing of Texas away from 
native peoples, a war that lasted half a century until the Comanches and 
Kiowas were defeated in 1874–75. Overall, it was through this use of 
violence that white settlers could continue to flood into the state as the 
population boomed from tens of thousands in the 1830s to 160,000 by 
1845, and 600,000 on the eve of the Civil War.128
Slavery and yeomen in Texas
By the time of the Civil War, Texas was a society with capitalism on its 
way to becoming a capitalist society. While still very much a territory 
of yeomen, this class was increasingly pulled into market relations and, 
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at the same time, plantation capitalism spread from the lower south 
into Texas. 
By 1860, few whites lived beyond the eastern two-fifths of the state. 
And within this section of Texas, different settlement patterns shaped 
around different ecological conditions. Lowe and Campbell, for example, 
delineate four social-ecological zones. In the east, hilly uplands and mixed 
forests prevailed. On the southeast coast, rich alluvial soil predominated. 
West of this were more prairie and planes with less rainfall, and in the 
north was the drier and cooler region of prairie counties.129 And like 
elsewhere in the south, social relations and land prices formed around 
these ecological conditions. Along the coast and in the more fertile 
eastern regions, for example, most of the plantation slave population 
lived, whereas in the drier northern regions, yeomen predominated and 
slaveholding was much less common. 
In Texas about one-third of all farmers owned slaves on the verge 
of the Civil War, and within this only a small portion could consider 
themselves planters. For example, 11.2 percent of the farm population 
controlled over $10,000 in personal wealth, or 64.4 percent. And within 
that, 8 percent of the population controlled 55.1 percent of the wealth.130 
Texas plantation owners migrated primarily from the lower south, and 
went into the state in search of cheap land and profits generated from 
surplus value produced by black slaves. Most slaves likely immigrated 
with their owners, but some came in through the slave market. Cities 
such as Houston and Galveston, similar to cities in Louisiana, developed 
permanent slave marts and auctions, and a mayor of Galveston named 
J.P. Sydnor was even a commission merchant and auctioneer himself.131 
Slave life on a Texas plantation was no different from plantations 
throughout the south. Slaveowners acted to reproduce the value of their 
slave capital and profit from the labor of slaves through the management 
of the plantations. Slaves were seen as lazy, childlike, and in need of 
supervision. One plantation owner, for instance, on his instructions 
to overseers, wrote, “Negroes lack the motive of self-interest to make 
them careful & diligent, hence the necessity of great patience in the 
management of them.”132 In other words, slaves did not naturally act in 
their own self-interest to maximize their market conditions, as neoclas-
sical economic theory suggests all humans do, but had to be forced to 
understand self-interest through careful management and, if needed, 
the whip. Capitalist time discipline and work habits had to be imposed 
with violence. As elsewhere, slaves tried to build lives and families in 
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the conditions they were forced into. And class struggle also shaped the 
social relations on plantations as, if pushed too hard, slaves would fight 
back or flee. Most slaves were expected to work five and a half days per 
week, from sunrise to sunset. On some plantations slaves were given 
their own plots of land to garden, and even, with the master’s permission, 
allowed, in some cases, to sell their produce on the market.133 
Before the Civil War slavery in Texas was profitable and expanding. 
In 1846, Texas had 30,505 slaves. By 1860 that number was, according to 
tax roll data, 160,467, or 182,556 by census data. Even in the five years 
before the Civil War the slave population increased by 50 percent, as 
slavery was not a static or frozen system, but an expanding, dynamic 
one. Overall, between 1850 and 1860, the slave population increased by 
200 percent. It was also profitable. Through Texas’ slave era, the price 
continued to increase even as the population did; the average price rose 
from approximately $345 in 1843 to $765 by the start of the war. And 
it was not unusual for even small slaveowners to receive a 6 percent 
average return on their investment, with relatively higher rates tending 
to go to larger slaveowners; those with over fifty slaves averaged as much 
as 12.35 percent by 1860.134 
Slave productivity also tended to rise in this era, as larger amounts 
of relative surplus value were extracted from the energy of slaves. For 
example, between 1850 and 1860 productivity in the cotton industry 
(bales of cotton produced per slave) rose significantly, from 1.2 bales 
per slave to 2.52 bales, or 110 percent. This was also divided by scale, 
as smaller farmers averaged a 77 percent increase, and owners of 20–49 
slaves 141 percent.135 In general, slavery was a dynamic, productive, 
expanding mode of capitalist production, which would have continued 
to spread west had it not been for the Civil War. Slavery also persisted 
due to the lack of wage labor. “We have employed both slave and free 
labor, and are well satisfied that, where it can be procured, the latter 
is decidedly cheaper to the small farmer than the former. The only 
drawback is the extreme scarcity of the latter.”136
But, as noted, two-thirds of families did not own slaves. And even 
a portion of those who did owned very few. Thus, “during the whole 
antebellum era Texas was still a log cabin frontier.”137 Another early 
settler wrote of traveling across Texas and finding scattered settlements. 
In some cases, families combined their efforts to organize their travel 
and early communities, as for example, “on our arrival at the settlement 
we found five or six families … they were engaged in building cabins.”138 
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Not all came as families though, as the immigrant records soon after 
coming across several men: “none of them had any white family, Wilson 
had a few negroes.”139 Another commentator noted, 
it must be conceded that the most independent station in life is that of 
the man who is free from debt, and who owns the soil that he cultivates. 
Trade may desert a man, money may take to itself wings, and the most 
accomplished financier may fail: but the attentive farmer, on the rich 
lands of Texas, will indeed seldom, if ever, fail to produce a sufficiency 
to serve the purposes of his family.140 
And one advertiser suggested: “A competency may be easily acquired; 
and affluence is at the command of those who aspire to it. He who keeps 
his speculations within a laudable compass, cannot fail, ultimately, of 
rising to independence and wealth.”141 These settlers were also seen as 
inferior to the whiter whites back east, for instance, 
But it sometimes happens that a white man from the States, who has 
become some what decivilized, (to coin a word,) is substituted. The 
dress of these hunters is usually of deer-skin; hence the appropriate 
name of Leather Stocking. Their generic name, for they form a distinct 
class, is Frontiers-men.142
Early settlers lived in dog-run wood cabins (generally with two rooms 
connected by a covered corridor) and produced little beyond subsist-
ence. Mary Rabb, one of Austin’s original 300, provides a clear example 
of early white-settler life. She left with her husband and baby from 
Arkansas in October 1823, bringing along over a dozen cattle and six 
horses, although some of the animals did not survive the trip. With local 
help, John Rabb built a log house in a week, their first house in Texas. 
They began to work to clear the land, but after conflicts with natives, 
decided to look elsewhere. Later they settled near Bernard River, and 
built another house, growing corn, raising livestock, and living little 
beyond subsistence. As early as April 1826, Mary Rabb records her 
husband selling corn in Brazos, but, as was the case with the patriarchal 
household mode of life, the Rabbs practiced safety-first agriculture.143 
Mary Helm, whose husband founded Matagorda, Texas, in 1829, 
tells a similar story. What exchange did occur in this mode of living 
was not about profit, but taking care of basic needs. Helm records, for 
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example, trading five cows and calves for hewed logs they could use to 
build their home. She also notes that, with little money in circulation, 
cows served as a form of currency, with one cow and calf equaling about 
$10.144 Mathilda Wagner’s story, part of the German immigration, is 
also similar. Her family settled in Texas where the local men contrib-
uted their labor by constructing a two-room home. The division of labor 
was structured around kinship and gender with the community, more 
broadly, contributing to larger scale tasks such as raising a house. Her 
father cleared the land and farmed, while the women made clothes, 
prepared food, and did other household tasks. Practically everything was 
produced in the household. Wagner notes, for example, that there were 
shoemakers in Fredericksburg, but often yeomen and their families went 
barefoot or crafted their own shoes: most could not afford to purchase 
such a luxury.145 
While a small amount of sugar was produced in antebellum Texas, the 
primary crop Texan plantation owners grew for the market was cotton. 
Additionally, between 1850 and 1860 it appears that an increasing 
portion of farmers were producing cotton, suggesting that market inte-
gration was deepening, even for small farmers, in the decade before 
the Civil War. For instance, while in 1850 around three-quarters of 
the farm population grew no cotton, a decade later 60 percent did not. 
This suggests that, overall, Texans were increasingly participating in 
market activity. That being said, 90 percent of cotton was grown by that 
one-third of the population owning slaves, suggesting that, as throughout 
the south, plantation slavery was the vanguard of capitalism, and many 
yeomen farmers were yet to be dominated by the law of value.146 
By the middle of the 1800s visions of empire—whether it be one 
of capitalist slavery or patriarchal competency—drove white settlers 
across the southern section of North America. But as a different form 
of capitalism began to dominate in the north, and as the northwest and 
northeast deepened their economic relations, so different views as to the 
shape of empire began to take hold of the American imagination. And 
up until the eve of the Civil War it was not the weakness of slavery that 
was the issue at hand, as has been suggested, but its strength.147 Slavery 
was a dynamic, expanding form of capitalism that sought out more room 
to generate profits. And, as the next chapter will discuss, it was tensions 
over empire’s form that led to the Civil War. 
6
The Consolidation of  
American Capitalism
Up to this point, this book has charted a pathway of the uneven devel-
opment of American Empire gradually transforming from a society 
with capitalism into a capitalist society. It has traced an interpretation 
of this story by focusing on the histories of settlement and development 
in particular states. This chapter moves forward to attempt to locate the 
moments in which capitalism and expansion converged in space and 
time and deepened their relationship. This chapter, in this regard, moves 
to a broader level of abstraction to link the particular uneven history of 
development into a broader picture. I do so by arguing that the period 
from approximately the 1850s to 1870s was an era of the consolidation of 
American capitalism. To say that capitalism consolidated does not mean 
that the society emerging out of the Civil War and Reconstruction was 
“purely” capitalist. Rather, by consolidation I mean the national imperial 
order was remade in a way that essentially meant that capitalism would 
fundamentally dominate American society and, most significantly for 
the purposes of this book, expansion itself would be driven primarily by 
the power of capital. 
To present this argument, the chapter explores several main themes. 
First, it examines the extent to which, in a general sense, by 1860, the 
United States was becoming an increasingly capitalist country. Secondly, 
it looks at the relation between these developments and the origins of 
the Civil War. Here I argue that it was not a division between northern 
capitalism and southern non-capitalism that the war was rooted in, but 
competing pathways of capitalist imperialism: one in slave capitalist 
form, the other in an increasingly industrial capitalist form, linked with 
the northwest of the country’s agrarian and increasingly capitalist devel-
opment.1 It was, then, a war over the form the American frontier would 
take. Third, the chapter looks at Reconstruction. To answer the question: 
was the Civil War a bourgeois (or capitalist) revolution(?), it is necessary 
not to focus just on the causes of the war but, more importantly, the 
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results: how did the war, and the remaking of social and political 
relations across the country, set the basis for further capitalist develop-
ment? Finally, I end the chapter by looking at the new south, and the 
ways that it was restructured in order to fit into an expanding capitalist 
state dominated by the increasingly industrial capitalist north. 
Late-antebellum capitalism
Capitalism is a system of labor control. It is experienced personally, 
as workers labor under bosses who command them, and abstractly, as 
forces of price dictate what workers might, or might not, decide to spend 
their money on, and linked to a broader chain of valuation stretching 
to fluctuating abstract valuations on a global scale. Either way, the 
uniqueness of capitalist relations of production stems not simply from 
market relations, but the ways that social relations are organized and 
articulated through market relations. By 1860, these relations were 
coming to define the American north. While, as discussed, southern 
capitalist slavery continued to expand west, into Texas and elsewhere, in 
the north capitalism was both expanding and deepening, and taking on 
an increasingly industrial form. 
This is seen in the making of an American labor market. Between 
1800 and 1860, the percentage of wage workers as a part of the total labor 
force (the south included) rose from around 12 to 40 percent.2 At the 
same time, the population laboring in agriculture declined from perhaps 
75–83 to 52–55 percent, give or take, depending on the estimate.3 Thus, 
the antebellum era was also the epoch of the “initial proletarianization” of 
the United States.4 This trend continued after the war, with one estimate 
suggesting that by 1870 as many as 67 percent of American workers were 
fully market dependent laborers.5 
As Norman Ware discussed in the 1920s, and “new” labor historians 
would later emphasize, the making of the American working class was a 
story in which a rising capitalist system stripped workers of control of the 
means of production, and pressed upon them an alien capitalist force, in 
which new forms of abstract value production structured into, and ruled 
over, the practices of everyday life.6 Artisans spoke in terms of prices 
rather than wages; in other words, it was not their labor power that was 
valued but the products they produced.7 And “journeymen subscribed 
to traditional conceptions of social improvement. As late as midcentury, 
they spoke alternatively of achieving independence or securing compe-
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tencies, not of the constant accumulation of wealth.”8 Many early labor 
organizations, termed “associations” and “societies,” were reflective of 
the pressures of this social—capitalist—revolution as artisans organized 
to hold on to the rights they had to control their own labor against the 
rising pressures of an emerging capitalist order.9 
While journeyman strikes, called “turn outs,” occurred in the colonial 
period, the first continuous organization of wage workers appears to 
be the Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers which started in 
Philadelphia in 1794. And the first general trade union that brought 
different craftsworkers together seems to be the Mechanics’ Union of 
Trade Associations, also in Philadelphia.10 Using a type of labor theory 
of value, the association did not engage in union politics in the sense of 
battling over labor’s share of the profits, for example, but, “they thought 
of themselves as the real producers, in contrast to the emerging parasitic 
capitalists who neither toiled nor benefited society.”11 Many of these 
early labor organizations represented a response to the rising pressures 
of capitalism and the desire of workers to hold on to control over their 
labor and lives. Labor leader Thomas Skidmore, for example, criticized 
the rising capitalist order, arguing, “whoever looks at the world as it 
is now is, will see it divided into two distinct classes; proprietors and 
non-proprietors; those who own the world, and those who own no part 
of it.”12 For Skidmore, the solution was to redivide property so that “then 
will everyone understand that he has full liberty to use the materials of 
which, during his life-time, he is the master, in such a manner as, in his 
judgment, shall promote his own happiness.”13 Rather than a world of 
capital and labor, then, for Skidmore, among others, the ideal world to 
fight over, as workers of this era did, was one in which the worker was his 
own master (and, given the patriarchy of the time, perhaps also master 
of wife and children). 
As David Montgomery discusses, the desire of workers to control 
the organization of production continued through the industrial era. 
Workers in the Columbus Iron Works in Ohio, in the mid-1870s, for 
instance, organized their labor around a moral code in which “those 
who held fast to the carefully measured stint, despite the curses of their 
employers and the lure of higher earnings, depicted themselves as sober 
and trustworthy masters of their trades. Unlimited output led to slashed 
piece rates, irregular employment, drink, and debauchery, they argued.”14 
But over time, workers gradually lost control to capital, as bosses and 
managers organized the rhythms of labor, rather than workers. Thus, 
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to make a relatively reliable working class, capital had to remake the 
culture of labor.15 This also entailed a movement from “customary” to 
“industrial” time, in which workers’ habits and behaviors were strictly 
regulated by clocks, and labor was organized to maximize profit, rather 
than reproducing the “competency” of workers.16 
Along with the stripping away of workers’ control came increased 
dependence on market relations for every aspect of social reproduc-
tion. This occurred both rurally and in urban locations as the American 
population decreasingly produced its own means of social reproduc-
tion, and increasingly specialized in market production to purchase the 
necessities of daily life.17 For example, in the making of the middle class, 
patriarchal culture meant that new consumer standards developed to fit 
the emerging increasingly capitalist class and gender structure. In places 
like New England in the 1830s and 1840s a variety of changes occurred 
and “these include improved lighting, more on-the-road vehicles, greater 
segregation of sleeping from daytime living facilities, and elements of the 
parlor culture associated with the cult of domesticity—window curtains, 
wallpaper, carpets, clocks, musical instruments, sofas, heating stoves, 
and the like.”18 
The making of an American wage labor class was further developed 
by a large influx of immigrants. Through the late antebellum period 
immigrants continued to flood into the United States, including those 
fleeing the Irish potato famine and Germans following 1848. Between 
1845 and 1855, for example, about 3 million immigrants arrived.19 And 
as David Roediger, among others, famously discussed, Irish immigrants 
were often not considered white, but something closer to blacks as immi-
gration increased racial tensions and racial divisions within the working 
class.20 And just as early American industry, such as the Lowell factories, 
drew from women’s labor, so Irish women also became an important 
component of the American working class as, by 1855, perhaps more 
than half of American industrial textile workers were Irish women.21 
While in cities, capitalist development tended to consist of the gradual 
transformation of “artisans into workers,” as Laurie put it, in the coun-
tryside it took a different path.22 Social relations of production in the 
northern countryside, between the American Revolution and Civil War, 
gradually were remade from what Charles Post discusses as “indepen-
dent household-production” into “petty-commodity production.”23 
During the Revolutionary War itself, state governments and the military 
purchased supplies from yeomen farmers for high prices, increasingly 
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drawing them into market relations as farmers themselves borrowed 
from stores. Along with debts, higher taxes also pushed yeomen 
farmers to specialize more in market production. This increased market 
deepening was a slow process, though, and by the 1820s and 1830s 
perhaps 30 percent of farmers’ production in places such as the Ohio 
Valley was production for the market.24 But 
by 1860, north-western farmers were selling approximately 60% of 
their total yield, well over the 40% that usually marked the transition 
from “subsistence” to “commercial” agriculture. In other words, these 
farmers were marketing not only their “surplus” product, but a major 
proportion of their “necessary” product, necessitating the purchase of 
elements of their subsistence, and making them increasingly depen-
dent on the sale of commodities for their economic survival.25 
As Elizabeth Blackmar shows, credit relations and probate courts also 
deepened yeomen family market incorporation. Traditionally, social 
reproduction expanded as farmers owned land and upon their death dis-
tributed it customarily and legally to widows and heirs. The eldest son 
often got double the share, with younger sons getting outlying properties, 
widows gaining a portion of the property, and daughters getting a portion 
of the non-landed property.26 But a variety of complications arose, par-
ticularly because farmers often died in debt. Thus, “from the 1790s to 
the 1840s, the judiciary took charge of disciplining customary practices 
of probate. In the process, courts brought commercial reasoning and 
accounting into the affairs of households and communities accustomed 
to informal arrangements and personal prerogatives in managing family 
property.”27 Against the customary pattern of property distribution 
upon death, courts valued the property and settled with creditors. It also 
became more common for the land to be sold and the proceeds divided 
equally among heirs. And through mortgages, farmers’ estates were 
also incorporated into the financial system, deepening their integra-
tion into the more advanced eastern urban capitalism. Companies such 
as the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company and New York 
Life Insurance and Trust Company, beginning in the 1820s and 1830s, 
invested in mortgages and profited from interest, paying dividends to 
stockholders, as “such institutions in effect siphoned off a share of family 
property to corporate investors.”28 
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While deepened market integration and incorporation into eastern 
financial markets did not immediately transform the way production 
itself was organized for patriarchal yeomen households, it did provide 
a starting point for the remaking of these relations along increasingly 
capitalist lines. But over time, especially after the Civil War, the social 
reproduction of non-capitalist (or proto-capitalist) agrarian relations 
were increasingly outpaced by the development of capitalist agriculture. 
And to create a working class from below, of course, also meant the 
creation of a top layer; a capitalist class. By the 1850s the modern corporate 
institution began to take form. Of course, different capitalist institutional 
forms had been developed and practiced much earlier than this, from 
port merchants building up profitable networks stretching across the 
Atlantic to Almy & Brown that in 1790 began the first significant cotton 
mill in the country, to the Lowell factory system, and beyond.29 As state 
and capital shape each other’s forms so, as early as 1809 for Massachu-
setts and 1811 for New York, general acts to allow for manufacturing 
corporations were passed.30 The number of corporations per 100,000 
people rose from one to twenty-three from the late eighteenth century 
through the first twenty years of the nineteenth century as the United 
States started on its way to be the world’s original “corporate nation.”31 
And the United States continued on this path as, between 1845 and 1859, 
Louisiana, Iowa, New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, California, Michigan, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, and Oregon all 
passed general incorporation laws in their state constitutions.32 
The modern corporate form emerged most significantly through the 
railroad industry in the 1850s. Nationally, the miles of railroad tracks 
during this part of the “transportation revolution” increased from 8,879 
in 1850 to over 30,000 by 1860.33 Stretching across the landmass, railroad 
companies had to deal with practically countless details as companies 
used complex organizations of managers, assistant managers, super-
intendents and salaried workers, and so on. Each played a role in the 
large-scale division of management labor that constituted a central 
part of the modern corporate form further creating a division between 
ownership and control.34 The scale of these firms dwarfed previous 
textile mills, the most significant type of corporate form in the earlier era 
of American capital. For example, the scale of accounting dramatically 
increased. While textile mills might have four or five different types of 
accounts, companies such as the Pennsylvania Railroad had, in 1857, 144 
sets of accounts.35 
the consolidation of american capitalism . 167
The Civil War and southern modernity
As slavery expanded west in the south, and industrial capitalism increas-
ingly took root in the north, so political tensions shaped by social and 
economic conditions deepened leading to war. The causes of the Civil 
War itself are still debated to this day. Was it an “irrepressible conflict,” 
or unnecessary, caused by a “blundering generation”? To what extent was 
the war caused, socially, by two different forms of society—slavery and 
capitalism—in contrast to the contingency of politics? What roles did 
culture and ideology play?36
My goal here is not to definitively suggest any overarching causal 
account, as in the most general sense perhaps all that can be said is that 
the war was structured around shifting social and economic relations 
that were interpreted and triggered politically, resulting in secession 
and war. My aim here is simply to emphasize the extent to which the 
conflicts that led to the war were primarily conflicts over what to do with 
the expanding western space. It was not the existence of slavery in itself 
that the war was rooted in, but the expansion of slavery. As Eric Foner 
has suggested, “there was no purely economic reason why the North 
could not continue to coexist for many years with a slave-economy in 
the south.”37 After all, the “lords of the loom” and “lords of the lash” had 
co-existed in harmony for decades. What was at stake was whether or 
not western territory would allow for slavery or not; in other words, it 
was a conflict over the social order of the west and the right of slavery 
to expand. 
Explaining the war this way also means looking at it not as a battle 
between capitalist and slave modes of production, but of two increasingly 
“modern” forms of capitalism that pushed different imperial strategies 
and politics. To reiterate an earlier theme discussed, the slave south 
was not frozen in time nor a product of an earlier era, but a key part 
of capitalist modernity, and itself modern and capitalist. The argument 
that the south was not modern or productive emerged out of northern, 
Republican, abolitionist, and new south ideology.38 In many respects, it 
developed to view slavery and forced labor as less progressive than the 
emerging modern capitalist system, and in doing so functioned—as it 
does today—as a form of liberal ideology, which a historical material-
ist perspective that sees capitalist history as practically always organized 
around racial, class, and gendered violence can view more accurately. 
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As Brian Schoen summarizes, southern slave society was modern in a 
wide variety of ways. “The size and scope of larger operations, including 
the estimated 46,000 planters who in 1860 possessed upwards of twenty 
slaves, almost certainly approximated Northern factories or merchant 
houses more closely than urban artisan shops or family farms.”39 
Planters developed complex, scientifically managed systems of agricul-
ture organized around clock time; capitalist time discipline, and used 
techniques such as “overwork” (rewarding slaves who worked beyond 
the required time) to increase output; to suck more value out of their 
slave capital. They reacted to changing market conditions by altering 
their production, such as in the expansion of King Cotton. They fought 
for state policies to support their economic positions, such as tariffs 
for lower south sugar planters, or less tariffs, as in the case of cotton 
producers. They also invested in technologies such as steam exhaust 
vacuums to produce sugar, conveyer belts, thermometers, steam-driven 
thrashers, and so on besides, as discussed in an earlier chapter, investing 
in industry and more productive modified seeds.40 
That being said, there is no doubt that southern farmers, practicing 
shifting cultivation, tended to use and improve less land than northern-
ers. While planters in Virginia and South Carolina, for instance, typically 
cultivated one-third of their farmland at a time, northerners tended to 
cultivate half.41 While northern farmers might use land for fodder crops 
or clover, for example, after a regular cultivation period, southerners 
would let this land lay fallow. This occurred for a variety of reasons 
including more fertile, nutrient-rich and less acidic northern soils, a 
southern climate which made livestock more difficult to raise due to 
diseases, fodder crops had a more difficult time adjusting to the warmer 
southern climate, and fertilizers were less common.42 But some southern 
planters aimed to reform southern agriculture, perhaps the most well 
known being Virginian planter Edmund Ruffin. Reformers, publishing 
in a variety of trade journals, pushed for southern planters to move from 
shifting cultivation, use more fertilizers, advocated for state support 
to subsidize scientific agricultural developments, professorships, and 
geological surveys as, “in their calls for state action, reformers combined 
scientific reasoning, economic rationalism, and romantic imagery.”43 But 
reformers ultimately failed for one main reason: the reforms suggested 
were, from planter-capitalist perspectives, not clearly profitable. For 
example, fertilizer had to be shipped and was expensive to obtain, and it 
was not clearly profitable for planters to invest in this, particularly if they 
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could continue to profit through shifting cultivation. Overall, reform did 
not seem profitable enough to be adopted en masse. 
Another aspect of the south’s modernity was the rush to construct 
railroads in the 1850s. Of the total 22,000 new miles of railroad tracks 
built nationally in this decade, 8,300 miles were in the south.44 Much of 
this was in the western, expanding part of the south, linking the region 
together. Railroad companies were themselves modern capitalist corpo-
rations and regularly used and owned slaves; these companies employed 
over 10,000 slaves in the 1850s and particular companies owned slaves 
themselves. Companies tended to use both slave and Irish wage labor, in 
some cases giving wage workers the more dangerous parts of the job (after 
all, it was a more expendable, dismissible form of labor. What capitalist 
would want to risk their big investment in a slave, when temporary wage 
labor that could easily be replaced could be used for dangerous work?).45 
Railroad construction in the south also demonstrated the southern 
states’ interests in economic development. Much of southern railroad 
building was state-funded and southern states spent over $128 million 
building railroads.46 
The imperial road to the Civil War  
and birth of the Republican Party
Perhaps more than anything else, the political struggles that led to the 
Civil War were determined by competing pathways of imperialism. Both 
the north and the south were driven by expansionary social forces. Small 
farmers desired land while land speculators, railroad companies, and 
slave planters pushed to increase the space for profits. This was solidified 
by the ideology of Manifest Destiny and racism, used to purge the land 
of Native Americans and expand the frontier. 
Tensions over slavery were foreshadowed as early as the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 with the three-fifths compromise and 
Northwest Ordinance, and tensions over slavery were most substantially 
rekindled during the Missouri Crisis. The battle over Missouri was not 
a question of slavery itself, but slavery’s expansion. It was a conflict over 
the social form that the western part of the United States would take. It 
began when New York congressman James Tallmadge introduced two 
amendments to a bill that would allow Missouri to enter the Union. One 
banned new slaves from entering the state and the other said all slaves 
in Missouri born after the state was admitted would be free at the age 
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of 25. Initially, voting was sectionally split over the amendments. The 
amendment preventing new slaves from entering Missouri passed the 
House 87-76 with most northerners for it and most southerners against. 
And the other amendment passed 82-78, with most northerners for it 
and most southerners, again, against the measure. But the amendments 
went on to be defeated in the Senate, which had a higher proportion 
of southern representatives.47 The result, after much wrangling, was 
the so-called compromise in which slavery would be prohibited above 
36°30́  for future states entering the Union, Missouri would become a 
slave state, and Maine a free state. But this was not a compromise on 
which both parties agreed, so much as a strategically developed political 
move in which the bills were taken individually, rather than as a whole, 
in order to develop the support needed to pass them in total. First, when 
the Tallmadge amendments returned to the House, fourteen north-
erners in the House voted against it and four abstained, although most 
continued to support it. And 39 out of 76 southern congressmen in the 
House—and a higher proportion in the Senate—agreed to the banning 
of slavery above the compromise line.48 Thus, while a compromise, with 
many exceptions, was passed, overall the Missouri Crisis demonstrated a 
wide sectional division between north and south that would be rekindled 
several decades later as sectional politics developed into total war. 
Sectional tensions would also escalate in the Nullification Crisis. The 
crisis arose as South Carolina’s economic pressures—with 56,000 whites 
and 30,000 blacks leaving in the 1820s—came into conflict with northern 
industry’s push for higher tariffs. In 1828, the tariff on imported goods 
was raised to 50 percent. For South Carolinians, this meant that the 
north was pushing upon them a higher price for imported goods, while 
giving them nothing in return. And while tariffs were reduced to, on 
average, 25 percent in 1832, they remained as high as 50 percent on some 
key goods such as wool, cotton, and iron. As a result, the “Nullification” 
Convention in South Carolina declared the tariffs unconstitutional, 
not to be enforced in the state. Eventually, though, the Calhoun-Clay 
compromise in 1833 agreed to keep the 50 percent rates in place that 
year, and slowly lower them after at a rate of one-tenth until they would 
get to 20 percent in 1842. This passed with the Compromise Tariff and 
Force Bill on March 1, 1833, with the Force Bill adding the stipulation 
that the federal government could use force to prevent nullification in 
the future.49 
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This was followed by the Gag Rule controversy, the next significant 
sectional conflict. Northern abolitionists, still a small minority, decided 
to send anti-slavery propaganda to Congress, given that mailing south-
erners themselves did not seem a successful tactic. But for southerners 
like James Henry Hammond, even this seemed a threat and he petitioned 
on December 18, 1835 that the mail be gagged before even being taken 
in. Eventually, supported by Calhoun and others, gagging the mail alto-
gether failed to obtain support, and the result was the passing of Henry 
Pickney’s resolution which stated that abolitionist literature might be 
accepted in, but would immediately be tabled, and while some northern-
ers and southerners continued to protest, it passed the House 117-68.50 
While the Nullification Crisis and Gag Rule battles may have been 
debates more over slavery and sectionalism within the Union, soon 
another major debate arose over the future of expansion with the 
annexation of Texas. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, population 
expansion west continued to grow. Between 1830 and 1840 while the 
eastern seaboard population increased by 17 percent, the population 
of Trans-Appalachia grew by 73 percent.51 As discussed, some of this 
growth occurred into Texas, which became independent in 1836. 
Initially, Jackson delayed annexation due to both domestic and interna-
tional pressures. If annexed, opposition in the north might prevent his 
successor, Martin Van Buren, from winning the next election. He did not 
recognize Texas independence until his last day in office.52 Additionally, 
Mexico might desire revenge for the loss of Texas, and annexation could 
provoke war.53 Thus, the question of Texas annexation stayed open for 
nearly a decade.
But things changed due to the continued American desire to annex, 
along with Texas President Sam Houston’s own political maneuvers. 
By 1844, Whig President John Tyler, expansionist democrats in the 
south and midwest, and southern rights supporters continued to push 
annexation.54 At the same time, Houston began to look towards Britain 
as a solution to the Texas predicament.55 Houston, open to the idea of dis-
allowing slavery in Texas in return for British loans and support, traveled 
to London at the beginning of 1843 with the goal of using Britain to 
broker a peace with Mexico. From Houston’s perspective, the outcome 
could be either succeeding at this, or else forcing the United States to 
annex Texas to prevent British influence in the territory. Houston’s tactics 
succeeded and on April 12, 1844 Texas and the United States signed an 
annexation treaty, which was passed by the House on January 25, 1845 
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and the Senate on February 27, with a joint resolution passed the next 
day inviting Texas to formally become a part of the United States.56 At 
the same time, the pressures of democratic imperialism pushed for 
annexation. James K. Polk defeated Henry Clay in the 1844 election.57 
Polk’s platform was centered on the “re-annexation of Texas” and 
“re-occupation of Oregon.” Polk finally signed the official bill bringing 
Texas into the United States at the end of 1845, and in February of the 
next year Texas officially became part of the United States. Meanwhile, 
its population continued to expand, to 102,961 whites and 38,753 blacks 
by the first census in 1847.58 
Besides triggering a war with Mexico over disputed territory along the 
Rio Grande, the annexation of Texas also rekindled the issue of the form 
new parts of the American state would take. This was seen most sig-
nificantly with the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso. The proviso was 
introduced on August 8, 1846, and stated that slavery and involuntary 
servitude be outlawed in any territory received from Mexico. Although 
Congress expired before the bill could pass, it signaled American politics 
increasingly dividing along the geographical lines of north and south; 
those who voted in favor were primarily northerners, those against 
southerners.59 Overall—over the question of empire—sectional politics 
increasingly took shape. 
The debate over the politics of westward movement resulted in the 
so-called Compromise of 1850. It was “so-called” because, as David 
Potter points out, it was not a compromise all parties agreed to, so much 
as a series of bills which passed because each, on its own, had enough 
support. First, under Henry Clay’s leadership, an omnibus bill linking the 
elements of the compromise together failed. Next, Stephen A. Douglas 
picked up the pieces as 
where Clay depended upon the existence of a majority in favor of 
compromise, and hence lumped the several measures together ... 
Douglas was astute enough to recognize that there was no workable 
majority in favor of compromise. But there were strong sectional 
blocs, in some cases northern, in other southern, in favor of each of 
the measures separately, and there was a bloc in favor of compromise.60 
The final result of the bills was Texas becoming a slave state with the 
government taking over a substantial portion of Texas’ debts in return 
for Texas relinquishing its claims to New Mexico which became a 
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territory, California became a free state, Utah a territory, the slave trade 
in the District of Columbia was abolished, and the fugitive slave bill 
passed. With the exception of New Mexico, which received support from 
a significant portion of northern senators, each vote was passed along 
sectional lines.61 
Four years later the debate over the form American expansion would 
take—slave or non-slave—reemerged with “Bleeding Kansas” and, two 
years later, “Bloody Sumner.” On May 22, 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act was finalized with a “popular sovereignty” clause, meaning it would 
be up to the population of the states to decide whether slavery would be 
legal or not. The result was a small-scale civil war in Kansas. A month 
before the bill passed, Eli Thayer organized the Massachusetts Emigrant 
Aid Company to bring free settlers into the area. On the other side, on 
July 29, the Platte County Self-Defense Association formed in Missouri. 
These two organizations represented the tensions the act created. From 
the point of view of anti-slavery northerners, bringing Kansas in as a 
slave state would upset the Missouri Compromise. For slaveholders in 
Missouri, being trapped between non-slave states would threaten the 
stability of slavery in the state. 
The laws of the new territory qualified anyone in the territory who 
might be eligible (that is, white men) to vote. In response, pro-slavery 
Missourians flooded into Kansas to vote, and through an election 
with much ballot fraud, elected a pro-slavery legislature.62 The new 
government prevented those opposed to slavery from holding office, 
from criticizing slavery publicly, and sitting on juries on slavery-based 
cases.63 Soon after another government formed in the state. While the 
pro-slavery government sat in Lecompton passing the “Lecompton 
Constitution,” in Topeka another government formed attempting to 
outlaw slavery.64 Violence also broke out, perhaps most famously in 
the pro-slavery “Sack of Lawrence” and rebuttal in the Pottawatomie 
Massacre in which John Brown convinced seven others, including four 
sons, to travel to the cabins of several settlers, including Allen Wilkinson 
who was a member of the territorial legislature, and slaughter about half 
a dozen people.65 Violence also spread to Congress when, on May 22, 
1856, South Carolina representative Preston Brooks attacked and greatly 
injured Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in the Senate chamber.66
The Dread Scott decision and John Brown’s famous attack on Harpur’s 
Ferry further, famously, polarized north and south. The former stated 
both that blacks could not be citizens and the federal government did not 
174 . how america became capitalist
have jurisdiction to regulate slavery.67 And the latter, given the support 
Brown received from the north as a martyr, further deepened distrust 
between north and south.68 And more generally, by the late 1850s, while 
both abolitionists and sectionalists were radicals in their own societies, 
northern fear of “Slave Power” and southern fear of anti-slavery 
continued to increase as the politics of the country realigned around the 
slavery issue. 
Tensions would continue to escalate. In part, this was due to 
deepening economic connections and development within the north. 
On the one hand, right up until the war, a segment of northern capital 
supported concessions to the south to hold the Union together. Par-
ticularly, northeastern merchant capital had a stake in the profits of 
slavery, and many merchants, although not all, did not desire to see it 
abolished.69 New York capitalists such as Charles Morgan built their 
own personal empires of capital through shipments of slaves and the 
products they produced.70 On the other hand, though, increasingly the 
northern midwest and northeast came together as a regional economic 
bloc. Canals and railroads linked states like Ohio and Illinois—and 
cities such as Cincinnati and Chicago—with the northeast, the midwest 
producing grains and livestock in exchange for northeastern industry. 
This emerging economy clamored for more improvements, but when 
Polk vetoed the Harbor and River Bill in 1847, thousands—perhaps tens 
of thousands—of people met in Chicago for the Northwestern Rivers 
and Harbors Convention in July of that year, as northerners increasingly 
saw their own economic development blocked by southern politicians.71 
Tensions also increased as southern politicians, initially half supportive, 
pushed against the Homestead Act (eventually passing in 1862 after the 
war began) and northerners and southerners fought over the route of a 
transcontinental railroad.72 
Finally, the birth of the Republican Party as an alliance of anti-slavery 
politicians further deepened the sectional divide. The party itself was the 
result of debates over the course of expansion. It emerged in the wake 
of the Kansas-Nebraska dispute and the collapse of the Whigs, bringing 
together a wide variety of different social groups with varied political 
interests, but all, to some degree, opposed to the expansion of slavery. 
As noted, 
the new party was an amalgam of many northern elements: Free 
Soilers, who were antislavery but also frequently anti-black; supporters 
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of the “American” or Know-Nothing Party, which was anti-immigrant 
and anti-Catholic; some remnants of the old Whigs; along with abo-
litionists, women’s rights advocates, and friends of temperance and 
other reform groups. They all agreed only that the south and slavery 
“must be contained.”73 
The idea of a “Republican” party emerged out of meetings called by 
the Free-Soil Party in early 1854. In February of that year, for example, 
Alvin E. Bovay wrote a letter to Horace Greeley, editor of the New York 
Tribune, proposing such a party. And by that summer, political conven-
tions in states such as Wisconsin and Michigan were beginning to use the 
idea of a Republican Party. At the same time, the Know-Nothing Party 
also emerged on an anti-immigrant platform, particularly in reaction to 
increased German and Irish Catholic immigration. By the time elections 
came in November of 1854, the political alignments of the north were 
highly complex. In Massachusetts, the Know-Nothings dominated, in 
Wisconsin and Michigan, the Republicans, elsewhere Fusionist parties 
sprang up. While it was clear that the Democrats had lost support in the 
north, as they increasingly became the sectional party of the south, it was 
not clear which party or parties would dominate the north in the coming 
years.74 Some Democrats became Republicans, as did some Whigs, 
Free-Soilers, and nativists, while other Whigs attempted to continue to 
hold their banner, but as Holt points out, they linked together through 
a, “lowest common denominator of opposition to southern whites and 
their northern Democratic allies, whom Republicans always portrayed 
as lackeys of and surrogates for the Slave Power.”75 Specifically, it was not 
just Slave Power, although, especially early on, Republicanism contained 
some abolitionist elements, but opposition to slavery’s expansion that 
united the Republican Party. 
Yet through the late 1850s up until the election of 1860, the Republican 
Party was not completely accepted as the leading party in the north. 
Other names such as the Union, Anti-Administration, Independent, or, 
most prominently, the People’s Party, were used, for example, in 1860, 
Lincoln was on a People’s Party, rather than Republican, ticket in New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania.76 And oddly enough, for the election which 
triggered secession, Lincoln, in part increasing his reputation through 
the 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas, was chosen as the candidate par-
ticularly because of his moderation. Possible candidates such as William 
Seward and Salmon P. Chase seemed too divisive within a divided party. 
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Lincoln, on the other hand, had a moderate but clear position on slavery 
(opposed to it in the long run, but not an abolitionist and viewed blacks 
as racially inferior to whites) and, “like a good politician, Lincoln had 
refrained from public comment on such diverse issues as temperance, 
nativism, and the Fugitive Slave Law.”77 
While the party represented a diversity of interests opposed to Slave 
Power, it also reflected the worldview of an increasingly capitalist society. 
Some Republicans may have maintained the idea, as Eric Foner famously 
discussed, that the Republican Party was the party of “free labor.”78 Thus, 
“for Republicans, ‘free labor’ meant labor with economic choices, with the 
opportunity to quit the wage-earning class. A man who remained all his 
life dependent on wages for his livelihood appeared almost as unfree as 
the southern slave.”79 But views on labor and capitalism in the party may 
have been more of a spectrum than this alone. While some Republicans, 
Lincoln himself included, may have had a definition of free labor as Foner 
suggests, other Republicans, including some supporting the Homestead 
Act, were more uncomfortable with wage labor, even if temporary, while 
others increasingly defined American “freedom” as the ability to labor 
for a wage: that wage labor and free labor were compatible, if not the 
same thing.80 Nevertheless, some Republicans increasingly developed an 
ideology that, with variation, accepted capitalism as American freedom, 
fundamentally different from the earlier view of American freedom as 
freedom from dependence, including wage labor. 
Southern imperialism and the road to war
In many respects, the election of James Buchanan was a last desperate 
attempt to hold together the conflicting paths of imperialism within the 
expanding United States that led to the Civil War. As William Freehling 
put it, “Buchanan was a northern man with southern principles, if one 
means a Border North man with Border South principles.”81 He grew up 
on the edge of Pennsylvania, 10 miles from Maryland, and his politics 
reflected a borderland mentality. For example, in 1834 he bought two 
female slaves ages 5 and 22. Immediately he signed papers to manumit 
the older one in seven years and the younger one in twenty-three years. 
In the meantime, they would serve as household servants. His politics 
reflected these types of borderland relations. Thus, he stood as the 
Democratic candidate due to his position as a moderator, whose main 
platform was saving the Union.82 
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Buchanan was also an ardent imperialist during an era in which 
public opinion was shaped around an ideology of democratic imperial-
ism. To be elected president during this era one had to be an imperialist. 
Buchanan—the great expansionist James K. Polk’s Secretary of State—
was such a person. While not supportive of unconditional expansion—he 
believed that it needed to be done through legal methods, rather than 
strictly aggressive violence—in his personal records in 1859, for example, 
he wrote that it was “the destiny of our own race to people and assimilate 
to themselves the whole of North America before the close of the present 
century.”83 Buchanan, then, was a supporter of the racialized imperial-
ism of his time, and his politics reflected this. And as an advocate of 
the Monroe Doctrine, among other things, throughout his adminis-
tration he pushed for Congress to grant him the right to use force to 
hold transit routes throughout Central America, and against natives and 
Mexicans in the southwestern border, although Congress prevented him 
from sending troops across the border. He also pushed to acquire more 
of Mexico, including Baja, northern Chihuahua, and Sonora, and sent 
agents to attempt to acquire Cuba from the Spanish. Congress also gave 
Buchanan funds to attack Paraguay in reaction to Paraguay attacking a 
US steamer in the country on a scientific exploration, the Water Witch, 
and pushed for an “open door” policy towards China in which the United 
States would have an equal stake with the European imperial powers.84 
While Buchanan was a relative moderate, other southerners pushed 
for imperialism as a solution to increased tension and sectionalism. 
In particular, it was seen as the destiny of the United States to acquire 
islands in the Caribbean and territory in Central America. To attempt 
to turn this imperial dream into reality, several filibusters developed. As 
both Polk and Buchanan failed to buy Cuba from the Spanish, others 
began to believe a war of conquest would solve the issue. Most promi-
nently, Narciso López led several filibuster expeditions to conquer Cuba. 
While initially receiving much support from exiled Cubans in New 
York City, he eventually looked to the south for support following an 
initial attempt in 1849 that was stopped by US officials. Receiving help 
from southerners including cotton capitalist and former US Senator 
John Henderson, López made another attempt the following year with 
an army of 600, mostly Americans. They made it to Cuba, but failed 
to generate support locally for the filibuster, and retreated back to the 
Key West, barely dodging Spanish and American authorities. Finally, 
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López again made it to Cuba in 1851 with 400 troops, but this time was 
defeated and killed.85 
The movement for Cuba continued, its next major filibustering attempt 
led by John Quitman, New York born-turned southern plantation owner, 
military man, and politician. As Robert May puts it, “to Quitman, annex-
ation of Cuba was a means of strengthening the South and states’ rights 
within the union, given the unwillingness of the southern states to secede 
in 1850.”86 Quitman was an ardent imperialist who saw expansion as a 
way to preserve the slave structure (through the ideological lens of “states 
rights”) of the south. In 1854, Quitman obtained support from Cuban 
exiles in New York, who previously supported López, and they agreed 
to sell bonds up to a total of $800,000 to fund the mission; in effect, 
trying to get support for capital with the idea that expansion would be 
profitable. Quitman also received support from the south as southern 
soldiers volunteered to participate in imperialism as a way to prove 
their manhood. But Quitman failed for a variety of reasons. For one, the 
federal government’s non-support for filibustering made it difficult to 
obtain funds, and investors could not be sure that expansion was prof-
itable, and some even began to ask for their money back by late 1854. 
After much pressure, Quitman resigned as leader of the Junta on April 
20, 1855. The Pierce Administration continued to attempt to persuade 
Spain to sell Cuba, but it became increasingly difficult after the “Ostend 
Manifesto,” which implied that the United States might pursue war 
against Spain if the Spanish did not sell, further spoiled this possibility.87 
The final major attempt to expand the American frontier south was led 
by William Walker of Tennessee. Within the growing American country, 
Nicaragua was increasingly seen as a route to California, where the gold 
rush had taken off, as dreams of personal capitalist empires coalesced 
with dreams of continental conquest. Cornelius Vanderbilt, in particular, 
obtained a contract from Nicaragua in 1851 for his Accessory Transit 
Company to transport people across the country. In this sense, the 
battle between Vanderbilt and Walker that developed was a battle over 
the form of expansion. While Vanderbilt preferred informal empire—
securing economic profits through deals with other “formally” sovereign 
states—Walker preferred the formal empire of conquest. And when one 
struggling side of a civil war in Nicaragua invited Americans to support 
them, Walker saw his chance. Walker and his men made their way from 
San Francisco Bay to Nicaragua and soon after he became President of 
Nicaragua, although deposed in 1857. Walker received much support 
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from the American south, legalized slavery within the country (in part to 
obtain this), and his minister to the United States, Padre Vigil, was even 
recognized as legitimate by President Pierce.88
In 1860, Walker was killed in Honduras as he made another attempt to 
expand the southern part of the United States. And with Lincoln’s election 
that year, and the secession of the lower south, led by South Carolina, 
followed by the upper south after the attack on Fort Sumter (but never 
the border states of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware), the 
attempt to use imperialism to save southern slavery ultimately failed.89 In 
fact, the only truly successful case of 1850s southern border expansion 
was the Gadsden Purchase in 1854, in which a part of Mexico in present 
day Arizona and New Mexico was purchased by capitalist James Gadsden 
who dreamed of a southern route for a transcontinental railroad.90 
Economics of the Civil War in the north  
and remaking of the American state
The war itself is sometimes considered the first industrialized “total war,” 
resulting in the deaths of 600,000–750,000 people, depending on the 
estimate. And it resulted in the abolition of southern formal slavery.91 It 
also gave the Republican Party unprecedented power to consolidate and 
remake the laws and social relations of the country. If the Civil War was 
a “bourgeois revolution,” it was so precisely because of the ways politics 
and power were reshaped during the war and after in the era of Recon-
struction and making of a “new south.” 
By 1860, the Republican Party, although still more of an alliance of 
different political groups than a cohesive institution, was increasingly 
both a party of expansion and capital. In the 1860 election, a phrase, 
“westward the star of empire takes its way” was used as a campaign 
slogan.92 Thus, the party that would go on to create a more centralized 
state during and after the war, protecting the interests of capital against 
labor, was also a party that embraced the idea of American Empire. 
Economically, much changed during the war. Decades ago economic 
historians debated the effects of the war upon the development of 
American capitalism.93 In a classic article by Thomas C. Cochran 
the author argued that, in fact, the war slowed economic growth and 
industrial development in the north. The rate of growth of the production 
of commodities such as pig-iron, copper production, railroads, and 
cotton textiles dramatically decreased during the war.94 Cochran’s con-
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clusions were further developed by, for instance, Saul Engelbourg who 
examined a wide variety of industries, including guns and ammunition 
and boots and textiles which, it might be thought, advanced during the 
war due to war production. In the small arms industry, for example, 
it seems that while the machine-based production of small arms with 
interchangeable parts continued, the industry itself was not revolu-
tionized. In some cases, even, to increase output and lower costs, less 
advanced industrial methods were used. Similarly, while the explosives 
industries grew, its largest company, Du Pont, increased output without 
expanding its overall number of employees, instead relying on overtime 
work. In other industries, there were more drastic changes, for example, 
wood paper increasingly replaced cotton paper and the wool industry 
grew. But even in the boot and shoe industry output per worker did not 
significantly increase during the war, as new, more efficient methods of 
production did not take off.95 
Within the north, though, during the war farmers increased their 
market integration and some took on more capitalistic production. 
For example, hay prices dramatically increased, and farmers reacted by 
selling hay on the market to the military. Additionally, farmers chopped 
down trees to sell firewood to the military. And as demand for wool for 
soldiers’ uniforms greatly increased, farmers raised more sheep. The eight 
leading wool producing states in the north, for example, increased their 
overall production of sheep from 22.5 million in 1860 to 28.6 million by 
the start of 1865 as wool prices increased during the war. The production 
of cattle and hogs decreased, for example, in Ohio from about 1.779 
million cattle and 1.918 million hogs in 1860 to 1.244 million cattle 
and 1.455 hogs in 1865. Agriculture became increasingly industrialized 
as the reaper and mower industries, already growing before the war, 
continued to expand; in 1860, there were seventy-three producers with 
a capitalization of $3,516, whereas in four years there were 187 plants 
with 60,000 workers and machines valued at $15 million.96 Overall, agri-
cultural production in the north grew in some ways and did not grow in 
others, but in general the war increased farmers’ economic integration 
into capitalism. 
But more importantly than the increasing or decreasing of output 
was the remaking of the American state to further the development of 
American capitalism. One part of this was the regulation of the working 
class and suppression of labor radicalism during the war. While, on the 
one hand, many workers, and particularly skilled artisans, filled with 
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national ambition to protect the Union, volunteered for the cause, on the 
other hand, for most workers the war was a disaster. Wages lagged behind 
prices, greenbacks created inflation, and taxation fell upon them.97 The 
result was increased labor militancy as strikes broke out across the 
Union. As a result, states passed anti-labor legislation. For example, 
Montgomery points out that laws around the coal fields of LaSalle 
Illinois, the “LaSalle Black Laws,” as they became known, were passed in 
a bipartisan manner, making it illegal to prevent a person from going to 
work, to organize against the lawful use of an owner’s property, and to 
enter a coal mine with the purpose of convincing others to strike. Other 
states proposed similar legislature, with Ohio passing a law preventing a 
person from stopping another from going to work.
And besides legislation, military violence was also used to control 
workers. When workers at R.P. Parrott Works, Cold Springs, New York, 
struck, martial law was declared and two army companies came to town, 
putting several labor leaders in prison. Similarly, in Pennsylvania 300 
soldiers, in addition to the sheriff ’s own army, put down a strike by 
workers in the Fall Brook Coal Company, only to later rehire the workers 
at half wages and an oath not to join a union. This was followed by leg-
islation allowing companies to evict employees from their company 
houses for going on strike. And most famously, after the state attempted 
to institute the draft in New York City in 1863, riots broke out which 
sprawled out to become race and class riots as whites murdered blacks 
they found and attacked and looted the homes of the wealthy.98 
With the Democrats out of the way and in wartime circumstances, 
the Republicans also remade the American state during the war in a way 
that, in the long run, created an infrastructure supportive of capitalist 
development. As one author puts it, 
they were the party of economic growth and development. They 
passed the laws that helped create the Gilded Age, an age symbolized 
not by Lincoln but by Ulysses Grant and his cronies, by bearded, 
overweight men in dark suits, smoking cigars at lavish banquets, 
eating ten-course meals while their minions crushed strikes, swindled 
farmers, and displaced workers. The Robber Barons threatened to 
eclipse the railsplitter.99 
For example, Jay Cooke used the war to become one of the country’s 
leading capitalists. Cooke and his team sold over $1.5 billion in war bonds 
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over the course of the war, as Cooke made a hefty profit for himself while 
developing personal relationships with the Republican leadership.100 
A Union monetary system was also created during the war. Before the 
war, banks issued their own currencies, based on their ability to honor 
the paper in circulation. With the Legal Tender Act that became law on 
February 25, 1862, the Union now had a national currency: greenbacks. 
And the first National Banking Act of 1863 (other national banking acts 
were also passed in the following years), while not outlawing individual 
banks from printing currency, made it increasingly difficult by requiring 
new banks to put one-third of their capital stock into union bonds, in 
return for a national currency that was redeemable in greenbacks or 
specie. Additionally, taxes were placed on banks’ own currencies to 
discourage the use of independent bank currencies instead of union 
currency. 
The Morrill Tariff Bill, initially introduced in 1860 but shot down in 
the Senate, became law on March 2, 1861 after southern senators left 
the government during the war. The Republicans dominated the north, 
and with southern Democrats no longer in their way, also greatly raised 
tariffs to protect domestic industry. The first national taxation system 
was also put in place after, in March 1862, a bill was passed imposing a 
3 percent tax on domestic manufactures and created a new institution—
the Internal Revenue Bureau—to enforce collection. By 1864, domestic 
taxes were seen as a legitimate instrument of government, and income 
taxes were passed in which incomes of $600 to $5,000 were taxed at 5 
percent, $5,000 to $10,000 at 7.5 percent, and over $10,000 at 10 percent. 
In addition to currency, taxes, and tariffs, the earlier much debated 
Homestead Act was also passed in 1862, along with the creation of a 
Department of Agriculture, Land Grant College Act, and 1864 Immigrant 
Act to promote workers to come to the north.101 The Homestead Act 
was supposed to offer any eligible citizen over the age of 21 up to 160 
acres of public land, but in fact, in conjunction with other land acts, was, 
at best, moderately successful. It has been estimated that from 1860 to 
1900, perhaps 400,000 families obtained land with the act which they 
kept.102 For one, it was not easy for workers without agricultural skills 
to suddenly live off the land. At the same time, the continued expansion 
of “the west” provided a great space for speculators to acquire large 
amounts of land, as expansion and profit shaped the west. And other 
acts also prevented the previous pattern of the expansion of the patriar-
chal household mode of production, most significantly railroad grants; 
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from the antebellum period up through 1900, about 183 million acres 
were given as grants to railroad companies.103 Overall, land policies put 
in place did more to allow capital to develop the west after 1860 than 
they did to continue the earlier tradition of the not-entirely-but-partly 
self-sufficient farm household. 
James McPherson has suggested that “as for [the Republicans] 
becoming the ‘party of big business,’ that too may require some modifi-
cation. Republicans could not have won all the elections they did in the 
North without support from many workers and farmers, who after all 
vastly outnumbered the Robber Barons.”104 But Republicans becoming 
the party of capital does not just mean they controlled the state: after 
all, the state is not simply an “instrument” to be wielded by one class 
over another, so much as a class space structured around capital’s legal 
dominance backed by police force. In this case, the hegemony of the 
Republican Party and creation of a deeper and more expansive “relatively 
autonomous” state during the war produced a structure in which capital 
accumulation could expand after the war.
Reconstruction and the consolidation of American capitalism
With the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, American 
society was revolutionized. No longer slaves, blacks were now legal 
citizens with the right to vote (although the right to vote could be limited 
through literacy tests, education tests, and property).105 Overall, though, 
the social order based around racialized slavery was fundamentally 
transformed. Ideas that seemed radical even a decade before suddenly 
became law. 
On the other hand, as generations of scholars have shown, for African 
Americans Reconstruction was, ultimately, a failure. Rather than 
liberating southern blacks, many of them found themselves, once again, 
working on plantations, this time as sharecroppers rather than slaves, but 
in conditions similar to slavery. And southern Democrat “redeemers” 
once again took control of southern states.106 By the end of the 1870s, the 
“retreat from Reconstruction” was complete.107 A “new” south was born 
in which blacks would remain in legal bondage, subject to “black codes” 
and the Jim Crow laws which remained in place for a century after the 
Civil War. 
Debates over why Reconstruction failed to do more for southern blacks 
have a long history, and covering the entire debate would be outside the 
184 . how america became capitalist
scope of this book. That being said, this section aims to emphasize the 
roles of capitalism and slavery in the retreat from Reconstruction. I want 
to suggest two important reasons why Reconstruction failed. First, in a 
sense, it was not a failure for northern Republicans. With the exception 
of the radical wing of the party, their aim was less to liberate blacks than 
to reestablish national capitalism and re-proletarianize slaves as workers. 
Secondly, imperialism remained a constant in American history, and 
American troops were brought from the south to the west as expansion 
took precedent over southern Reconstruction. In other words, Recon-
struction and its retreat set the basis for the consolidation of capitalism, 
at the expense of both black and Native American freedom and life. 
As Eric Fonor discusses in his magnum opus, the goal of northern-
ers was to create a free labor society in the south. But “as Northern 
investors understood the term, ‘free labor’ meant working for wages on 
plantations; to blacks it meant farming their own land, and living largely 
independent of the marketplace.”108 Without masters, former slaves who 
obtained land tended to become relatively self-sufficient farmers. In 
the well-known case of the Sea Islands, for instance, they destroyed the 
former property of their masters, and grew crops like corn and potatoes 
to feed themselves, but expressed little interest in growing cotton.109 
Elsewhere, similar stories prevailed. In Davis Bend in the Mississippi 
Valley, for example, existed “the largest laboratory in black economic 
independence.”110 Here, free blacks even went so far as to self-organize 
their own type of commodity production, producing cotton for the 
market and earning $160,000. 
But—as it continues to today—the fear of black independence sent 
shivers down the spines of most whites. And it was in this context that 
Reconstruction policies were organized. The central organization in this 
was the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, generally 
termed the Freedmen’s Bureau. The goal of the bureau was not to 
support black independence and autonomy, but remake the south in the 
image of northern free labor ideology. As Michael Fitzgerald puts it, “the 
Bureau’s basic policy was to induce planters and freedmen to sign annual 
labor contracts at standard rate of wages; the object was to school both 
planters and their ex-slaves in the ways of free labor while monitoring 
their outcome.”111 Initially, in 1865, the military pushed for blacks to 
return to plantations and kept in place racialized laws, such as making it 
illegal to travel without passes, which went along with the “black codes” 
southern states put in place, such as vagrancy laws, forcing blacks back 
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to plantations. The Freedmen’s Bureau continued these traditions, in 
many respects, as their goal became not land redistribution, “40 acres 
and a mule,” but returning blacks to plantations. This went along with 
the redistribution of land back to its original owners, half of which was 
returned by the middle of 1866, and more afterwards.112 
By the late 1860s, then, on the one hand, Reconstruction policies 
aimed to put black labor back in the hands of plantation owners and, 
on the other, blacks pushed against this system to obtain autonomy. The 
result of this racialized class struggle was the sharecropping system.113 
This prevailed on cotton plantations by the early 1870s, and remained 
the primary labor system on southern capitalist plantations for decades. 
Sharecropping itself also took different forms. Legally in states such 
as South Carolina, for example, technically sharecropping was a type 
of wage labor in which dispossessed working families obtained their 
means of survival by working for the landlord who essentially owned 
the means of production, and were paid an indirect wage in the form of 
a share of the production.114 Under sharecropping, farmers, owning no 
implements, rented equipment, land, and often houses, from plantation 
owners. In return they were required to give generally one-half of their 
production (in some cases one-third or one-quarter) to the capitalist. 
By contrast, tenant farmers technically rented the land in return for a 
portion of their crop or a cash rent.115 That being said, as Edward Royce 
notes, “however clearly established in law, the distinction between share-
cropping and tenancy tended to break down in practice; this distinction, 
furthermore, was not clearly recognized or acted upon by landlords and 
laborers.”116 And not all ex-slaves became sharecroppers.117 Some became 
wage laborers, in which a very small proportion were able to obtain 
their own land, albeit often times in less fertile regions. Nevertheless, 
overall, sharecropping became the predominant form of agricultural life 
replacing the old south slave system. Sharecropping, in the general sense 
of free ex-slaves lacking access to their basic means of survival, were 
forced into variations of the sharecropping system which replaced the 
plantation south. And as Aiken discusses, this was part of the broader 
“resubjection of blacks” as an entire legal structure was put in place to 
control black labor for the profits of southern capital. This included 
passing lien laws to fortify the sharecropping and tenancy systems and 
laws preventing blacks from voting, for example, by 1910 less than 10 
percent of southern blacks registered to vote.118 And this, was, of course 
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driven by violence against blacks, seen more prominently with the rise 
of the Ku Klux Klan. 
This also raises a question as to the extent to which the new south 
was “capitalist” or not. On the one hand, it seems that sharecropping 
may have been a step backward for capitalism. Former slaves regained 
some of their dignity and control over their own lives by working for 
themselves as sharecroppers rather than slaves (although in some cases 
sharecroppers remained directly supervised by landowners). Their 
control over their own means of production was greater than previously. 
On the other hand, they remained formally subsumed to the power of 
capital. Under the credit lien system which prevailed, croppers were 
indebted to merchants and landowners (who themselves were often 
in debt) or in some cases merchant-landowners, thus had to focus on 
for-market commodity production so that someone else would profit 
from their labor. And this led to, for example, an explosion of credit 
rating agencies in the postbellum era.119 Thus, while it might be tempting 
to say sharecropping was not really “capitalist,” I might suggest it was, 
in the sense that dispossessed former slaves who asserted their power 
against becoming simply wage laborers still remained subordinated to 
capitalists under whom they labored so that the latter could profit. 
William Gillette, in Retreat from Reconstruction, saw the period 
as, primarily, a political failure. A divided, relatively weak northern 
Republican government, along with a decentralized political tradition, 
reinforced with rampant racism, blocked Reconstruction from going 
further.120 But framing the Reconstruction’s retreat simply in terms of 
politics and race misses the important question of capitalism. Du Bois 
saw this eighty years ago, arguing:
this control of super-capital and big business was being developed 
during the ten years of Southern Reconstruction and was dependent 
and consequent upon the failure of democracy in the South, just as it 
fattened upon the perversion of democracy in the North. And when 
once the control of industry by big business was certain through con-
solidation and manipulation that included both North and South, big 
business shamelessly deserted, not only the Negro, but the cause of 
democracy; not only in the South, but in the North.121 
In this sense, when asking whether Reconstruction failed, the question 
is: for whom? For the white American north, Reconstruction was, apart 
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from radicals and abolitionists, not a failure. Their goal was to develop 
and expand American capitalism, and in this sense, Reconstruction was 
as successful as it needed to be. As Richardson has put it, “Northerners 
wanted the South to develop an economic system that was compatible 
with the North quickly so that the nation could boom.”122 This meant 
viewing former slaves as “good workers” and potential free wage 
laborers (as wage labor became increasingly defined as compatible with 
American freedom). And for some northern capitalists, concerned with 
profits rather than equality, the post-war south was seen as a space to 
invest their capital. In particular, the ecology of the south was seen as 
potentially exploitable by northern capitalism as, in the 1870s, northern 
capital went south. Woodward notes, for example, a northern congress-
man who purchased 111,188 acres in Louisiana, Chicago capitalists 
who purchased 195,804 acres, a Michigan company for land brokers 
that purchased close to 700,000 acres, a capitalist in Grand Rapids who 
bought 126,238 acres, and so on. Overall, forty-one northern groups 
purchased 1,370,332 acres in Louisiana alone.123 
But it was not just the Republican Party that transformed. In the 
elections of 1868 the Democratic Party campaigned with the slogan “new 
departure,” as they also became a party of capital in its post-war form. 
Northeastern American capital, for example, had always been somewhat 
reluctant to embrace the cause of the north as they had a long history 
of profiting from the slave trade and its products, most significantly 
cotton which went in northeastern ships to England.124 At the same time, 
while some southern capitalists found their fortunes destroyed by the 
war, many southern planters reestablished themselves as Reconstruction 
and Andrew Johnson’s pardons restored their property.125 For capital, 
the politics of north and south were less important than the politics of 
profit, and, like the Republican Party, Democrats shifted accordingly. 
As Camejo puts it, “the Democratic Party was becoming an alternate 
expression of the same class interests as the Republicans.”126 By the 1872 
elections, the Democrats ran with the slogan “acceptance of the results 
of the war,” against the corruption and radicalism within the Republican 
Party. They also supported Liberal Republican, rather than traditionally 
Democratic candidates, as many previously Republican members split 
with the party in 1872, opposed to Ulysses Grant’s perceived corruption 
and found themselves fusing with the Democrats, including Charles 
Sumner, Horace Greeley, George W. Julian, and Lyman Trumbull. In 
1876, for example, the Democrats ran Samuel J. Tilden, a New York 
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lawyer, for president, signifying the extent to which the parties were no 
longer sectional, but variations of a party of national capitalism.127 
For the most part, then, the period after the Civil War might be 
thought of less as the failure of Reconstruction than as the success of 
racialized capitalism. While the economy and culture of the south would 
continue to be shaped by the legacy of slavery—as it is to this day—and 
the “new” south remained relatively economically weak compared to 
the north, overall the Civil War and Reconstruction successfully further 
established the hegemony of American capitalism. The final phase of 
continental empire building was to be forged, principally, by the power 
of capital. 
Conclusion:  
Capital and the Conquest of Space
By the 1870s, from the standpoint of capital, the west was a vast garden 
ripe for exploitation. And the extraction of western natural resources, 
along with the creation of the nation’s breadbasket, would also provide 
the United States with the capacity to propel itself further on to the 
world stage. Unlike previous eras of expansion, which were comprised 
of more complex articulations between capitalist and not-so-capitalist 
social relations, the incorporation of the great and far west was primarily 
driven by the forces of capital. This was not just a national capitalist 
project though. From British capital investing into the burgeoning 
railroad industry to Chinese workers digging in the mines of California, 
the making of the capitalist west was a globalized process. 
David Harvey defines the uniqueness of capitalist imperialism as “a 
contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire.’”1 For capitalists, 
territory and political power are not so much important beyond the sense 
that they encourage capital accumulation through time and space. For 
politicians, augmenting state power against other states and questions 
of territory are central. While this distinction may risk underplaying the 
extent to which capital and state are not separate, but tend to be merged 
(as often the same people running the state are the capitalist elite), by 
the era of Reconstruction, in the United States, the politics of state 
and expansion, and the logic of capital’s growth were, essentially, fully 
merged. Space itself would be territorially incorporated into empire to 
generate profit. Of course, capitalism is never “pure,” and the Homestead 
Act did allow for the continuation, to a limited degree, of independent 
household production, but overall, this became increasingly secondary 
in relation to the political economic dominance of capital. 
The continued opening of the west after the Civil War created a vast 
space for capital accumulation.2 As William Robbins discusses in what 
remains the most significant work that links imperialism and capitalism 
in the west, by the 1870s, expansion was no longer about pioneers and 
small farms, but capital and industry. As he argues, “to a significant 
degree, then, the emerging western industrial program was an extension 
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of capitalist relations in eastern North America and in Europe where 
surpluses had accumulated.”3 Central to this was the rise of Chicago as 
the nodal point between east and west. By mid-century it appeared that 
all roads led through Chicago to New York City and back again. And as 
New York’s rise came from its commercial orientation from the start, 
so Chicago was very much started as a capitalist project. As William 
Cronon discusses in his definitive study, early Chicago development was 
a product of the speculative mania of the 1830s that culminated in the 
panic of 1837. As the US government “removed” native populations in 
the region by 1833, so capitalists who viewed western space as a land of 
profit flooded into Chicago.4 The state also played a key role in trans-
forming Chicago into the empire’s western thoroughfare by organizing 
and investing in internal improvements. Following the lead of the Erie 
Canal, first, the legislature supported the construction of the Illinois and 
Michigan Canal. Secondly, it established a Board of Fund Commission-
ers and a Board of Public Works along with an internal improvement 
fund. As the harbor was dredged and roads and railroads were built, so 
the state played a key role in developing capitalism in Chicago.5
By 1836, Chicago is reported to have exported a total of $1,000.64 
worth of goods from its port. By 1840 that number was $328,635.74.6 By 
the mid-1850s Chicago was said to be perhaps the world’s largest grain 
port, with total exports for the year 1855 as high as 12,902,310 bushels of 
grain and with over 100,000 hogs packed and 23,691 cattle slaughtered 
as the meatpacking industry formed. By this year the population had 
risen from 12,088 in 1845 to 83,509 a decade later.7
As Chicago arose as a trade and manufacturing center of power, so 
elsewhere in the capitalist west mining and agribusiness took off. The 
government additionally paved the way as the American state also began 
to develop more of an interest in incorporating the west as a space for 
capital accumulation. In the 1850s, for example, the US Army Corps of 
Topographical Engineers conducted large railroad surveys, and surveys 
continued after the war with the government sponsoring Clarence King, 
Ferdinand V. Hayden, George M. Wheeler, and John Wesley to further 
survey the west. These surveys, and the eventual establishment of the 
US Geological Survey, opened the way for capital by locating the poten-
tially profitable geography of the west.8 This was explicit as shown, for 
example, in the introduction to the 1871 annual report of the Commis-
sioner of Mining Statistics which states the report is “likely to be of use 
to miners, metallurgists, capitalists, and legislators.”9 Thus, the state-led 
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sciences of mapping, statistics, and so on became central to providing 
investors with key information to make the west profitable. This went 
hand-in-hand with a renewed interest in the study of geography itself, 
as concerns over mapping and controlling space and territory to subject 
them to capital’s will became of greater concern both for mining and 
agriculture.10
States such as Colorado also rapidly developed due to the mining 
industry. Incorporated as a territory in 1861, by 1863 the population was 
estimated to be 45,000 settlers along with 15,000 Native Americans.11 
Capital in search of profits and workers in search of higher wages flooded 
in, as by the late 1870s it was suggested that over 60,000 mines had been 
discovered. Additionally, soon after agriculture began to take off; in 
1877, the state exported about $9 million worth of gold, silver, copper, 
and coal and perhaps 1.5 million head of livestock and 1,750,000 bushels 
of wheat, among other commodities.12 Colorado’s capitalist development 
was also a broad-scale process as Denver quickly became the territory’s 
main commercial center and by the late 1860s, 400 Chinese laborers 
were even recorded to have been imported.13 Montana’s history tells a 
similar story. While some settlers may have come as homesteaders, many 
came for the mines. It was estimated that $600,000 worth of precious 
metals were exported in 1862 alone, and by 1878 that number was 
$5,867,000.14 Similarly, in the 1870s prospectors began to flood into the 
Black Hills of Dakota as the native Sioux were pushed out of the region. 
Cities such as Deadwood sprung up, driven by the mania for gold and 
minerals. Mining companies from California and Colorado came in and 
developed towns fundamentally based around mining as early sorts of 
company towns formed. The Homestake Mining Company, for example, 
was one of many corporations incorporated (in this case in California 
in 1877) to explore the riches of the Black Hills. With a capital stock of 
$10 million divided into 100,000 shares (a relatively common amount 
for these large investment projects)15 the company was soon processing 
thousands upon thousands of tons of ore and set up a machine shop, 
carpenter’s shop, offices, homes, and so on as settlement was strictly built 
in the name of capital. 
As extractive mining drove the capitalist west from Nevada’s 
Comstock Lode to Arizona copper and beyond (not to mention the 
California gold rush) so the midwest rose to become the breadbasket of 
the west. By the late 1870s, for instance, Nebraska was said to be “full in 
the pathway of empire, on the great highway of the nations.”16 While by 
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1870, 1,848,000 bushels of wheat were grown, in 1877 that number was 
8,759,319.17 While petty-commodity producing homesteaders came into 
the state, much land was also swallowed up by capital, particularly that 
near railroad lines. This land was farmed under contract at established 
rates for crops as speculators monopolized and profited from the land 
with easiest market access.18 And other commodities such as oats, rye, 
and so on along with corn have a similar story: “the total corn crop of 
Nebraska for 1877 was greater, by a good margin, than the combined 
corn crops of all New England, New York and New Jersey for 1876.”19 
Stock raising for profit also quickly developed as by this time 250,000 
cattle grazed in western Nebraska.20 And Omaha itself was in many ways 
started as a for-profit enterprise by William D. Brown who started the 
Lone Tree Ferry across the Missouri River in the spot where Omaha 
would grow.21 Brown then organized a variety of other investors to start 
the Council Bluffs and Nebraska Ferry Company in 1853. As treaties 
were made with the native peoples, including the Omahas themselves, 
the Ferry Company surveyed the land as capital directed frontier urban-
ization.22 Meanwhile in Kansas, for instance, one commentator wrote, 
“the American people are about, then, to inaugurate a new and immense 
order of industrial production—pastoral agriculture.”23 Throughout the 
great west, agriculture would develop at an industrial pace as it “filled 
its appropriate place in the general economy of our industrial empire.”24 
And the destiny of Kansas City was to be “one of the most substantial 
depots of this extensive empire.”25 While by 1875 the yearly dollar value of 
the combined production of major agricultural commodities for eleven 
combined states in the northeast amounted to around $383,421,397, for 
twelve combined western states it was around $715,824,075.26 
The development of California, perhaps more than anything else, is 
demonstrative of the consolidation of American capitalism. And perhaps 
the gold rush more than anything symbolizes the mid-century mania for 
riches. Following the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill at the end of the 
1840s, the population rose from 25,000 in 1848 to 865,000 in 1880.27 
Native populations were pushed out and in some cases themselves 
employed to mine for gold.28 Additionally, laborers came up from as 
far south as Chile and Peru and contracted out as far across the ocean 
as China as California developed through a global capitalist process.29 
And through this globalization San Francisco emerged as the central 
key point for the movements of commodities and labor across the state. 
Additionally, as in other cases, it was also quickly found that the soil—if 
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irrigation systems were put in place—was highly bountiful.30 Not only 
grains, but fruits grew in abundance as (along with Florida) California 
became the nation’s fruit basket.31
As Bruce Cumings puts it, “California agriculture differed dramati-
cally from the Jeffersonian ideal from the beginnings—in its industrial 
scope, its high-tech machines, and its employment of masses of cheaply 
paid labor in a milieu of rank exploitation.”32 From its relatively late 
development onward, always with an eye to the markets of the east, 
California developed into a capitalist powerhouse. As of 2016, for 
instance, California, ranked by GDP, was only topped by five countries.33 
California’s development, resulting in Hollywood and Silicon Valley, 
emerged not only from its ecological resources, but from its position at 
the western edge of the continental American Empire. It provided not 
only a powerful state economy, but a ledge from which American power 
could expand. 
In 1854 the Gadsden Purchase of the bottom part of Arizona and 
southwestern corner of New Mexico was the last piece of the continental 
empire the United States would acquire, not including “internal” colo-
nization through the continual dispossession of Native Americans. And 
it was the result, basically, of a capitalist process. Eastern capitalists had 
long been pushing for the construction of a transcontinental railroad 
and this dream was taken up by James Gadsden, President of the South 
Carolina Railroad Company.34 In an attempt to prevent revolution in 
Mexico, and desperately seeking funds, Santa Anna finally agreed to the 
treaty which provided Mexico with $10 million in return for the land.35
By 1870, the first transcontinental railroad had been completed, and 
three decades later five railroads ran across the continent. Railroads 
made the transportation of goods and peoples to incorporate the west 
into capitalism possible, and were a profitable industry in themselves. 
And a significant amount of capital came from Britain, as between 
the Civil War and First World War, 34 percent of Britain’s overseas 
portfolio investment went to the United States. Effectively, it was not 
just western-oriented companies building the railroads, but British 
capital, transferred to New York City banks, then flowing to the west that 
developed the western capitalist frontier.36 
Of course, as with the entire history of American expansion up to this 
point, there was one major obstacle to expansion: the fact that the land 
was populated by native peoples. During the Civil War itself southerners 
continued to see it as their own Manifest Destiny to continue expanding 
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west as, for example, from autumn 1861 to summer 1862, 2,700 soldiers 
transported thousands of animals, and, of course, themselves, west from 
Texas to New Mexico. And under Henry Silbey, in 1862 Texas troops 
traveled west to Glorieta Mesa, outside of Santa Fe, where they were 
attacked by soldiers from Colorado at the Battle of Glorieta Pass, after 
which they were forced to retreat.37 And under the leadership of Chris-
topher “Kit” Carson, Indian wars continued in the southeast against, 
among other tribes, Mescaleros and Navajos. After a campaign against 
the Navajos, for example, the natives were finally coerced to go to Bosque 
Redondo, New Mexico, and on their 300-mile march 300 were reported 
dead, 200 escaped, and several children stolen (as Hispanos and Pueblos 
appear to have raided them). And more generally, while 10,000 were 
said to have made the journey, only 8,000 arrived, their whereabouts 
unknown, whether enslaved, killed, or escaped.38 
Further north, wars with indigenous peoples also continued through 
the Civil War. The Sioux rose up against Americans in Minnesota in 
1862, and war with various native groups broke out again in 1864. Led by 
John Evans and John Chivington, American soldiers waged a campaign 
of cleansing against the Cheyenne in Colorado. At Sand Creek Village on 
November 29, 1864, while men were out hunting, 700 soldiers attacked, 
killing over 100 women and children. In response, Sioux, Cheyenne, and 
Arapaho attacked American stations and ranches in the era, triggering a 
broader war in the South Platte area.39 
After the Civil War the last wave of ethnic cleansing continued. From 
the Mexican-American War to 1892, according to the War Department, 
thirty-four wars were fought with natives, and between 1866 and 1876 
alone, 200 military engagements occurred.40 Among other figures 
Americans continue to glorify, in 1868 General Custer and his troops 
killed 103 indigenous people near the Washita River in Kansas, and, 
although it turned out that these were not hostile natives but friendly 
Cheyenne, he considered it a noble battle. And “Buffalo Bill,” William 
F. Cody, killed over 4,000 animals as, between 1872 and 1874, over 6 
million buffalo were killed in the great plains, mostly by whites, as the 
natives’ modes of production were destroyed.41 Yet today, figures such as 
these are memorialized as American heroes for paving the way for the 
expansion of the great white country.42 
The reservation system also became increasingly used after the 
Civil War. As natives were forced into reservations, and, in some cases, 
do-gooding whites set up native schools to supposedly “civilize” them, 
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they continued to lose their land. From 1881 to 1900, for example, 
the amount of land natives held went down from 155,632,312 acres 
to 77,865,373 acres. And finally, at the Battle of Wounded Knee, the 
indigenous peoples were, essentially, fully subordinated and defeated by 
the United States. The roots of the war went back to the discovery of gold 
in South Dakota’s Black Hills in the middle of the 1870s, after which, 
through a decade and a half of war, the natives were cleansed so that the 
whites could turn the land and resources into profits.43 
Imperialism ad infinitum
This book has examined the history of how the rise of capitalism trans-
formed the shape of American Empire over two and a half centuries. 
The narrative began with the international development of capitalism 
in Europe. It was through the formation of European capitalism and 
Europe’s globalizing links with the rest of the world that white-settler 
colonialism reached the shores of New England and Virginia. And, while 
in each case a joint-stock company provided the investment so potential 
settlers could realize their dreams, the social relations that developed 
in the early colonies differed drastically both from each other and were 
somewhat unique from the land the colonists came from. The forms 
these settlements took, then, went on to shape the pathways of empire 
in the north and south. From the submission of capitalist tendencies to 
the moral economy in the north, to the violence of slave capitalism in the 
south, the first colonies set the course of future empire. 
From here, the story moved west as the American settler population 
grew, fueled both by the expanded reproduction of colonial society and 
the continual influx of European immigrants and African slaves to the 
so-called New World. Of course the land that became the United States 
was far from unsettled. Although colonialists may have viewed the early 
western frontier as an empty space to conquer, the narrative told here has 
also discussed the ways this involved the dispossession and destruction of 
native populations who continually resisted the force of empire. And this 
powerful, complex social force also shaped, and was shaped by, the forms 
of racism and patriarchy that developed in the colony-into-independent 
empire. Expansion west was pushed by both the political economy of 
colonialism and by the reproduction of masculinity through “indepen-
dence” expressed through imperialism as, generally, the ever-expanding 
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frontier was built by white men who brought their families and slaves 
further and further west. 
The argument made here has also suggested that plantation slavery 
was central to the history of capitalism. In a sense, it was an especially 
powerful form of capitalism, as capitalists did not simply buy the 
temporary labor time of the wage laborer, but had total bodily control 
over the life of the unpaid, violently controlled slave. But I have also 
suggested that while plantations were essentially capitalist institutions, 
not all slavery was necessarily capitalist, as small farmers in some cases 
incorporated slaves into a patriarchal household mode of social repro-
duction, similar to the frontier yeomen of the north. 
Throughout the story the book has also emphasized the continual 
usage of the imagery of empire by Americans. Not only were white colo-
nialists building an empire, they were highly self-aware that they were 
as the term “empire” was regularly used to triumphantly describe the 
society they were creating. But while this language fell out of use by the 
latter part of the 1800s, particularly as “imperialism” became criticized 
publicly, by the end of the nineteenth century the United States was 
essentially a dominant capitalist empire, and ready to establish its place 
as the premier power in an increasingly capitalist global order. But in 
many ways this was only the beginning of the story of American Empire. 
The raw materials and resources made available by the spatial capitalist 
conquest of the west would allow the United States to propel itself to the 
world stage.44 By the end of the century, Hawaii would be incorporated 
into the empire as a result of American sugar planters taking control 
of the islands and overthrowing the indigenous government, and the 
Spanish-American War would further extend the grasp of America’s 
capitalist empire. And, to this day, the United States is setting its sights 
on the conquest and control of the next frontiers: cyberspace and 
outer-space.45 The end of the imperial vision is yet to be in sight. 
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